


WUNSCH 26

INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF PSYCHANALYSIS OF
THE FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELD

March 2026



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**« REINVENTING PSYCHOANALYSIS : A
SCHOOL TO ACTIVATE WITH
REPETITION, THE NEW »
INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM
SCHOOL MEETING
4 July 2025, Buenos Aires**

**« THE PASS : EXPERIENCE AND
TESTIMONIES »
EUROPEAN CONVENTION SCHOOL
MEETING OF EPFCL
12 July 2025, Venice**

EDITORIAL

*Dybalma N. Ávila-López
Secretary CIG 2025-2026 for America
Porto Rico*

With the same enthusiasm and joy with which, upon publication of the last issue of our International Newsletter, our colleagues from the previous CIG celebrated the first quarter century of the “desire for School” in the EPFCL community, the members of the current CIG 2025-2026 are pleased to share with you this 26th issue of *Wunsch*, which marks the beginning of what could well be a second quarter century of commitment to sustaining the proposal developed and reworked, launched and relaunched by Lacan¹ since his bold founding act of 1964.

In this issue, you will find the interesting papers presented last year during our two main School activities, following the Meeting that accompanies the International Meetings: the Days held every two years as part of the Inter-American Symposium and the European Convention. The texts presented at the Inter-American Day were called upon to focus on a question related to this slogan left to us by Lacan², at the end of his teaching: “reinventing

¹ J. Lacan, “Acta de fundación, 21 de junio de 1964”, en IF-EPFCL, *Directorio 2023/2024*, pp. 219-227, <https://www.champlacanien.net/public/docu/3/Repertoire2023-2024.pdf>

² J. Lacan, “Intervención sobre la transmisión”, *Acheronta*, no 17, julio de 2003, <https://www.acheronta.org/lacan/9congresefp.htm>.

psychoanalysis.” The question, which is also an invitation, is as follows: how can we, in the work of the School, “activate the new through repetition”? For their part, the texts of the European Day were called upon to address the fundamental issue that animates this work of the School, the *dispositif* of the pass, based on two signifiers that capture the essence of what is at stake in Lacan’s enigmatic invention: “experience” and “testimonies.”

We hope you enjoy reading them!

We look forward to seeing you in Sao Paulo, where on July 23 we will be celebrating our next International Meeting of the School, for which this CIG, as the organizer, has chosen the theme “Pass to the analyst: aporias of the testimony. This is a theme that has undoubtedly set us to work intensely within the CIG, not only prompting us to return to the reading of some of Lacan’s references and other texts resulting from the work of the EPFCL in its first quarter century, but above all, of course, based on our own experience in the cartels of the pass constituted during our first year in office. An experience that, after listening attentively to twenty-two transmissions from passeurs, on the testimonies of eleven passants, has resulted in three AE nominations, giving us the opportunity to weigh “live” the important question—which, of course, remains open—about the aporias inherent in the *dispositif* we “inherited” from Lacan.

We hope that this topic, as much as those addressed by the works here, will encourage each of you to continue “making School” during this potential second quarter century of the EPFCL.

Translation : Gabriela Zorzutti

REINVENTING PSYCHOANALYSIS : A SCHOOL TO ACTIVATE WITH REPETITION, THE NEW

INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM SCHOOL MEETING

4 JULY 2025, BUENOS AIRES

ARGUMENT

“Reinventing psychoanalysis” is that to which, according to Lacan’s affirmation¹, every analyst is “forced” to, due to the overwhelmingly “annoying” fact that psychoanalysis is “non-transmissible”. He affirms this in the context of the question for the possible transmission at stake in a testimony of the “way in which one becomes analyst”, that is: what makes is so that, after having been an analysand, one becomes analyst? In other words, the question he attempted to respond to with his Proposition² of 1967 which established the *dispositif* of the pass.

For Lacan, annoying is both the non-transmissibility of psychoanalysis, and its effect, which he stresses, is the “one missing”: that reinvention to which each analyst is forced to. It is to this matter precisely that he had attributed his ‘deception’ on the pass.

What is necessary for each one to reinvent? Here the indication of Lacan: “the way in which psychoanalysis can endure”; something each analyst will, indeed, have to deal with “in terms of what one will be able to withdraw from the fact of having been an analysand for awhile”. These are matters to which, as Lacan pointed out, he had tried to give “a bit more body” to with writings such as that of *Other*.

We thus borrow Lacan’s expression in order to outline our proposal when organizing this Sixth Interamerican Meeting of our School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field: to encourage, to animate, to enliven, giving the ‘a bit more body’ to the School work around that which Lacan calls us to reinvent. Something to which, though annoying, is best to remain disposed towards; certainly, not from annoyance, but from the enthusiasm of taking perspective of what is at stake: “activating, with repetition, what’s new”.

¹ Lacan, J. (2003). Intervención sobre la transmisión. IX Congreso de la École Freudienne de Paris (1978). Trad. de Michel Sauval. Acheronta 17. <https://www.acheronta.org/lacan/9congresefp.htm>

² Lacan, J. (2016). Proposición del 9 de octubre de 1967 sobre el psicoanalista de la Escuela. Otros escritos. Buenos Aires: Paidós.

Wunsch n°26

OPENING

Dybalma N. Ávila-López
Secretary of CIG 2025-2026 for America
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Good morning, everyone, and thank you very much for joining us this morning as we begin the proceedings of the 6th Inter-American Symposium of the International Forum of the Lacanian Field with this School Day, for which, as you know, we have chosen the title: *REINVENTING PSYCHOANALYSIS: A School to activate, through repetition, the new.*

Due to a contingency, which seems to evoke something of the theme of ‘repetition’ and ‘the new,’ it falls to me to pronounce these Opening Remarks for the Day, just as it fell to me to pronounce the Closing Remarks for the last Symposium, which we had the great pleasure of organizing two years ago from the Forum of Puerto Rico. I mention this fortuitous fact as a pretext to highlight what its strict literal meaning raises. It could be said that it points to what underlies, at the most basic level, what would motivate us to attend a space like this: a change of position. A change that involves bringing a certain ‘closure’ to the first stage of our journey, and moving from participating mainly in spaces linked to the wider community of the Forums to a next phase of ‘opening up’ to greater participation in spaces called ‘School’, which, according to Colette Soler during a seminar at our Forum's Clinical College in 2023, would belong to a field integrated, in principle, by analysts and no longer by analysands.

Unlike the arrangements for the School Days of the European Conventions, which are organized by the outgoing members of the International College of the Guarantee, on this side of the Atlantic, the task is taken on by the incoming members of the CIG, who are, during this term: for the North Latin America Zone, Dyhalma Ávila, from the Forum of Puerto Rico; for Southern Latin America, Gabriel Lombardi, from the Buenos Aires Pole of the Argentine Forum, and Gabriela Zorzutti, from the Colorado Forum; and for Brazil, Ida Freitas, from the Salvador Forum, and Adriana Grosman, from the São Paulo Forum. We took on this task with great enthusiasm and, from the outset, our goal was to organize a workspace that would “enliven the School”.

Guided by this desire, at the first meeting of what we humorously christened CIG-A – an acronym for CIG-Americano, which, in resonance, called us to sustain a work that CONTINUES – we outlined, according to my notes, this general tripartite proposal:

1. to bring together several founding members of the Forums and the School to talk about history from the perspective of ‘what they created from repetition,’ and to do so in a way that would not be “cryptic” but ‘inviting’ to younger members;
2. invite the actual AEs of the Americas to address the ‘crucial problems of psychoanalysis,’ specifically in relation to the difficulties of sustaining testimony over a period of three years, and to a question that might be somewhat uncomfortable: what does the AE do, ‘beyond testifying,’ as part of its function of transmitting the analytic cause; and
3. to ask some other colleagues – AME and passeurs, for example – to share an elaboration on the question of the analyst's authorization, starting from a very specific question: what do we mean when we say that such authorization requires a ‘subjective destitution’?

Regardless of these thematic axes, it was agreed that the essential thing would be to think of the three tables as spaces for conversation and debate, which would give rise to a 'living work' of the School, around the questions raised.

In the following meetings, we continued to turn over the idea of 'the new repetition' until we arrived at the final title. We also agreed to conclude with a plenary discussion table, conceived as a 'closing that opens,' and to which we decided to invite members of our Local Guarantee Commission, the CLGAL, to facilitate. We also finally arrived at the definitive program, after 'reinventing' it a little in light of the 'new' that emerged in the process, how two AEs from Europe, who are members of the actual CIG, would travel to Buenos Aires to participate in the cartel of the pass in the days leading up to the Conference.

Also as part of the organization process, it was appropriate to accompany the dissemination of the Program with a few words of introduction. These were guided by those addressed by Lacan to the Freudian School of Paris in 1978, on the occasion, not of an opening but of a closing: that of its ninth Congress, which revolved around the theme of '*Transmission*'. Although many may already have read both Lacan's presentation and our *Presentation*, it seemed appropriate to me – to evoke Freud, so to speak – to 'remember, repeat, and work through' some of what was proposed there.

According to Lacan, this 'reinventing psychoanalysis' that, after almost half a century, the title of our Conference evokes, is not a matter that the psychoanalyst can consider optional or discretionary. It is not something we can simply choose to do or not to do. On the contrary, it is something we will all find ourselves 'forced' to do. The reason? That fact, described by Lacan as extremely "annoying", and which we continue to observe, time and time again, with each new effort to carry out the work of the School: the 'intransmissible' nature of the experience of psychoanalysis.

Lacan's assertion about the inherently difficult, and therefore annoying, character of our work is framed by a specific question: that concerns what transmission would be possible to achieve through a testimony about the way in which 'one is made an analyst'. In other words, that which would make one move from the position of analysand to that of the analyst. As we know, Lacan had already attempted to answer this question a decade earlier when he established, with his *Proposition* of 1967, the enigmatic dispositif of the pass, which we in our School work so hard to continue to uphold and clarify. On this point, I would like to make a brief digression to recall that, a couple of years later, in the *Communication from the Confirmation Jury to all members of the School*, Lacan would say, referring to the pass: 'currently we do not even know what it is'. Do we know any better today?

Returning to what was said in '78, what Lacan considers annoying has two aspects: on the one hand, there is the non-transmissibility of psychoanalysis itself; on the other, the effect of this non-transmissibility. And this effect, Lacan emphasizes, is a necessary one; it is an effect that is 'needed'. What effect is this? It is the reinvention that every analyst will be obliged to undertake. Lacan adds, incidentally, that this is precisely what had already led him to declare himself 'disappointed' by the dispositif he himself had instituted. Perhaps this is another issue that could be discussed in these spaces: those 'disappointed by the pass' ... in our School.

Now then: what exactly is it that, for Lacan, one is required to reinvent? What must be reinvented, according to his indication, is the following: 'the way in which psychoanalysis can last'. And that challenge is one that every analyst will have to take on, of course, based on 'what they have managed to withdraw from the fact of having been a psychoanalyzand for sometime'. Only from there, from one's own experience, can the inevitable reinvention that Lacan speaks of take place.

Something additional that particularly resonated from what Lacan expounds there is his comment that these are questions to which he had tried to give ‘a little more substance’ by resorting to various writings – such as, for example, that of the Other barred by the Signifier. We said in the *Presentation* of the Conference – and it is worth repeating here – that, taking Lacan's expression, we can point to what we set out to do when organizing it: to encourage, animate, and enliven, giving more ‘body’ to our work as a School around *that* which Lacan calls us to reinvent. We also said that, although – as we have been warned, and as we have verified in our experience – dealing with the intransmissible nature of psychoanalysis can only be tedious, it is and will continue to be necessary for us to be willing to take it on. But the challenge, of course, cannot be to do so out of annoyance. It is to do so out of enthusiasm, which we seek to promote with this symposium School Day, by proposing, as the essence of what is at stake, to ‘activate, in repetition, the new’. The proposal evokes this image for me: the ebb and flow of the waves of the sea, which “repeat” their movement, but could never do so exactly the same way, nor reach exactly the same point. A movement that is renewed and relaunched with each repetition.

Let us therefore begin our work, which will consist of two round tables during the morning: *Times of the AE: After Testifying, What?*, where one of the AEs of the Americas will be accompanied by our guests from France, and *What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Subjective Destitution?*, with representation from the ALS Zones and Brazil; followed in the afternoon by two other round tables: *Repetition, the New*, and the *Plenary Debate*, where our three Zones will be represented.

We are betting that this will be a new opportunity for each of us, individually but not without the others, to renew our desire to activate our School – today in particular from its inter-American ties – something that requires us not to remain in mere repetition, but to continue finding that which is new, which allows us to continue ‘making progress’ and not simply ‘walking’. I am well aware that it is not new to repeat these words of Machado, which we have heard so many times. Nevertheless, I allow myself to do so, because it was the other thing that – how the image of the waves of the sea – came to mind as I was writing, and perhaps they will be “novel” when evoked in this context. We could well say that, if we agree with Lacan, this is precisely the path we must follow: the one we can trace with our own actions, actions with which we will have to continue ‘reinventing psychoanalysis’ each time.

Thank you for joining us in sustaining this commitment.

Translation by the author and Gabriela Zorzutti

Wunsch n°26

TABLE 1 : TIMES OF THE AE : AFTER HAVING TESTIFIED, WHAT ?

**Opening Speech – AS Panel at the Symposium
Contingency Counts**

*Adriana Grosman
AME, CIG 2025-2026
Brazil*

Presentation of the Panel

First of all, I would like to thank the presence of our guests, Constanza Lobos, Dimitra Kolonia, and Christelle Suc, ASs who are nearing the end of their term as Analysts of the School, and thus could say something about this theme proposed for our panel, under the question: *AS times – after testifying, what then?*

I must also thank the beautiful coincidence of having two Europeans, who, also serving at the ICG, would be crossing the ocean for the cartel of the pass taking place for the second time in Buenos Aires. We seized this coincidence to have them at our inter-American symposium, to which they responded with enthusiasm.

The title of this panel was born from an interesting conversation among the members of ICG-America, where we thought that the testimony is something that, in its own time, is detached. At the beginning, it has an importance, in most cases, and with time something is distilled from it, and thus, what emerges of the analyst? What remains? *“Beyond the testimony, what?”* It brings forth the doing of the analyst—and what would that be?

The AS somehow animates these school spaces, based on their path, from an analysis that came to an end and where it is discovered that something worked, because it was transmitted, that is, heard by the cartel of the pass. Since this knowledge is known to be untransmissible, the passer tries to say—beyond words—something of this passage from analysis and to analyst. Often, it makes visible that analysis can touch upon the lying truth, the unknown truth, and yet this is not enough for a nomination to take place.

At the point where nomination occurs, that “something extra” that the cartel of the pass listens to is not easily revealed. Something goes off-key, breaks away from speech, bursts forth, deviates, and this bizarre desire “shows its face.” A product of an analysis, the desire of the analyst, balm of the Real, makes the AS speak until exhaustion in order to transmit the impossible-to-say, their small discovery.

Listening once to an AS who grew tired of repeating herself in public testimony, I wondered: how can a speech from this place be the same and become tiresome, when it opens onto an impossible to be explored? Still ignorant of the desire at stake at that moment, but later nominated, I invented a way, initially with this “concern” of not becoming boring. And while transmitting, I realized how the speech of others affects me, as they are affected by my own. And how it animates me to go further, to try to say something more—never enough. The questions I was asked during the transmission, testimony, already pointed toward a path of continuing to write, driven by the desire of the analyst. It was noted: beyond the testimony, because it is refined like a good wine—the aroma of the mixture that once gave it consistency remains, leaving a sediment. Yet in tasting, each one is alone with their palate, sense of smell, and gesture of appreciation. Words decant, histories decant, and what remains is residue, the essence—always difficult to reach, never certain, but unique.

This residue transmits itself if one is willing to pass through the narrow paths, through words without any control. We keep trying.

And so, working in the ICG, as I mentioned, came the proposal and invitation to the ASs: to speak of what is gathered now, in this other time. To speak of that—*beyond the testimony, what?*

And before giving the floor to the panel, I would like to present our most recently nominated AS, Agustina Cedolini, who is here with us today and will soon give her first testimony.

Conversation with the Panel

Thank you very much, it is so interesting to hear you. In your responses—responses as analysts, I mean—I paraphrase C. Soler: “the expected response, if we take it in the strong sense of the word, is the one that reaches the response of the real, the one Lacan evokes in ‘the without... or worse’—by which the real is guaranteed. It cannot be without it.” I quote her: “Psychoanalysis is at the mercy of the responses of the analyst. Therefore, psychoanalysts are responsible not only for the position of the unconscious, as Lacan said in 1964, but above all for the existence of the discourse of the analyst, since this discourse depends entirely on their responses.”¹

So, let us hear them:

Constanza responds by highlighting the work of the School—how does it impose itself? From there, she distinguishes the work of the School of the AS and of the member of the School, with the first tied to the desire of the analyst, which is “indissociable” from formation. Furthermore, she affirms that the work of the School is necessary to sustain the psychoanalytic act. It may not seem obvious, but she points to the sense that psychoanalysis is a different practice, one of the gap and not of “common sense.” Something of this relation with the analytic cause, the School as a base of operations for work that goes in a different direction—which, in this way, unsettles the analyst. Could this be the path? Leaving the analyst dizzy, risking at each encounter? A work of un-School-ing (*d-Es-cola*), as she plays with words: draining, filtering, leaving some remains in the form of incompleteness, emptying. Finally, she presents a very interesting paradox in the phrase: “*to veil contingency*,” precisely what belongs to the order of the impossible. What did you mean in constructing this, “*the work of the School veils contingency*”? And in this relation, this passage toward the “I do not think” of the act, with the work of the School?

Dimitra responds first by speaking about the temporality of testimonies and asks: what does the AS testify to? Certainly something different from the passer, because it passes from a testimony of a singular analysis, one’s own, to thinking analysis as a process: “*From one (passer) to the other (AS)*.” An experience structured with the crucial problems it implies. Thus, this moment—which she calls the moment of opening of the unconscious—she says that the nomination of an AS has the effect of making this moment exist, keeping it open in an unstable way, during the time of the function. This ephemeral opening, where the AS is invited to work in apnea, with an impulse to illuminate the step taken in occupying the place of analyst (a beautiful quotation from her discourse to the EFP). Beautiful! And thus she proposes that the dispositif of the pass, after testimony, allows the passage from an identification (without knowing how it was done) to a spotting (*repérage*). And that the AS bears witness to this necessity—a necessity for a knowledge that says what psychoanalysis is. She concludes with the importance of the School, while not leaving out the precariousness of the AS’s place. I ask you: how to sustain the precariousness of this AS position and this other production, this necessity of knowledge? And furthermore, you ask yourself: what changes

¹ Soler, C., *Interpretação – As respostas do analista; Opção Lacaniana*, n.13, 1995, p. 23

with this spotting and at what level, especially since the act is produced within an analysis? Could you say more?

Christelle responds right away that testimony is not the narrative of neurotic mythology—“we don’t care about that.” So, what then? There is a step to be taken, an act that brings forth the psychoanalyst. The analyst is oriented by a failure—a failure that succeeds. They are freed from being, free. There is, therefore, a passage from analysand to analyst, from the position of subject to that of object. That is what we witness. But if this cannot be said, can it be heard? It is the passage that makes the path, not the other way around—and it has effects. She proposes a path for this construction: from one’s mythology to one’s mytho-logic. It is about making the hole, and how to keep it open without covering it? An excellent question—could you go further? The condition for being open to surprise, to make a hole. The function of the AS as worker, craftsman of psychoanalysis, as with the breath of desire that never ceases to produce, “bitten” as it is. And thus the School is made? You say: sometimes School-analyst, sometimes School-analysand. How do you think the “School-analysand” here?

Listening to these post-testimonies—analyst responses—I find myself raising many questions, already formulated in their very responses. More than that, a work of the School is being done, from which “some knowledge” emerges—be it a dense sediment, or even a tiny object. Something is heard from an AS in this impossible transmission.

Thank you!!

I now pass the word to you and then to the panel.

Mytho-logique

Christelle Suc
AE 2022-2025, CIG 2025-2026
France

So? The AE, after the testimony, what?

The testimony is not the recounting of neurotic mythology. We don't care about that! The testimony is not the narrative of the case, but rather making heard what a completed analysis produces, "the moment when a psychoanalysis is resolved [...] it must, for better or worse, indeed be resolved."¹ », tipping point. What tips the scales is the passage, in act.

The testimony is a question of structure, not some little story, so it's more like myth-ology!

The AE testifies not about, but from his experience, and Lacan says, speaking of the analyst, that "he will know how to make a conduct of it."² of this experience. It is having *opercu* something in one's own cure that orients the analyst in their practice and enables analytic *operance*. *Opercu* is a neologism coined by Lacan that encompasses both *aperçu* (insight) and *su* (knowledge) that operates. It is not a question of words, it is a question of body. The bit of real to which one is reduced at the end of a cure, while one cannot say anything about it, one can use it. "The question of the psychoanalyst's knowledge is not at all whether it articulates or not, but where one must be in order to sustain it"³.

For, as Lacan says, "there is no such thing as a psychoanalyzed person, there is only someone who has been a psychoanalyzand, which results in nothing more than an forewarned subject"⁴. Another way of putting it, same logic. So, what are we basing our conduct on? What are we being forewarned about? Well, what is going to happen, because we've been there before. So, is the analyst a fortune teller? A preacher?

No, nothing is predictable, it's one by one, but the structure itself has invariants (as Colette Soler calls them). The analyst has experienced the logic of the structure, the logical impossibility inscribed on the entry ticket. The experience that there is knowledge that is not known, but which, far from being an obstacle, acts as a lever. No deciphering can overcome the unconscious. The analyst is oriented by a failure, a failure that succeeds! He is on the scent, says Lacan. Being on the scent is an expression; when we look up the definition, we find: "to be freed." Freed from being, the (a)freed. A quarter turn of discourse.

The passage from the analysand to the analyst, therefore, from the position of subject to that of object, is what we are testifying to. But if it cannot be said, can it be understood? Testimony is what can pass through enunciation, through what is said but left unsaid. This

¹ J. Lacan, *Autres Écrits*, Address to the School, Paris, Seuil, 1969, p. 293

² J. Lacan, *Silicet 4, L'étourdit*, Paris, Seuil, 1972, p. 44

³ J. Lacan, *Speaking to walls*, Paris, Seuil, 1971-72, p. 38

⁴ J. Lacan *The Analytic Act* Paris, Seuil, 1968, p. 245

goes without saying, and it will be my topic in Venice, so I won't develop it here, but for me it is an essential point. In space, a point is a place; the AE speaks from a place, from its edge; it is topo-logical. From where speech arises, to paraphrase Lacan, I propose: The AE is its enunciation. Enunciation is what goes beyond the AE and is at the same time the most intimate and the most foreign; it is what has the chance to carry on. That is to say, to make a break. The AE is not a stopgap but the bearer of the gap. AE common name for the gap in knowledge.

With Dimitra Kolonia, we proposed an image for the flyer of an “AE space” in France: a chair with a hole in it, a chair on which the analyst sits. The analyst is not cozy, no routine, not comfortably settled in for a nap; he is “open to surprise.⁵ ». This chair with a hole in it is not that of the civil servant of analytical discourse. Because, after all, that is what an analysis can produce: an analyzed civil servant of automated analytic discourse, comfortably installed, earning “money” but not, psychoanalyst. For there to be a psychoanalyst, there must be the body and the act, therefore a change of position, a change of position in act, something radically new. So the act, the passage into act of the clinical pass, changes the subject, definitively. Analysis does not form, it transforms. There is no going back. It has effects. When we cross the threshold of a door, we simultaneously exit and enter, but we do not exit as we entered. Crossing over.

So, let's do a little mytho-logic:

I was working as a psychologist in the public service, and I was particularly keen to be of service to others—a real commitment! I wanted to save others and the world while I was at it! I worked for child welfare services, a phallic position supported by the desire for (two). Until the moment when, through an equivocal, I heard that service is vice that serves (serves-vice). There was no question of the Other in this matter, it was only about me, saving the Other to save myself, to make myself exist, to give myself substance. With the glimpse of the ro-ment (in French there is an ambiguity that makes the lie audible) that I had knitted for myself, the fall of the ideal, no more desire for (two), the revelation of the radical loneliness at the heart of the subject. Turning point. Passage into act, I resigned from the civil service to practice in the private sector. Transition from public to private⁶. From service to non-serviceable of fantasy, it no longer serves me. “*Privaté*” has therefore proven to be the open possibility of dealing with lack, constitutive lack. Jouissance passes through the one and no longer through the Other. With this possibility, it would be more accurate to say this disposition, because it is indeed a change of position, of making room for another without receiving unconscious narcissistic feedback, a feeding of fantasy. A cracked screen, a structural crack revealed: the possibility of welcoming the analysand's speech. When it is no longer a question of the quest for being, there is the possibility of offering oneself as a function, a causal function. I lend myself to the other; I have gone from “serving them” to “being of service to them.” It is no longer a question of being or wanting to be in a position of exception, but rather of counting oneself among the others, as just one of many, which allows for movement... in act.

The analyst supports the division and can remain in the very place where knowledge is lacking, allowing the analysand to construct their own knowledge until a short circuit occurs. From mythology to mytho-logic. From the logic of the signifier to that of structure. A shift.

⁵ J. Lacan, *Crucial Problems of psychoanalysis*, Paris, Seuil, 19 mai 1965, p. 299

⁶ and, from one Other to another, to the public with the AE function, see first testimony of pass, Millau

The movement, the passage to the analyst, produces noticeable effects in the way the cures are conducted. We make use of knowledge that has not been learned, but which has taken hold. From *understood to body stand*, a change takes place, something new in the mode of presence which, by definition, cannot be put into words, but manifests itself, is experienced. In interventions too. Before, I was silent—I was already Lacanian! Theoretically, I could say it was a desire to make room for the other, but my unconscious was at play, in full swing, if you'll pardon the pun. With the surprise conclusion of the analysis and the cut, an event of the body, a stamp of *jouissance*, an encounter with silence at the heart of the subject. Silence, a mark on the body that inscribes the interval, that of the breath. The possibility of remaining silent is no longer a matter of restraint and also opens up, unexpectedly, the possibility of not remaining silent. So the analyst intervenes, by speaking or by remaining silent, not to do more but to do less. That is to say, not to saturate meaning but to erase it. Interpretation does not aim to produce meaning; it aims at *jouissance*. It also intervenes to support, in its early stages, the analyzing speech, to hysterize the discourse, to hook the transference, to make the patient want to say more, more than expected, a chance to make the uninvited guest who invites himself resound. It is the race for meaning that anchors the patient, *joui-sens*. The analyst, for his part, aims for the Real, the effect of the cure, but upstream there are the twists and turns of the words that dig deep. We cannot go faster than the music. But it can be dissonant... Equivocation allows something other than the meaning to which the analysand, I specify neurotic, clings to resonate. Cuts in the fixity of the humming discourse. With the cut, the sound of language resonates in the body. With the crystal of language, it is possible to make something other than meaning resonate, something other than the dead-end meaning that loses those who seek to find their way. Because meaning, as experience has shown, feeds quite well on its own. The Danaids' barrel. Infinite as announced. Equivocation throws off balance, throws off sex. There is no relation. To break free from the rut of meaning, from its infatuation and its entanglement. With analysis and its conclusion, the passage of the rebus, this is what there is to guess, the refuse is what remains when the riddle no longer makes sense, when it ceases, in fact. The refuse is what falls from the rebus.

When it is no longer a question of thinking one's psychoanalysis, the open possibility of thinking psychoanalysis, of being in a process of elaboration. A new commitment to the analytic cause, a revitalized relationship with the School. The function of AE. So, thinking psychoanalysis, with a small p, because there is no Psychoanalysis with a capital P, totalitarian and totalizing knowledge.

I will repeat some things I have already said in Paris:

Psychoanalysis is a discourse, a mode of social linking ” *that has a different consistency from other discourses. It is a link between two people. It is precisely in this that it takes the place of the lack of sexual rapport*»⁷.

Psychoanalysis is both a discourse and a practice. Psychoanalysis as a discipline finds its source and its consequences in the very exercise of analytical practice.

Psychoanalysis as a discipline is conceived on the basis of the practice of analysis. The experience of analysis, on both sides of the couch, so to speak, as an analysand, the one we have undergone, and as an analyst, the ones we conduct.

There is therefore a direct two-way connection between psychoanalysis as a discipline and analysis as a treatment; they are “*in solidarity* with each other.»⁸. They cannot exist without each other. Thinking about psychoanalysis is an ethicological necessity because the practice cannot

⁷ J. Lacan, *The third Paris*, Navarin, 1974

⁸ J. Lacan, *Autres écrits, Introduction de Silicet au titre de la revue de l'École freudienne de Paris*, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p. 283

be carried out without thinking about it (after the fact), about that which cannot be thought but operates. Based on our own experience, therefore, thinking about psychoanalysis cannot be done without its exercise; it is inseparable but not equivalent; it does not come from the same place. One side and the other, Moebian?

"It is (nevertheless) essential that the analyst be at least two: the analyst who has effects and the analyst who theorizes those effects.»⁹ Thought and pr-actice and vice versa.

Pr-actice for the practice of the act, the heart of analytic practice. But the act only occurs when one does not think, a-thought with the privative a. In his act, the analyst is alone, he is even without himself. The act engages division. Thinking, on the other hand, only takes place after the fact. After the fact, we think about the work undertaken one by one, in control for example, thinking about the work allows us to continue to engage it in the right direction, which is to say, in the direction of the analysand.

Thinking about psychoanalysis is done for each one only from their own vintage, that is, from their own terroir, their own, and from the vintage, the one that nothing can cover, the unveiled, indelible, horror of knowing, but also from what our patients teach us and from the teachings of Lacan, Freud, and a few others.

Psychoanalysis can therefore only be thought of on the basis of the cure, one's own and those one conducts, of what has taught us and continues to teach us. So perhaps we could suggest that thinking about psychoanalysis is done on the basis of what is *tested*, that is to say, what is proven and proves itself (and provides proof).

With the why, thinking about psychoanalysis, there is the how and the where. So here we are with three strands to try to braid (*tresse*). The braid, an anagram of "being" (*s'être*) and "remains" (*restes*) can only be made from what has fallen. Braid is another name for knot, the knot that serves and tightens.

But psychoanalysis, says Lacan, is "*intransmissible*"; "*each psychoanalyst must reinvent, based on what they have managed to glean from having been a psychoanalyzand for a time, each analyst must reinvent the way in which psychoanalysis can endure* »¹⁰

We can conceive of psychoanalysis, but not the unconscious, because by definition it is not only unthinkable but unthought. But we cannot simply say that it is ineffable and untransmittable, even if saying so is already something, as it indicates an impossibility. But if we stop there, psychoanalysis would flirt with the mystical-esoteric, and all we would have to do is say a few vespers or incantations while drinking herbal tea!

Indeed, the unconscious is not knowledge that knows itself. "The unconscious knows you."¹¹ reversal proposed by Lacan. With the Real, there is no sound, no image.

But it is precisely the untransmittable, the hole, that forces us to invent. It is from and because there is that which cannot be known that knowledge is produced and therefore there is a

⁹ J. Lacan, *RSI*, Édition ALI, class of 12/10/74, p. 18

¹⁰ J.Lacan, *Lettres de l'Ecole*, n°25, Bulletin intérieur de l'Ecole freudienne de Paris, volume II, La Transmission, juin 1979.

¹¹ J. Lacan, *Les non-dupes errent*, Paris, Seuil, 1973

chance for something new to happen. It pushes us to invent. “*To confront one's impossible. Teaching is renewed.*»¹²

What is it that makes one want psychoanalysis, is it not without consent, one just wants to think? This desire to think, this drive to elaborate, is sustained by a desire, which is sustained by a no-thing: the analyst's desire. A desire that shifts, from the analysand to the analyst. That is to say, “*that the subject leaves knowledge in order to re-enter it.*»¹³

Where we thought we would find the true answer, there was only emptiness. No S2 to his S1, no one else to answer, no one else who knew. The bar falls on the A.

No longer seeking the truth, there is knowledge. Knowledge with gaps can provide a framework. There has been a shift: from the subject supposed to know to unknown knowledge, from the love of knowledge to desire, from knowledge as the driving force behind development. Does this mean that before, before the conclusion of my cure, I did not think about psychoanalysis? I don't believe so. But thinking was a barrier to knowledge. I did not think from the same place, searching for a there, a fullness, the piece of the puzzle, as I have said on other occasions. It is the question of “where from”? Where do we stand in order to think about psychoanalysis? Now, starting from a “there is not,” subtraction effect of division.

Desire thus relieved of the Other can turn to the other, to others: to serve them¹⁴, This can obviously be understood from the position of the analyst as a semblance of object a, so that the analysand can place their desire, their own desire, there and perhaps in turn become the analyst, a hollow shell... and so on. Something continues from one to one, and thus psychoanalysis can endure. But serving them can also be understood in terms of transmission, in a School, there too from one to one through the transfer of work.

From “where” do we think about psychoanalysis? From the edge, where analysis has led us, to a ‘where’? Could the school be thought of as an edge? To establish a school would then be to stand on this edge, the edge between the singular experience of the cure and a collective, “*where the satisfaction of the subject is realized in the satisfaction of all in a human endeavor*»¹⁵. A collective of a school that is not all where each one's language does not dissolve into the language of all. A collection of ones and not One Whole, “*scattered mismatched*»¹⁶ who have experienced the incurability of the speaking being. There is a sharing, a knowledge to be produced that is constructed from one alone, but not necessarily *all* alone.

Psychoanalysis must live on! It must remain alive and not become a dead language, and for that to happen, there must be spaces, such as this one, for circulation, transmission, and work that produces an invigorating effect. A moment of life for the School in the flesh. Spaces, intervals, breath. The vitality of the School.

¹² J. Lacan, *Transfert à St Denis, Lacan pour Vincennes*, Paris, Ornicar, N° 17/18, 1978, p. 278

¹³ J. Lacan, *Autres écrits*, Allocution sur l'enseignement, Paris, Seuil, 1970, p. 300

¹⁴ J. Lacan, « *J'ai appris dans ce métier l'urgence de servir non pas aux, mais les autres, – ne serait-ce que pour leur montrer que je ne suis pas le seul à leur servir* », « Manuscrit 83 », dans *Œuvres graphiques et manuscrites*, Paris, Artcurial, 2006, p. 48.

¹⁵ J. Lacan, *Écrits*, Function and field of speech and language, Paris, Seuil, 1953, p. 321

¹⁶ J. Lacan, *Preface to the English edition of XI*, Paris, Ornicar 12/13, 17/05/76, p.126

From the edge, it is therefore necessary to try to explain oneself, to construct knowledge. It is a matter of putting the work back on the table, again and again; it is an ethical stance. So “thinking” is a *Thinking*: present participle in English, Work in progress, still in progress... no arrival but a path, paths.

To think about psychoanalysis is to forge a path because there is no whole, no wholly traced path. Psychoanalysis cannot be thought of as One. There is no universal standard to apply, no orthopraxy, therefore. There is no ready-to-wear clothing to put on; a body is needed in the garment, which in fact introduces the one, the uncommon. Lacanian psychoanalysis is not and must not be a fixed practice, closed to knowledge that is closed, duplicated. There is no dogma because it is based on an indisputable truth and we know the fate that is reserved for truth! Psychoanalysis, the analyst, is supported by semblance (blank meaning).

To forge a path, therefore, is not to apply a theory, but to develop knowledge from practice that opens the way, following the etymology of *Frayage*: *Bahnung* in German, “to open the way,” “to dig,” and “to reveal”¹⁷

So, psychoanalysis again! Again and again, give it voice/path and not a single voice/track. Not the single path, the one-way street with no exit. Analysis is only one-on-one, not the same for everyone. No cloning of psychoanalysis, and that forces us to think, to invent!

According to Alain Rey's definitions in his historical dictionary, to *frayer* is to make a hole, to keep the hole open, and therefore not to cover it up. The open hole, the empty, hollowed-out space, is the condition for being “open to surprise.” For “*fray*,” we find “friction (rubbing something) and fragments that separate,” so to *fray* is to be in space, in the interval, to make holes, small holes. Function of the AE.

Since the 14th century, it has meant “to trace a path by passing through,” which is interesting, because it is the passage that makes the path and not the other way around. Echo of the pass.

To think about psychoanalysis is to have and to apply taste, knowledge (*sapere*). What for? To be a worker, a craftsman, always following Alain Rey's definition, craftsman meaning artisan, “by hand,” not machining. A worker meaning “a manual laborer who does work with skill »¹⁸. «Determined worker»¹⁹ which sustains the thesis of the unconscious that ex-ists.

Worker, craftsman, of psychoanalysis, that's an idea I really like! By working, building, participating in the present, for those who commit themselves to it, with the breath of desire that never ceases to produce, “bitten»²⁰ that he is!

AE, analyst of the School, “analyzand of the School »²¹.

¹⁷ A. Rey, *Dictionnaire historique de la langue française*, Le Robert

¹⁸ Alain Rey, *ibid*

¹⁹ J. Lacan, *Autres écrits*, Acte de fondation, Paris, Seuil, 1964, p. 233

²⁰ J. Lacan «But it must be said that to become an analyst, you have to be really passionate about it; passionate about Freud mainly, that is to say, believe in this absolutely crazy thing called the unconscious» Assises de l'École freudienne de Paris : « L'expérience de la passe », Deauville. Parue dans les Lettres de l'école, 1978, n°23, p. 180-181.

²¹ C. Soler, *D'une impasse à l'autre*, intervention aux journées de l'IF, 2000

Wunsch n°26

And why err?

Take a chance on whispering the breath of air /err²² of psychoanalysis

Translation Gabriela Zorzutti

²² J. Lacan, «small erring [...] it's something like momentum. The momentum of something, when what propels it stops but it continues to run». Class of November 13th, 1973. *Les non-dupes errent*, Paris, Seuil, 1973

*d-Es-cuela Work*¹

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AE 2023-2026
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The theme bringing us together at this table is: “Times of the AE. After offering testimony, what?” I propose an answer that seems quite obvious and by no means novel: School work. An approach to thinking about psychoanalysis at its most crucial points and, in keeping with the theme of the day, to reinventing it.

Attempting to “describe” this work would imply venturing into an illusory and normative realm. On the contrary, the challenge will be to reinvent from the ground up, by asking ourselves anew. This work involves not only the AE, but every member of the School, the analytic collective, and entails the sustaining of psychoanalysis, thereby highlighting its importance and the value of bringing the question back to the table: What is the work of the School? What spaces exist for the work of the School, and what conditions of possibility allow its productions to emerge?

However, a clarification is in order. The question regarding the work of the School does not imply disregarding the importance and distinctiveness of other spaces and their productions—the Forum, clinical colleges, clinical formation activities. Let us remember that these are “oriented toward the School” and, from that standpoint, are concerned with it.

Lacan points out the entry point to this question in *The Founding Act*², by stating that this is where “a work must be accomplished”³ and “is indissoluble from a formation”⁴ We can sift the “must” not as a duty to an Other that we bring into being, but through another path, one that “imposes itself as the analyst’s own.” Now, when we say “imposes itself,” does this imply that this work is linked to desire? Is it of the same order as desire? A starting point for distinguishing this work, in that it is linked to the analyst’s desire, is inherent to it, an indissoluble body, a sustaining formation.

Lacan founds his School as alone as always⁵, and from that solitude, he summons us to the working bond from a different structure.

Years later, he makes this explicit when, alluding once again to his solitude, he says that “it is precisely what [...] I renounced when founding the School.”⁶ Immediately, he leaves us with

¹ A sonorous play on words between “de Escuela,” “descuela” (from “descolar,” meaning “to remove”), and “cuela” (from the verb “colar,” which colloquially refers to “sneaking in somewhere unexpectedly or without permission,” alluding to what disrupts the count, the sum, or the idea of a group).

² J. Lacan, “Act of foundation”, in *Otros escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2016.

³ *Ibid.* p.247

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ J. Lacan, “Discourse in the Freudian School of Paris”, in *Otros escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2016, p. 281

an intense, vital question that I believe sheds light on what is implied in the work of a School: “What does it have to do with the one in which the psychoanalytic act is sustained?”⁷

Let us open another door. In times when it is easy to observe the multiplicity of institutions and analytic productions, how can we differentiate the work and the productions that our School must carry out from those of others? By saying “School,” he situates it in a specific place and alerts us to the need to take into account the conditions that make its emergence possible. Let us move in the direction of investigating this.

The psychoanalyst is not a scientist who works shut away in a laboratory to produce novel findings. Science bets on progress by plugging holes, and we know it always succeeds⁸ because if it cannot do so, it gives up. Precisely this is what makes it certain. If science takes the path of plugging holes—the path of certainty, of always succeeding—what path do we take in psychoanalysis? Let us rule out the path of the “sense of meaning,” of “good sense,” or of “critical sense.”

To give our path its full dimension, I link it to two signifiers left to us by Lacan: precariousness⁹ and the feeling of absolute risk¹⁰. To experience the feeling of absolute risk and precariousness in every space and work of the School? If we add “making holes” and “accompanying in dissolution,”¹¹ we see, consequently, that it is by no means evident how this would be reflected in the work of the School and in its productions. We were just talking about the indissoluble and now about dissolution, which suggests a paradox: dissolution to contribute to and sustain psychoanalysis?

The expression “Times of the AE” orients us toward a temporality in which a work is carried out and then dissolves. It is this latter aspect that is necessary, that relaunches the work and offers a glimpse of that going against the grain. A nomination goes against the grain of common sense. It is not a title, nor the completion of a training program, as might be attributed in other settings, but rather, “it is the only thing we are certain of—that it creates a hole.”¹² A gap through which the School’s echo can be heard and around which work might take place and extend within the analytic collective. Two letters, AE, like a reverberating sound, reflect off a surface and make present what cannot be absorbed or completed into a whole in relation to psychoanalysis.

The School as a base of operations for a work of thinking psychoanalysis alongside others. Let us ask ourselves again: what is thinking psychoanalysis? Here, too, a jolt. It is a thought linked to the analytic discourse that differs from thought based on what we already have or based on previous ideas. It is a thought on the edge of the point where one stands, where

⁷ *Ibid.* p.281.

⁸ J. Lacan, “Speech at the Congress of the Freudian School of Paris in La Grande-Motte. November 2, 1973” in Document for internal circulation at the Freudian School of Buenos Aires. Published in French in *Lettres de l'École freudienne*, no. 15, 1975.

⁹ J. Lacan, “Discourse in the Freudian School of Paris”, in *Otros escritos*, op.cit. p. 288.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 23: The sinthome*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2008, p. 45.

¹¹ J. Lacan, *Seminario Disolución*, unpublished, lesson of March 11th 1980.

¹² J. Lacan, *Seminario R.S.I.*, unpublished, lesson of April 15th 1975.

vertigo and the feeling of taking a risk are present in every encounter. A *pensaviento*¹³, which includes movement, the breath that scatters and invites us to reinvent.

A thought that returns to the texts of Freud and Lacan but also returns to the experience traversed by each one, to that moment of passage, of choice. The relationship with the analytic cause stems from that traversed; not forgetting it is a necessary fiber. Thinking it from that position implies not only an ethical decision by each analyst but also that there are spaces that make it possible.

I say *d-Es-cuela*, written with hyphens to bring in the “between,” the “gap,” the “void”—the necessary space that provides the conditions of possibility for the new. *D-Es-cuela*, a play on words between: “School,” “unschool,” and “to strain.”

“Descuela” is a movement that does not come to complete or secure anything, but rather to decomplete and remove a piece. “Colar” is a verb that can be used both for the expression “to strain, leaving the dregs behind,” as well as in colloquial usage to refer to “sneaking into somewhere unexpectedly.” It alludes to a mode that differs from an orderly line with the illusion of security. Colar emphasizes surprise, the unexpected and unplanned. It also disrupts the order, the organized whole; perhaps it leaves us with some remnants.

The “cuela (sneak in)” reminds us of that not-all, the real at stake in the formation, what cannot be captured in words—keeping this in mind in a School where knowledge is in the making, is to recognize that this elaboration does not rest on an assumption but on the work of each member and on how each one produces and sustains psychoanalysis. Let me put it another way. The sustaining of psychoanalysis does not come from outside but from what happens—or does not happen—here, in our School, in each person’s work. This reveals a vital, crucial dimension. Rather, it is a dimension that could not leave anyone entirely at ease; it ought to unsettle us.

The work of the *d-Es-cuela* differs from planning. The new cannot be programmed nor is it a matter of will. Nor are there guarantees, but we can do our best to foster the conditions of possibility for something new to emerge. A *d-Es-cuela* work that is only possible through seriousness and by encouraging ourselves to take risks; therein lies the contingent possibility of contributing to psychoanalysis.

Lacan saw that the analytic community was threatened by inertia and invented two dispositifs: the cartel and the pass, which enable a different kind of production. These are working dispositifs with a logic that differs from the will to regulate, evaluate, or standardize diversity, and they seek to prevent homogenization. Are these dispositifs sufficient to sustain the work of *d-Es-cuela*? Would we have to invent others? To this last question, I am inclined to answer no. Only that it becomes important—not only in the dispositifs of the cartel and the pass but in every space, in every School gathering, in every seminar—to commit to “caring for the conditions of possibility of what *d-Es-cuela*. Taking care not to let the word walk within walls of silence so as not to drift toward the entrenchment of thought or routine.

The spaces that would make *d-Es-cuelarse* possible are far from comfortable—rather, they are uncomfortable places that shatter any illusion of group cohesion, understanding, and universal agreement. Spaces where a strong desire to stay awake prevails and where the impossible is taken into account.

¹³ *Pensaviento* is a neologism that combines the concepts of thought, movement, and wind to emphasize that it differs from a fixed idea.

As spaces of the order of experience, we might encounter members moved to bear witness to it, as an experience that contributes to the community and psychoanalysis. This can be seen in the Cartel Meetings of Lacan's School, where members sought to bear witness not only to their own analytic traversal but also to these novel experiences of work. An open door to the courage to bear witness to the experiences that *d-Es-cuelan*.

I am nearing the end. Both Freud and Lacan have made use of games—to name a few, the magic slate, chess, bridge—to convey some aspect of psychoanalysis. From those traces left along that path emerges the “string game”¹⁴ that I have used on another occasion to allude to the dispositif of the pass. Today it will be for the work of the *d-Es-cuela*. I invite you once again to play with that string, but now it is not so much a matter of “passing a thread” as it is of knowing that what is crucial is “to dismantle the figure and let the gaps remain,” emphasizing each person’s work but, at the same time, the necessary original bond with the other so that we may continue playing, questioning, and sustaining psychoanalysis.

Sustaining the gaps with movement and emptiness and, thus, as María Elena Walsh¹⁵ tells us in her song—where “two plus two equals three” and “a year lasts a month”—breaking the sum, the sense, and time... to bring forth the most critical point... the psychoanalytic act. *d-Es-cuela* work implies an indissoluble “thought” to sustain the “I do not think” of the act.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

¹⁴ String game. Originally, it was used to convey an experience not through words but through the body. It is a very ancient game found in most cultures, no matter how diverse or distant they may be. Although there are differences in each culture, the structure of the game remains the same. It is a hand game based on a knotted string that forms loops. The rope must be held between the two hands of the first player, who begins by forming a shape—a unique shape created right then and there. A second player inserts their hands through the loops so the rope passes through, and by stretching and unraveling the initial shape, forms a new shape with the rope stretched between their hands. Thus, each player presents shapes to their partner until, due to lack of skill or because it becomes impossible to continue the shape, the game ends.

¹⁵ María Elena Walsh (February 1, 1930 – January 10, 2011), an Argentine poet, novelist, writer, playwright, singer-songwriter, and composer, best known for her songs and children’s books. Song: *El reino del revés*.

From the one to the

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The title of our roundtable, and the very question it poses, raises, it seems to me, a question of temporality, starting from which I would like to introduce my remarks.

After having testified, if there has been a nomination, this is the time of the AE.

The AE is appointed following their testimony, which means that this does not occur in the same time period. Indeed, the testimony in the *dispositif* is that of a *passant* and not of an AE. While these two times are linked, they do not constitute a single, unified time. Times at once distinct and linked, in a logical sequence for the AE, who was necessarily a *passant*.

So, after their testimony as *passant*, what next for an AE?

I will answer that, after the testimony within the *dispositif*, the AE testifies. If *passant* and AE give testimony at two different times, with different durations and from two different positions, the question then becomes: to what exactly does an AE bear witness?

This question, like all the others we do not stop exploring, does it not demonstrate the necessity of the *dispositif* of the pass for a School of Psychoanalysis? The pass cannot happen without the School, and this is seen in the first version of the *Proposition*, foundational text on the pass and the AE, presented in 1967.

Lacan proposes the School based on his critique of the IPA, in which « there is no teaching about what psychoanalysis is [...] the only concern is making sure it conforms¹ ». He sees a connection between this failure to think psychoanalysis, necessary if one doesn't want to miss it², and the hierarchy that reigns there, in the form of a co-optation of experts and all of the prestige associated with this.

Lacan's School thus offers as itself as a « remedy », even a way out, of this impasse. « No other remedy but to break the routine that is currently the prevailing constituent of the practice of the psychoanalyst. [...] Our poor School can be the point of departure for a renewal of the experience³ », says Lacan in the first version of the *Proposition*.

The *dispositif* of the pass contributes to this renewal. Through it, and in spite of his conceptual advances, Lacan interrogates and always tries to clarify the very same obscure point: *What decides an analysand to take up the position of analyst*⁴?

¹ J. Lacan, « Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole », in *Autres Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 245.

² « The psychoanalyst in psychoanalysis is not a subject: and that by situating his act in the ideal topology of the *objet a*, it can be deduced that it is by not thinking that he operates. An 'I do not think', which is the law, in fact makes the psychoanalyst depend on the anxiety of knowing where to give it its place to still think about psychoanalysis without being doomed to miss it. », J. Lacan, « L'acte analytique » in *Comptes rendus d'enseignement*, *Ornicar? bulletin périodique du champ freudien n° 29*, Paris, p. 20.

³ J. Lacan, « Première version de la Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole », Annexes, in *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit., p. 589.

⁴ J. Lacan, « Télévision », in *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit., p. 531.

To work on clearing away this thick shadow that shrouds the point where analysand passes to analyst is no simple matter.⁵ A crucial problem for psychoanalysis. Analysis teaches us there will never be a final answer. There will never be an exhaustive answer, one answer for everyone, because « everyone » does not exist. « There is a heap of ‘alls’ which are radically distinct. [...] The statement ‘the alls’ comes from a main idea of the heterogeneity among things⁶ ». Of the *One by One*, the scattered and mismatched.

That we are still trying to respond, to clear away this thick shadow, even now, more than sixty years after the *Proposition*, testifies to this.

So then, to what does the AE testify?

Lacan says « that the analyst of the School is credited with being among those who can bear witness to the crucial problems [...] for analysis, especially insofar as they themselves are engaged in the task, or at least on the verge of resolving them⁷ ». I emphasize that Lacan is not saying this about an individual's psychoanalysis and this point seems important to me, because this is where I differentiate the testimony of the *passant* from what an AE testifies to.

The pass in the dispositif is a « test of the hystorisation of the analysis⁸ » ; but the *passant* does not give a theoretical testimony about psychoanalysis and its crucial problems. The *passant* authorizes himself from himself in order to enter into the dispositif; and some others, the cartel, authenticate or not, this testimony, via the *passeurs*. The *passant* testifies to what they have grasped about their own psychoanalysis. They endeavor to transmit a distillate of this.

The *passant* hystorises their analysis, they attempt to organize their own treatment into a narrative, to demonstrate « how could the idea came to them of taking up this function of [the psychoanalyst]?⁹ ».

In this sense, the *passant* bears witnesses to his own analysis, whereas the AE bears witnesses, not to his analysis but to analysis as a structured experience, with the crucial problems it implies. With my title, I wanted to make clear the understanding I came to regarding the task of an AE. Namely, that they pass from witnessing to a singular analysis, their own, to thinking analysis as a procedure. In other words « From “an” to “the” ».

« An » for the *passant*, « the » for the AE. Except that the AE can only work on thinking and illuminating analysis as a procedure *starting from* their own analysis. Especially since it is from this analysis, or rather, from what they knew about it, what they testified to and were appointed from. As a result, the AE is linked to their testimony of passage. This is the logical consequence and, in my opinion, it is from this link that they are expected to testify. So thinking one's own analysis and thinking analysis based on one's own are not exactly the same thing.

At this point, a question arises. If « we cannot cleanse ourselves of experience¹⁰ », to think analysis from the perspective of one's own treatment would not be unique to the AE. In this

⁵ J. Lacan, « Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole », in *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit., p. 252.

⁶ J. Lacan, « L'expérience de la passe », in *Ornicar? bulletin périodique du champ freudien n° 12-13*, Paris, p.121.

⁷ « On impute à l'analyste de l'Ecole d'être de ceux qui peuvent témoigner des problèmes cruciaux [...] pour l'analyse, spécialement en tant qu'eux-mêmes sont à la tâche ou du moins sur la brèche de les résoudre », J. Lacan, « Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole », op. cit., p. 244.

⁸ J. Lacan, « Préface à l'édition anglaise du *Séminaire XI* », in *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit., p. 572-573.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 572-573.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, « Conférence de Genève sur le symptôme ».

case, is there something that distinguishes them from other analysts who also contribute to knowledge by thinking about analysis?

I believe the question of time is important here. I am proceeding tentatively because this question seem to me to be complexe. Lacan « is interested in the pass where the act could be grasped in the time it occurs¹¹ ». I understand this « in the time » as a present time, that of the subject and their desire. Not a time of the Other. Separation. « There where the subject realizes itself in its own temporality, that is in the time of separation. And it is there that Lacan suggests we locate haste. [...] That hour, it is that of the subject, this is its hour. [...] The time of the subject is a time that separates him from the Other. [...] The act of speaking, like any act, is decisive only if it comes at the right moment¹² ».

I link this time to the moment when the subject decides to enter the *dispositif* and *to what could push someone to historicize from himself*¹³. *To authorize himself from himself*, to speak in his own name, without the guarantee of the Other, *to historicize from himself*, without being pushed by the desire of the analyst who causes desire for the subject, in a time which is not that of the Other, giving indication of an Other that has been launched.

In the analysis, the analysand hystorises himself as subject, hystorises his life, pushed by the desire of his analyst who is at the place of subject supposed to know. The *passant* hystorises his analysis through his own movement, there is no subject supposed to know to drive it.

In following this logic, what pushes the subject to hystorise from himself cannot be a question that is addressed, which would establish the cartel as an Other, for example regarding the end of his analysis. Based on my experience, the testimony of the pass is not a question. It is not demand in search of signification and sense.

Each *passant* who decides to do the pass is pushed by his/her reasons in a temporality relative to their treatment which differs from one to another, and all of this is of interest.

In my own case, there was a moment of opening of the unconscious following an act, not at all recognized as such at the time. *There where I am I do not think*. Behind what makes advance, the act.

Could this moment of opening of the unconscious be a time in which the act could be grasped? It is not then the nomination which allows this opening, but the act itself, once it has happened, and which precipitated entry into the *dispositif*. This is the opportunity, in this moment of opening that cannot be a moment of forgetting, in which the *dispositif* tries to catch a glimpse of the aporias of the act and of desire which are veiled, present, but always under a thick shadow.

I think the nomination of an AE has an effect of bringing this moment into existence, of catching it before it closes and keeping it open, albeit precariously, for the duration of the task, with the aim of grasping something of the act before it slips into oblivion. I think it is in

¹¹ J. Lacan, « Discours à l'Ecole freudienne de Paris », dans *Autres Ecrits*, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹² B. Nominé, *Le présent du présent, Essai psychanalytique sur le temps*, Editions Nouvelles du Champ lacanien, Paris, 2020, p. 93-95.

¹³ J. Lacan, « Préface à l'édition anglaise du *Séminaire XI* », dans *Autres Ecrits*, *op. cit.*

this ephemeral opening that the AE is invited to work feverishly and enthusiastically, to catch and illuminate the step they made to assume the place of the psychoanalyst ¹⁴.

I find that Lacan questions himself and us, that *the pass can, by way of a entirely different lens, highlight for one who offered himself, a certain shadowy aspect of their analysis* ¹⁵. This is what I attempted to say at the R-V in Paris last year. The *passant* in his effort to hystorise his analysis makes an effort of formulating what he distinguished in it, and this can bring light to what he had already distinguished in his treatment but had remained in the shadows.

How to understand this? What a subject detected in his analysis is not necessarily something « thought-out ». Lacan states this explicitly in his seminar *Les problèmes cruciaux* ¹⁶. He emphasizes there and elsewhere that the analysant can pass to the analyst without knowing how he did it, because « a nature can be identified without necessarily being thought ».

I believe the dispositif of the pass permits passage from detection to thought-out detection. The AE bears witness to this necessity. To testify regarding the crucial problems of psychoanalysis, we must conceptualize the experience; we require a knowledge that defines what psychoanalysis is. This is not the knowledge that issued from the experience, knowledge without subject, but knowledge that structures it, the theoretical texts; because analysis is a structured experience. Lacan's School was proposed for this reason.

What difference does thought-out detection make and at what level, all the more as the act is produced in an analysis? For the analyst's analysis, it does not change anything. But what about for passes, which need to begin again and again? Or for formation and analysis in extension? An AE is closest to these questions.

The AE thrives on his precariousness, says Lacan. Being « on the verge », what is expected from him is an elaboration which contributes to the renewal of the experience. For this, two elements seem to me to be necessary: The AE and their School.

The AE is nourished by the School, by the exchanges and by the sustained, welcome rhythm of the work, which maintains them on alert, alive. In Greek, I would say « σε εγρηγορηση » which is a compound word containing the ideas of haste, waking up, getting up, and putting in motion.

From what he has grasped from his analysis, he tries to throw light on certain shadows. I do not see this contribution as being at the level of doctrine, at least not primarily, but at the level of what testifies to and introduces something new, a particular path. Renewal of the experience. What is it that the AE *knows* about himself, which he does not keep to himself but offers to the School through the product of his work?

The duration of this experience also has its importance. I realized as my work progressed that a thread emerged from the topics I chose to address. A thread I had not anticipated or thought about beforehand. One topic led me to another, but all were rooted in a certain way in my testimony as *passant* and ultimately in my analysis. And this is what leads me to say that

¹⁴ « The pass is that point where, having completed their psychoanalysis, the place the psychoanalyst held in their journey, one takes the step of assuming it(...) in order to function like the one who occupied it, even if they know nothing of this function except that to which in their experience, it had reduced the occupant (...) Anyone who wishes can bear witness to this, on condition they subsequently take care to clarify it », J. Lacan, « Discours à l'Ecole freudienne de Paris », in *Autres Ecrits, op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹⁵ « Can the pass truly illuminate, for the one who has offered himself to it, as a flash of lightning might, a certain shadowy aspect of their analysis? This is something that concerns the *passant*, », in *Ornicar? bulletin périodique du champ freudien n° 12-13*, op.cit., p.121.

¹⁶ J. Lacan, Séminaire Les problèmes cruciaux, leçon IV, du 6 janvier 1965.

the work of an AE is linked to a logic of sequence, of continuity, which is worth taking into account in the time of the task.

If a thread unfolds and gradually weaves itself, if the AE thinks psychoanalysis based on their own analysis, it seems to me they do not need to settle into a routine of testifying, for three years, about their own treatment. Otherwise, what would be of interest for the School or for the AE himself ? I believe this would be the stagnation of desire, a closure of knowledge. The reverse of the new. And would this not be the antithesis of a moment of opening of the unconscious and of Lacan's idea about the School and the pass ?

Lacan opted for the experience of a School, not of a group, to combat the refusal of knowledge in conformist psychoanalysis that he denounced in his *Proposition*. The School works against this refusal of knowledge, the automatisms and the routine, so that analysts who authorized themselves not rigidify themselves.

The pass, like the School, stands in the way of this auto-ritualisation. A School strives to maintain an open space that ensures against this tendency. The dispositif of the pass contributes to this.

It is expected that AEs will be psychoanalysts who come from experience of the School¹⁷. They cause it / speak about it (*Qu'ils causent*). We can hear the double meaning of *causer*¹⁸. I think it is expected of AEs to work against this stoppage of thought towards which the real leads us; Lacan spoke of a menopause. So then, the AE, *awakening* (*éveil*) ? « **Analyst Éveil (AE)** » ? With the novelty that is their singular style, their own *One*, their own bit of knowledge.

Whether the AE is very good, insufficient, too much or too little, not enough, not always, too this, too that, what they could have done, what they didn't do.....it is testimony to *it's not that, "not always/not everyday"*¹⁹. This is what is expected. I tell myself, if sometimes the AEs torture themselves, if from time to time they succeed in destabilizing the doxa of the School, this is when it becomes interesting.

Lacan, with the pass, sought a *recrutement* (*recrutement/regrowth*) of analysts with a style different from the selection emerging from the co-optation and power of the elders, « of an order quite precisely modeled on the analytic discourse²⁰ ». He also expected that, to the AEs, would fall « the internal institutional duty of submitting to a permanent critique the authority of the top ones, the sages²¹ ».

The AEs, with their ephemeral and precarious status and mode of recruitment do not constitute a caste. So then, let us not rush to turn them into a caste of doctrinal sages! They are but « on the way (*de pas-sages*)²² ».

Translation : Devra Simiu

¹⁷ J. Lacan, « Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole », in *Autres Ecrits*, op.cit., p. 243.

¹⁸ In French, *causer* can mean both « to cause » and « to speak ».

¹⁹ In French, a play on words between « *pas toujours* » (not always) and « *pas tout-* » (not all-) : « *pas tout-jours* » (not all-days).

²⁰ J. Lacan, « L'expérience de la passe », in *Ornicar? bulletin périodique du champ freudien n° 12-13*, op.cit., p.121.

²¹ J. Lacan, « Première version de la Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'Ecole », in *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit., p. 576.

²² a play on words: to be "on the way" ("*être de passage*") and to be "not sages" ("*être des pas-sages*").

**TABLE 2 : WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SUBJECTIVE
DESTITUTION ?**

The act of destituting oneself subjectively

*Ida Freitas
AME
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In a meeting with the members of the ICG of the Americas to discuss the theme of the School Day at the Inter-American Symposium and the related panels, we identified “subjective destitution” as one of the themes, since it seemed to us that we had not devoted ourselves specifically enough to this essential point, which is implicated in the conclusion of an analysis, just as we have done with others, namely: the fall of the subject supposed to know, the crossing of fantasy, the fall of the object *a*, or identification with the symptom.

So I decided to work on this notion and extract from it—or rather, to examine the uses of this “state of the subject,” a state of destitution possibly reached in an analysis—for the function of the analyst, but also for the functions involving the pass, from the secretariat, to the designation of passers by the AME, to the work of the passer, to the cartel of the pass, and to how it presents itself, demonstrates itself, and is transmitted by each passant.

The notion of subjective destitution is introduced by Lacan in the act of his Proposition of the psychoanalyst of the School, the moment in which he establishes a common space of work for analysts. Thus, subjective destitution as the destination of an analysis, of psychoanalysis in intention, is the term Lacan chooses within the School—and therefore the field of psychoanalysis in extension—to promote the possibility of a collective guarantee as a counter-experience to hierarchies grounded in imaginary identification.

So I’ll take it upon myself to reflect on the functions involved in the pass, keeping in mind an important point I read in a text shared by Gabriel Lombardi¹ in his response to the request addressed to the AMEs by the previous ICG, which struck me as pertinent, regarding the designation of passers, I quote: “The pass does not consist in destituting oneself as a subject once and for all, but rather in the act of destituting oneself each time and for that specific purpose—that is, the act of listening to another subject.”

Thus, having been instituted, appointed, or elected to certain functions, what do we do with the subjective destitution possibly achieved and experienced in our analyses?

Is this epistemic gain—the experience of destitution—sufficient for our practice, our know-how, our “knowing how to be there,” well situated in our functions, in the work to which they call us?

It is certainly up to each of us to investigate—to examine our own practice each time we stand before another subject—constantly renewing, whenever necessary, Lacan’s proposal to never cease passing the pass, so as not to fall into the automatism of repetition that extinguishes every creative spark and the inventiveness and plasticity necessary to be sensitive to the new, the unprecedented, the original.

¹ LOMBARD, G. Text shared at ICG 2025 in response to CIG 2024 regarding the criteria for designating a passeur.

I will draw primarily, though not exclusively, on references from Lacan and Soler to introduce the notion of destitution, gathering the points that stood out in my reading.

In his text “Variants of Subjective Destitution” (2002, pp. 11–21), Soler traces the path from institution to subjective destitution, noting that the institution of a subject depends on the discourse that locates it; this is not the same position for all discourses, as we know, so we must ask ourselves: how is the subject instituted in an analysis through analytical discourse?

The institution of the subject is a discursive operation that consists of circumscribing an unknown, an enigma of the subject based on their symptom. The cut is the most evident demonstration of the instituted subject, which reveals itself through the associative chain. Punctual and evanescent, the subject appears in the cut of the signifying chain between S1 and S2. As Soler proposes, the instituted subject is a “destitution of the self” from common discourse.

“In this sense, the institution of the subject is already a loss of the subject assured of what he is, of what he wants, of what he says, of that subject who refuses to think that his malaise, his symptom, might have an unconscious meaning” (Soler 2002, p.14)

We can thus distinguish, on the one hand, the *Je* as the assured subject, identified with his fantasy, and the barred subject, instituted in an analysis as still indeterminate between the loss of an identification and the expectation of a new one to anchor himself.

Subjective indeterminacy can be endless; the search for new meaning can be infinite; hence it becomes necessary to attain satisfaction at a point of certainty that paradoxically implies subjective destitution as a certain traversal of “I want to know nothing of what I am as jouissance” (Soler, 2022. p.17) and this operation implies the loss of indeterminacy, “a certain consent to the limit,” but also implies a gain in knowledge, a point of certainty.

Lacan introduces the term “subject” into psychoanalysis based on the Cartesian cogito, demonstrating that the subject of psychoanalysis would not exist without this formulation and negating Cartesian logic, he subverts the cogito by drawing on Klein’s group, establishing the logic of the unconscious and the logic of analysis through the operations of union, intersection, and disjunction of the sets “I do not think” and “I am not,” extracting from this logical manipulation the operations of truth, alienation, and the diagonal of transference.

Torres (Stylus, 2009, pp. 89–113) provides a precise and illuminating account of this development in Lacan, to which I refer here, where we can locate, in Lacan’s passage through the Klein Group—found in the seminars on The Logic of Fantasy and The Analytic Act—the subject’s forced choice of the displaced “I do not think” set, dissociated from its union with the “I am not” that carries the empty set. This empty set is lost through a cut produced in the “I do not think,” a choice for the “I do not think” that implies the loss of the intersection that is precisely the void. Lacan makes this disjunction function as a cut, a gap that places on one side the “I do not think” related to the signifying mark that determines a being (*je*) through this “I am nothing but this mark,” and on the other, what is lost by the cut of the choice, yet maintaining a relationship with it. In this part, in this empty set that is lost, we locate the “not-I” (*pas je*) and the id. In the void, therefore, we find the being without the (*je*), which Lacan equates with the id, the achæphalous drive he introduced in Seminar 11.

Thus, on one side we have the *je* as a mark and, on the other, a being without *je*. This leads Lacan to locate in this empty set the *object a*, which is another way of speaking of this same negativity, and it is in this very position that he also situates the “*wo es war sol ich werden*,” which leads us to think of subjective destitution as an operation resulting from the passage of these negativities through the diagonal of transference. However, we must consider, as Torres warns us (Stylus, 2009, p. 93), “that this **being without je**, a figure embodied by the object a, is an object of the Other’s cession. And, therefore, related to the subject’s lack (**being without je**) as well as to the Other’s lack—S(A/).”

Therefore, the relationship between the *je* as a mark and the object (**being without *je***) suggests that we can also locate the fantasy ($\$ \hat{a}$) there. As Lacan states in the Seminar on the Act, without this “I do not think,” the fate of alienation, “we could not have articulated anything at all about what the logic of fantasy is.”

Locating fantasy there resonates directly with the $\$$ of fantasy, which is not the same expression of the subject of the signifying chain, but rather a fixed subject, marked and linked to a relationship with the object that, through the diagonal of transference, can come to decay from this fixity of fantasy.

At the end of the transferential relationship, that is, “when, having resolved the desire that sustained the psychoanalyst in his operation, he no longer has the will at the end to raise his option, that is, the remainder which, as the determinant of his division, causes him to fall from his fantasy and destitutes him as a subject.” (LACAN, 2003.OE.p.257)

This well-known elaboration of the Proposition seems to indicate that subjective destitution is an operation resulting from the transference’s ending, that is, from the fall of the subject supposed to knowledge and the traversal of fantasy, insofar as the analysand, through the twists and turns of his statements, reaches his saying—that determining remainder of his division which empties the truth bias of his fantasy.

“It is the possibility of extracting the *object a* that preserves a certain margin of freedom [for the subject] in relation to the place it occupied as the object of the Other’s desire,” but for this to occur, the subject must have reached the impasse of having attempted to bring the sexual relationship into existence within the fantastic montage, as a response to the loss that he himself was for the Other. (RABINOVICH, D. 2000, *The Psychoanalyst’s Desire*, p. 145)

It is for this reason that Lacan establishes this passage from lack to loss and then to the cause. Formalizing the end of analysis in this way lies in the proposition of the act by which the subject, starting from a certain destitution of the self, gives way to the most singular aspect of his “being” as the cause of desire.

Subjective destitution, therefore, does not concern the subject of lack-in-being; it produces an effect of being. In her text “Variants of Subjective Destitution” (2002, p.8), Soler clarifies a point of rectification made by Lacan between 1967 in **The Proposition** and 1969 in **The Discourse to the EFP**, stating that destitution is not lack-in-being, but rather it brings about being. Soler follows this line of reasoning by adding that, in a certain sense, destitution is an effect homologous to identification, insofar as it leads the subject to his identity of *jouissance*; and thus we can conceive of identification with the symptom as an effect of subjective destitution, which produces a subject who recognizes himself in his modes of satisfaction.

This is why Lacan asks whether “one ought not to discourage the amateurs, since the subjective destitution inscribed on the admission ticket might provoke horror, indignation, panic, or even an attack, or at least provide a pretext for an objection of principle?” (LACAN, 1967/2003, p.257)

Therefore, it is the most singular aspect of one’s being that is at stake in subjective destitution, and not the *non-being*; “dstitution does not produce *non-being*, it produces strong beings.” We find this reference to subjective destitution in the Discourse to the EFP (LACAN, 2023: p. 278) when Lacan extracts from experience the position of the analysand in relation to the analyst and says: “For after all, is the psychoanalyst not always at the mercy of the analysand, even more so since the analysand can spare him nothing when he stumbles, and even less so when he does not stumble?”

What he cannot spare him is the *non-being* with which he is affected as the term to be attributed to every psychoanalysis. And what Lacan will say causes him astonishment is

precisely the attribution of *non-being* to the analysand, whereas, on the contrary, he is in the pass “connoting solely subjective destitution”

What is at stake, therefore, is that subjective destitution does not produce *non-being*, but rather being—singular and strong—a compelling assertion by Lacan that leads us to consider which instance of speaking being can be approximated to this strong and singular being, and of what order would this strong and singular being be?

To infer that it is the being of the object, *object a*—the being of *jouissance* that remains as the irreducible residue of an analytic experience, the residue of the division that becomes a cause—is one possible path.

The determination of the subject as *object a* has as its effect subjective destitution, which brings us to the analyst’s body, based primarily on how Lacan situates it in the Summary of the Act when he states that “The psychoanalyst makes himself of *object a*, he makes himself produced: from object a: with object a.” (O.E., p. 375). Lacan does not write that the analyst is the object a, but that he makes himself produced by the object a; a making-oneself—there is a choice here, an activity equivalent to the drive movement, for example, of making oneself seen by the scopic drive or of making oneself heard by the invocative drive. But beyond making himself from the object a, through the *object a*, he makes himself with the object a, entwined with the object a represented by the analyst.

Making oneself produced by the object, with the object, implies subjective destitution and encountering an unprecedented desire—the analyst’s desire as a drive destiny that “allows one to no longer be entangled with neurosis, and qualifies the analyst to disconcert it [...] by turning its structure inside out: moving from the logic of fantasy to the logic of the act: ($\a) a ($a \rightarrow \$$)” (Fingermann, 2016, p.69).

To conclude, I offer brief reflections based on my experience in various roles concerning the pass dispositif, which I relate to subjective destitution.

I participated in the last CLGAL, which is the Latin American commission that receives applications for passes and decides whether or not to grant access to the pass dispositif. This occurs through interviews with the candidate for the pass, discussion, and elaboration of the issues that may arise from there.

Gathering the request and the reasons of the candidate justifying their entry into the pass—which is always a gamble—while intervening as little as possible, requires guided listening, free of judgment, from a position sufficiently destitute of subjectivity.

The responsibility of the AMEs is considerable regarding the functioning of the pass as a dispositif, since the designation of passers depends on them.

The analyst’s sufficiency is, paradoxically, relative to their subjective destitution; we find this observation in the written version of the Proposition as developed by Quinet (2022, p.99). This is the only form of sufficiency compatible with the analyst and which is the opposite of positioning them as the knowing subject, since what is emphasized is their destitution.

The analyst must therefore be sufficiently destituted of his own subjectivity—something that occurred in his own analysis—in order to be able to exercise his function as such. This means having experienced not only narcissistic destitution but also finding oneself destituted of the signifiers that represent him, experiencing oneself as disidentified, symbolically empty of representation. To be sufficiently destituted is to consent to effacing oneself in order to play the role of the object; thus, it is while destituted of his subjectivity that the analyst locates in the analysand the signs of the end, of the analysand-analyst passage—which can lead this subject to honor the passeur function.

The passeur function is, in my view, the most challenging in the structure of the pass; its responsibility is immense, like walking a tightrope carrying a crystal treasure that does not belong to you in your hand without letting it fall until it is delivered to its destination. And how to fulfill this task without bringing something of oneself into it, setting aside possible identifications with the passant or theoretical judgments, and instead allowing oneself to be traversed by the passing's testimony and transmitting it to the cartel of the pass. Living up to the function of transmitting the testimony that can carry the impossible depends on the "act of setting oneself aside to listen to the other," as well as on transmitting to the cartel the essence of one's listening.

As for the passant who comes to historicize his analysis before the passeurs, he may be fortunate enough to convey in his testimony something of his subjective destitution, his "strong and singular being"—a destituted subject who knows himself to be an object and makes this position his destiny of satisfaction.

Finally, it falls to the cartel of the pass the delicate task of welcoming and listening to the passeurs, respecting the particular way in which each one presents themselves and chooses to carry out their work, though it is sometimes necessary for the cartel to intervene to guide the excesses or deviations of the passeur's function.

On the other hand, it is expected that each member of the cartel be able to allow themselves to be moved by the passeur's speech, gathering within the texture of their speech and voice the indices "of the unheard, of the unexpected" (Finguermann, 2016, p. 106) of that which, emerging as an original trait, serves as a sign, a sign of passage to the analyst. To have known, in one's own analysis, the experience of subjective destitution and to be able to operate from that point—which implies the real of the act—is what can authorize each one to perform their function within the dispositif. From this experience, the outcome of each pass is decided, and from it is drawn, in subsequent elaboration, the knowledge that arises from the encounter with the passeurs.

Situating subjective destitution as an ethical position capable of sweeping away certain obstacles present in the pass dispositif is less an apology than a commitment to the formation of analysts at the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field.

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I want to place some considerations on the subjective destitution in the passage to the analyst. Not all the destitutions that take place in the cure and in a School of psychoanalysis are homologous to the one that Lacan introduced around the analytic act and what emerges from this act. In order to better situate the one that is, I will begin with two that are not. I begin then with a dismissal that takes place in the School and its Forums, the permutation of positions, which stipulates a necessary destitution.

Permutation does not only respond to a definition of institutional architecture, which could be that or any other, but to the fact that there is a power inherent in the functions of the word. Permutation limits this power, that of the word, by limiting accumulation and distributing the opportunity for experience in the School. When this power operates in a clandestine way, as Lacan said, the destiny is the clan. They are libidinal weaves that in some cases, to tell the truth, we hasten to call “transference”. What makes these weaves sometimes turn to aggressiveness?

The act « disaifies² » it is a fact, but a suggestive libidinal trail remains after the termination of the analytic course. I will come back to deaification in a moment. Now, can the transference balance be elaborated in the analysis itself? And what can the School offer to this effect? There is another device for dealing with political matters, one that did not wait for psychoanalysis to appear: the assembly. There, too, the transference and incurable entanglements come to light. I am not going to go into that now, I am just mentioning it. It is something that has to be dealt with.

So, do we have to dissolve the libidinal plots of the clans? The question is not new, of course. Not in my opinion, not at all. On the other hand, not that we could. I consider that for a School desire, it is more important to see how to link them together than to fight them blindly. In this sense, the poster as a working device usually gives good results, even if, like any poster, in some sections it gets difficult. And what will be a desire for a school? I do not know if I can define it, but I can recognize in this: the survival of a School of psychoanalysis and not of psychoanalysts. That is to say, if there is a community of experience, it is because there is a treatment of enjoyment. There, the blurring of singularities that occurs in the cartels awakens and sometimes consolidates a taste for a collective way of working that is quite rare in comparison with any other form of the group. So, what motivates the association between people who are interested in and even engaged in psychoanalysis? I come back to destitution.

In addition to the permutation, another destitution different from the one that takes place in the analysis is that of the melancholic. I take it also as a counterpoint. That of the melancholic is a destitution beforehand. Although we call them testimonies, in the existential testimony of the melancholic there is not that proper thirdness that is on the horizon and in the structure of a true testimony. Exhibiting *jouissance*, even claiming it, is not the same as “identifying oneself with one's symptom”, as Lacan proposes in his Seminar “L'insu que sait...”. The

² J. Lacan, “L'acte psychanalytique”, dans *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001 p. 379.

Freudian intelligence here is still unsurpassable: these identifications that oscillate between the most real edge of the object and the imaginary sticking to the ideal do not deprive, but cancel the subject. And yet, there are melancholics in analysis who reach that conclusion that is drawn by interrogating, and not only describing, the symptom.

I would therefore like to use this rather late proposal of Lacan's, the identification with the symptom, to demarcate a specific point of destitution in analysis. The identification with the symptom locates what the analyst will have to destitute himself of in order to cause the analyzing task, or at least not to hinder it too much. In the subjective destitution there is something that is captured by what Lacan introduces in the seminar on the act as the aforementioned "desaification". This takes the position of the analyst a step beyond not knowing or abstinence from being represented as a subject in the dispositif. That is to say, when does an analysis enter the Lacanian field? That is already a question of enjoyment and not only of language.

In the very destitution of the act, the analyst is introduced into the logic of the cure as object a, the incidence of a lack, a Lacanian definition that I take up from the seminar of the crucial problems, comes in handy at this point. The incidence of a lack is a function of the object a that is very rare outside analytic discourse. In the unclean world, the object is not lacking, it is superfluous. The difficult handling of the object a in psychoanalysis is something that we could say constitutes the Lacanian field as a practice of his theory.

Even in the School, where each one manages according to what he obtained in his analysis, there are discursive effects, flashes, polishings that without implying a new entry into analysis can affirm transformations in the subject. It is that analysis, what a paradox, has prepared the subject for contingency. Because it is also true that the School not only tests what has been obtained, but also prolongs and realizes it. But, there is something that the analyst has not lived, something that from his own experience cannot be repeated with his analysand: that which analysis introduces *anew* in the subject.

The subjective destitution in the analyst is conditioned by the case-by-case, because each analyst tests the destitution in his analyst in a different way. It is there where, with his interval essence, the analyst gives his « desêtre³ ». This desêtre, even if it is always the same in its logical consistency and ethics, is not universal at all levels, nor does it mean the same thing at every opportunity. Even the same case at different times of the cure teaches the analyst with what of his person he will have to pay. The analyst has experienced in his analysis that the desêtre is worth as an opportunity and not as a position. Is this what Lacan is aiming at when he says that it is not the subjective destitution « that makes desêtre, but rather being, singularly and strong!⁴ »? What this function of the void means in the real is a chance for the analysand, the good hole, the real one through which to make something new pass, the signifier of his heresy in the Other. And then, what leads someone to want to deal with the position of the analyst, which is neither a subjective nor an existential position?

³ J. Lacan, "Discours à l'École Freudienne de Paris", dans *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 273.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 273.

This decision is radically ethical, perhaps more opaque than the obscure decision of being. The analytical, transformative act is like laughter, which makes itself heard without asking for anything. It does not lie, it happens or it does not happen. And it is something that is really important in the procedure of the pass, how it is detected, how something is felt that allows inferring there a saying in the analysis. In my different experiences at the School, I was able to verify the echo of a pulsional meaning in the very thrust of the collective work. A work that was then about questions for psychoanalysis and that no longer found its cause in my own curiosity about the analysis of others, nor in a personal desire for confirmation.

The subjective destitution takes over from the separating object as a condition of the analytic opportunity, but it also implies a counter-experience of the plus-de-joy in the analyst. That is why I return here to two balances of the analysis, two balances that I found in both devices of the School: one, in the name of what to disassociate my position, and two, wanting to love my unconscious with a fresh, real, incautious love. That is why the pass is not a guided tour through the museum of analysis itself, but a living experience. That with the unconscious it is better to have a *crush* so that it is not a *crash*, that has marked me. Rather, every time I give place to the unconscious, when it happens, then I find something quite new again. But, and here comes an important but, “this does not mean that the unconscious guides us well”, warned Lacan in his Opening of the Clinical Section. And of course, if it is the identification with the symptom that gives its Borromean sanity to the use of the unconscious in the analytic experience. Otherwise, the interpretations will be parlor jokes, without colors, neither black nor green.

That something matters in the real happens to me a little more often during the conversation with the analysands, when I meet again that which leads me to give them the opportunity to love their unconscious... or worse. The subjective destitution that I practice, when it comes out, is never once and for all, which makes the matter much more unexpected and without any guarantee. It is not an existential position, nor a stipulated requirement. It is rather not, to tell the truth, a proper position but the very step to be present in what is said, without going too crazy. Present in what is said and in what is not. Sometimes it happens, even without my acknowledgment, but never without me seeking for it.

Translation by the author

TABLE 3 : REPETITION, THE NEW

I DO NOT THINK, I FIND...

Silvia Migdalek
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Argentine

I have thought long and hard about what I wanted to convey with my speech today, which is part of the space we give to the School, to our School, at each of our meetings, on this occasion as a preliminary to our Sixth Inter-American Symposium of the Lacanian Field. I remember perfectly well that, in this very room, we inaugurated the first one, the one that began the series, and that it was oriented towards the act of naming and consolidating working relationships, what we genuinely call work transference. Interamerican, with all the diversity that this includes. The Interamerican is an inclusive proposal. At that time, we came together to work and debate 'The voice and the gaze in art and psychoanalysis'. On that occasion, I also had the opportunity to present a panel in which this inclusive character was embodied in action, that is to say, if you like, politically and ethically, although as always, we were able to elaborate its effects a posteriori, après coup. It was a panel in which colleagues spoke, testifying in community, with others, about their experience as 'non-nominated' passants, about its effects and also its defects. I remember it as something novel and interesting. But above all because what was verified in those presentations was that the outcome was an enlivened desire for psychoanalysis beyond nominations, which is another issue, the value of the experience itself was conveyed in a very exciting way. We cannot expect less from this meeting in Buenos Aires, and to begin to orient myself on the subject, I will say that this Symposium School meeting makes room for the automaton and also for tyche, open to surprise. As we know, there is no one without the other, and a conceptual clarification I would like to make at the outset is that for psychoanalysis there is no emergence of the new outside the framework of repetition.

Undoubtedly, the theme that brings us together is immense, and I must confess that my first association was with a biblical sentence from the book of Ecclesiastes, a book to which Lacan refers in Seminar 21. Ecclesiastes is the book of vanities, vanity of vanities, all is vanity... One of its sentences is 'nothing new under the sun', which paradoxically and ironically encourages the search for something new.

So I thought I would try to refrain from falling into repetition, even though I knew that, as Lacan said in Seminar XI

'What repeats is never the same, but rather what insists on repeating.'

The theme that brings us together at this table, 'Reinventing psychoanalysis: a School to activate with repetition, the new', formulates a wish for our community: an active, present School of psychoanalysis that accepts the challenge, the task, of reinventing psychoanalysis each time. I found it interesting that in the presentation of the theme, we are told that this task that Lacan has bequeathed to us is fastidious, precisely because there is something untransmittable at its core. Elsewhere, I have found the word 'annoying' used as a translation for what needs to be done, but not only because of the impossibility that always underlies what is transmissible, that is, its untransmissibility, but above all because of its effects, its consequences.

I will begin by briefly clarifying the crucial importance of the ‘fundamental concept’ of repetition, both for the analyst who is part of what is produced, who puts the body in the scene, etc., as well as for the clinician who must theorize and reflect on it.

It appears very early on in Freud's work. This is not the place to trace its genealogy, but it should be emphasized that in Freud's work it is a new clinical shift, arising as a result of the conclusions he reached regarding analytic technique after more than 25 years of work. Freud links repetition with the drive in some famous chapters of that text. The compulsion to repeat is staged in transference, emerging, says Freud, as a scene with unwanted fidelity in the field of transference. This text is the most acute with regard to repetition in transference, which is one of the three clinical references that Freud introduces to demonstrate the existence of a beyond the pleasure principle. He makes lengthy lecture developments, presumably imagining the consequences that this novelty of the Beyond could generate. We know that it was strongly resisted by both his disciples and his contemporaries, resisted because it questioned the very idea of Good and the effect this could have on his contemporaries and detractors. I always remember the anecdote that when we presented the content of the Freud Psychoanalysis course to the governing council of the University of Buenos Aires, we were objected to for including the reference to the demonic character of this compulsion to repeat. The objection was directed at the use of the term ‘demonic.’

The fundamental conclusion of that text is that psychoanalysis, after 25 years of experience, needed to correct an error in its conceptions: resistance in analysis does not come from the repressed unconscious, since the unconscious is the greatest contributor to the efforts of the cure.

As we said earlier, ‘What is repeated is never the same, but rather what insists on repeating itself.’

Along these lines, Freud distinguishes a repetition as the motor of the work of cure, that is, the repressed unconscious, which chooses repetition as one of the modes of the return of the repressed, and concludes with the statement that ‘novelty is the condition of *jouissance*’.

Repetition allows the emergence of the new, but this is not without a certain suffering that cannot be avoided, and likewise without going through the tedium and tiresome nature of repetition.

Finally, the text to which we are referring opens the way, somewhat abruptly, to a change in the doctrine of drives, which is the aspiration to return to a previous state from which life once departed... one of Freud's biological metaphors. Resistance comes from elsewhere, from what remains after each repetition, that eternal return of the same or those enigmatic masochistic tendencies of the ego.

With Lacan, that miraculous reader of Freud, when addressing this topic, we cannot fail to recall the fundamental contribution to understanding repetition in our field, namely the differentiation of what in repetition must be distinguished as *Tyche* and *automaton*. I do not have time to elaborate on this, but *tyche* as an encounter, as good or bad luck, gives rise to a new elective opportunity for a subject, contingently in a transference.

Lacan, as we know, articulates it as the function of the real in repetition, an aspect which, having been unknown, allowed a deviation to occur in psychoanalysis, which Lacan calls the greatest stupidity, which consisted in confusing transference with repetition. Lacan warns that it is not a question of there being no repetition in transference, but rather that transference is not reducible to repetition.

And what must operate in this direction beyond transference and even against transference is the function of the analyst's desire as a cut, without which there is nothing new under the sun. If we had a little more time, this moment would lead us to question the fundamental

dimension that the event acquires as the emergence of a saying that is not without consequences.

There are several Freudian ideas that draw on this direction: repetition in the context of transference is not harmless; it summons fragments of real life; nothing can be executed in absentia or in effigy; and Lacan, many years later in Seminar XIX, says

'every traumatic father is, in fact, in the same position as the psychoanalyst.'

Lacan specifies that if the psychoanalyst reproduces neurosis from his position, the traumatic father, he produces it innocently. This is what this example of Lacan, psychoanalyst and also traumatic but innocent father, shows us.

To conclude, I would like to refer to repetition and the new in the analytic institution.

To do so, I will use an articulator that connects the theme of the analyst and the clinician (the theme of our Symposium) with that of the analytic institution, and for us, or for many of us here today, the analytic institution, to which we continue to commit ourselves in a renewed way, is the School. The articulator I want to use is the mechanism of disavowal, the *verleugnung*.

In the splitting of the ego in the process of defense, Freud defines it as the simultaneous coexistence of two contradictory judgements: the subject knows, but at the same time does not want to know, the famous 'I know, but even so' written by Mannoni, which illustrates the position of the neurotic in the face of castration, that is, in the face of the impossible. Disavowal is neither repression nor denial nor re-negation. It has an anchor in logic and ethics.

We also know that Lacan refers to the analyst's position in regard to the act, to its forgetting and to its disavowal in Seminar XV, where the idea that the analyst can be the one who disavows the very act that constitutes him as such is sharpened like a scalpel. Lacan precisely distinguishes the analytic act from other forms of action; it is not a question of the analyst's intention, the analyst does not know about his act except through the effects it has a posteriori, and in this way he introduces a discontinuity, a twist in the repetition.

The analyst's forgetting of the act, the disavowal, the horror of the act due to the emergence of the real, prevents the rupture of repetition and does not introduce the new. The new in the cure only comes about if the analyst consents, allows himself to fall, as an object, and endures the loss in that place.

In the Proposition to the Analysts of the School, a founding moment of something new, a beginning, Lacan indicates the importance of that hinge, of that articulation between intension and extension,

and among other things - this is what I want to say in conclusion - analytic institutions often have a discursive structure in which they systematically proceed to disavow what the experience of an analysis leads to, that is, the encounter as an event for each person of some real that they have confronted without looking away. This disavowal in the analytic institution obstructs the emergence of the new. The use of the master signifiers prevails

. In 1998, the International of the Forums of the Lacanian Field was born, precisely as a counter-experience to go against the one of uniformization. Our testimonial book of that crisis, recently reissued by ED de ALSUR, is a gesture that gave way in our community to a new re-reading of history, as well as to the question of what institutions we want, which once again acquired the centrality it deserves to be sustained.

With the founding of the School, an act born of a rupture, of an excommunication, came a break with the dogma and orthodoxy of the IPA. It was a new beginning, an act that would be understood by its effects, its consequences. A new form of grouping of analysts was created, a new form of bond between analysts. Not a 'scientific society', not an 'association', but a

School of psychoanalysis, not of psychoanalysts. The founding act of the School was a form of resistance and affirmation of the specificity of psychoanalysis.

An institution that does not disavow what an experience of analysis confronts, in the sense that it is an operation of sweeping away the Other, a castrating operation.

Today more than ever, the detractors of psychoanalysis and also the faux amis (false friends) accuse us of being stale, of always talking about the same thing, as we say here, for the parish. We continue with our immense task of reinventing psychoanalysis, of sustaining our offer of a School in which the procedure of the pass makes room for the analysand who decides to renew the commitment to a possible future for the analytic discourse in our world.

To conclude, I must say that from the Buenos Aires Pole of the Argentinian Forum we are working with renewed enthusiasm, overcoming the obstacles, which are always present, but working so that, as we have been invited to do at this School day:

“encourage, animate, enliven, give “a little more substance” to the work of the School around that which Lacan calls us to reinvent.”

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

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The experience and the repetition

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In 1990, Colette Soler examined the particularity of the experience of the pass as an experience distinct from experimentation, which the dictionary defines as "a scientific method that, starting from a hypothesis, consists of observing and classifying a phenomenon under controlled conditions." We could also understand it by returning to an intervention four years earlier by François Regnault, when, in the United States, he distinguished between *experimentum mentis* and *experimentum crucis* – an expression used by Newton.

In fact, in 1986, Regnault questioned Newton when he identified science with the *experimentum crucis*... because, as Koyré had shown, to prove that bodies fall at the same speed in a vacuum, it would be pointless to throw cannonballs of different weights or metals from the Tower of Pisa – in a vacuum, there is no air resistance, which they would encounter in Pisa... Therefore, concluding that in a vacuum bodies fall at the same speed required only the *experimentum mentis* – the mental experiment. Unlike the simple mental experiment, the experiment to which Colette Soler refers would, in fact, be the manifestation of something that always surprises the subject grappling with anticipations in their reality. In other words, "experience is what one does not imagine" and, therefore, in it "the real would respond without being questioned" (p. 473). She concludes: "Psychoanalysis is truly an experience" (idem).

We could articulate this with Kierkegaard's observation, reflected in the title of the Danish philosopher's work on *Repetition: Essay on Experimental Psychology*, from 1843, in which he examines repetition as a vehicle for each person to find their own truth and determination – *Wahrheit und Bestimmung* (Kierkegaard, 1843/2008). This conception of *experimental psychology*, which runs counter to experimentation as a scientific method – something that even people who call themselves psychoanalysts aspire to today, especially in the context of the Anglo-Saxon IPA – is truly surprising, as well as it is surprising to find a mid-19th-century author who is so current, to the point of even approaching repetition in a way that is the opposite of what we read, for example, in Marx's contemporary *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (Marx, 1852/1953, p. 11) where repetition interrupts the historical continuity of the creation of something that has not yet been there – *von etwas noch nicht Dagewesenem*.

Now, the notion that Lacan (1964/1973) introduced in 1964 in connection with a minor footnote in Freud's text written in 1912 (Freud, 1912/1975), of repetition as *tuché*, is precisely what creates something new, something that was not there before, because it repeats in contingency, in chance, surprising us. This is precisely where Kierkegaard proposes that repetition can be an instrument available to a subject seeking their Truth and Determination.

In his text, François Regnault does not deny that the subject of psychoanalysis is a product of scientific discourse, that is, produced by science as that which it rejects. Moreover, it does so because it allows "research programs," with greater or lesser investment of capital, but precisely programs in which scientists question the real, as Colette Soler says, which requires imagining it initially. Psychoanalysis is impossible to imagine initially, no matter how many times we repeat psychoanalytic experiences. What is repeated here is the new: with each analytical experience, a new one, just as Rimbaud sang of love: "Your head turns away: O the new love! Your head turns back, - O the new love!" ¹

Therefore, it is not in science that we find crucial experiments, but precisely where that which science rejects is present: it is "in psychoanalysis that we find crucial experiments because it is there that cases exist" (Regnault, 2020, p. 100), the clinical cases. Psychoanalysis is an *experimentum crucis* in which the subject learns his usual way of dealing with the real, that is, by evading the impossibility of repeating it, to return to the reference to Kierkegaard in Lacan's Seminar *Encore* (Lacan, 1975). This impossibility of repeating it is due to the gap between inscription and event, as Maine de Biran already said, and which Lacan associates with the object *a*. This object is the very fact of saying: "where am I in saying?" if not always elsewhere, when I seek my Determination? An experience from which emerges, for each of us, the truth of the Freudian discovery, identified by Lacan as that of "the radical eccentricity with respect to itself that man is faced with" (Lacan, 1957/2002, p. 435), and which "brought the border between object and being that seemed to mark the limits of science within its ambit" (idem, p. 438).

Each case is a crucial experience, a paradigm, so that "our experience" as analysts is the totality of our cases, but totality taken as contradictory in itself, an open or empty totality, a surprising novelty. An experience that Freud introduced in his time when he created psychoanalysis, repeated by Lacan against the single thought in psychoanalysis supported at the time by *La Psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui*, the title of the book then published by the IPA and which Lacan imposes as an ethical orientation to question, both in *The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious*, from 1957, as in *The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power*, from 1958. "Thus the vulgarity of the concepts by which its practice [of *La psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui*] shows its mettle, the embroidery of Freudery [fofreudisme] which is now mere decoration, and what must be called the discredit in which it prospers, together bear witness to the fundamental repudiation of that discovery" (Lacan, 1957/2002, p. 438). A counter-experience that he would have to revisit in 1967, creating the pass, and in 1980, when he dissolved his School, only to persevere, as he said. With each new repetition of what Freud introduced, whether in psychoanalysis in intension — in transference work, when the analyst offers himself to the consumption of the achievements of desire for the benefit of his cause, as Colette Soler takes up from Lacan — or in the transference of work, when the School promotes counter-experience with each repetition, I understand that it is repetition as a product of the psychoanalyst's discourse that we are talking about: the new love that changes!

Translation by the author, revised by Gabriela Zorzutti

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From repetition to Repetition : From *Automaton* to the *Thyké*

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Introduction: Freud the inventor's solitude, Lacan the founder

I will begin with a personal anecdote that accompanied me when I was investigating how to respond to this invitation. In that search I revisited the text *Split, Excommunication, Dissolution*, and I had a feeling similar to the one that is imposed on me every time I start reading *One Hundred Years of Solitude*: to make a family tree that allows me to orient myself in the succession of generations, however, the succession of generations is the succession of repetitions in the sense of a kind of *automaton*; some reproduce the sins of previous generations, others are inventors, founders.

In the same sense, I also believe that it is not gratuitous that the signifier "100 years of solitude" refers me to the solitude of Lacan, and also to that of Freud. There is the time when Freud considered himself like Robinson on the desert island, a time in which, although loneliness and isolation reigned, even harsh criticism and rejection, it was nevertheless a time that he considered "the beautiful heroic age". That solitude was to a certain extent the condition for the invention of psychoanalysis as an event: to introduce a new, unprecedented thought into the world.

There is also Lacan with his well-known sentence "I found as alone as I have always been..." with which he begins his *Act of Foundation of the Freudian School of Paris*, written on June 21, 1964, a dense statement that, as usual with Lacan, condenses multiple levels. "I found as alone as I have always been in my relationship with the psychoanalytic cause"; he uttered it when he created his own School, the *École Freudienne de Paris* (EFP), after his excommunication from the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). So, what does this loneliness refer to? Because it is, without a doubt, a foundation in psychoanalysis:

1. Structural loneliness of the subject: "loneliness" is not simply the feeling of not having others. In Lacan, the subject is structurally alone; there is no Other that guarantees the ultimate meaning. The subjective division, the unconscious structured as a language and the misunderstanding, the "*there is no sexual relationship*", all point to an impossibility.

2. Solitude of the analyst: the analyst, for Lacan, is not an *ego* that directs or knows, but a function that is embodied in the analytic act. This act cannot be supported by any external authority, neither scientific, nor religious, nor institutional.

The foundation of a School *solely* implies assuming the risk of an act without guaranteed support, such as the analytic act itself. In this sense, the act of foundation: founding is an act, which would not be identical to the analytic act, but which shares its structure of doing so without the guarantees of the Other, of being the creator of something unprecedented, and, thus, defines it as an inaugural experience because in doing so it aims not to repeat or ritualize the experiences of institution that precede it.

Repetition – ritualization

Let's keep history in mind. It is Freud who created it, I would say delightedly, *ex-nihilo*. The historical, cultural, as well as subjective conditions of Freud's appearance can be cleared up, and thus open the chapter of what Lacan was able to formulate about these conditions, but whatever these may be, it is Freud's saying that is the cause of this transfer to psychoanalysis. It is the Freud event that brought into existence a desire for psychoanalysis.

Lacan managed to relaunch – that is certain – a new transference to psychoanalysis that is clearly translated by the new or revived presence of psychoanalysis, wherever its teaching reaches in the world. However, for him it was not *ex-nihilo*. And, from the beginning, he did so to overcome the limits of Freudian practice about the "resistance" of the analysts themselves and their impasse to resolve the "living rock of castration" at the end of analysis.

With respect to the term "inaugural experience", Lacan used it to define the foundation of VET, in which he tried to sustain the relationship of each one to psychoanalysis and also to favor the thought of psychoanalysis, which is not the characteristic of our School today, the relationship of each one to psychoanalysis is not enough. but how that relationship can make community, and today we have a different logic. Today the School is international, the pass is international and we organize ourselves through international and multilingual devices and commissions, in such a way that today what can be defined as a community implies a different logic.

Diagnosis of our moment

Now, which is our moment? Colette Soler makes a pathetic, disturbing diagnosis. She says:

“At present, regarding what we teach of what psychoanalysis teaches, it is not a fecund moment of unprecedented productions. It is evident: all Lacanians live on the existence of the doctrines of Freud and Lacan. Luckily for us the stocks are so rich that the inventory is not completely finished, there are still drawers that have to be emptied before it all starts to sound like that same old refrain; and we do our best, of course, but it does not prevent us from being in a process of assimilation, of illustration, in the best of cases of development, of explanation, of elucidation. Look at the epidemic of quotations that afflicts the analytic world, the repetitions, the repetitions so tiring and that its enemies hold against it. Some would like to fake the new, removing the references, it is a lost cause. We deploy, then, a knowledge already there that is sustained by the name of Lacan, placed in function of the signifier Master.¹”

What is missing is the act, we are adepts of psychoanalysis, we are transmitters, but we do not know how to be analysands of psychoanalysis as Lacan did. So I ask myself: do we repeat Lacan?, what is the new that we can create?, how to create the new without implying a deviation?

¹ C. Soler. "Política de la Escuela", in Florilegios del Mensual, Asociación Foro del Campo Lacaniano de Medellín, Medellín, 2010. p. 66.

What have we learned in the history of our institutions? What can come as new?

The School of the Lacanian Field – itself – has been created, founded to transcend the experience that precedes us in the WAP (World Association of Psychoanalysis). What have we learned? Are we safe from returning to the natural slope of the installation of the rector Other? This has been the bet for more than 20 years to maintain the polyphony of multiple voices without the masterful One. The signifier Forum itself indicates a collective space for debate.

There is really no vaccine against segregation, rivalries, group obscenities, there is no vaccine against the tendency to install the Other in the place of the master, even if it is Lacan himself as S1. Freud himself said that the masses thirsted for authority, but we have managed to create a community in which the rules of operation have been created year after year as a result of international debates, trying to make those rules essentially conform to the meaning of our praxis. In them, permutation stands out. No one should hold the same position for a period of more than two years and decisions are not made in a personal capacity.

The Charter and the Assembly are the consultative and decision-making body in the operation. On the other hand, if the dispositif of the pass was precisely at the heart of the crisis that preceded our counter-experience, in the EPFCL, since 2001, an experiment has been carried out that ensures that its procedure depends only on the analytical experience itself and with the sole objective of accounting for the guarantee of the analyst's formation. And for this we have created the Pass Cartels as ephemeral, multinational and multilingual, there is no Pass College with a power of reception and appointment according to the political conveniences of the functioning of groups, as was evidenced in 1998 in the WAP. For each pass request, the International College of Guarantee (ICG) chooses a 4, +1 cartel composed of AME analysts or AEs, members of the College, who meet on a temporary basis to listen to the testimony of the 2 passeurs, deliberate for as long as necessary and determine whether or not there is an AE nomination.

Once this process is completed, the report is given to the ICG; the response must be prompt and the cartel is automatically dissolved. We can specify, a little more, that when choosing these five members for the Cartel of the Pass, a procedure is carried out to verify the inabilities or incompatibilities according to the proximity by friendship or colleague or the analytical inabilities that refer to the proximity because it is a colleague who controls or, even, an analysand of the analyst himself. *The Charter* on the Rules of Procedure of the ICG states: "The ICG is responsible for directing passes to one of the Cartels of the pass, taking into account languages and incompatibilities. It would be advisable to avoid the presence in the cartel of: the analyst of the passant, of his current control analyst, possibly of a current analysand of the same analyst, and sometimes people very close to him."²

What can be seen is that the work that has been done over these 20 years is to think of a politics of transference that can exclude any type of transference that may fall on a single person, cultivating, in contrast, polymorphism; this must also be thought of because one thing was the mode of organization proposed by the International Psychoanalysis (IPA), created by Freud, in which the transferences are directed, commanded in a vertical way, exclusively directed towards the analyst and, in turn, exclusively designated by the institution itself. We know that Lacan did not cease to regret that Freud's choice was to maintain his institution on the model of the Church. The proposal made by Lacan implies a different logic with respect to transferences, one could say cross-transferences, but how can they be preserved in order to keep them free from manipulation or incidents that could depend on political interests in the management of functioning?

² International College of Guarantee, *Echos, Echoes, Ecos, Echi*, n° 17, 2018-2020, p.4. <https://www.champlacanian.net/public/docu/3/Echos17.pdf>

It should not be forgotten that Lacan, in his text on *The Direction of the Cure and the Principles of its Power*, highlights the power embodied by transference, but clearly says "on condition of not making use of it"³, that is, it is an ethics in the institution, in the analytic school that is the International of Forums (IF) ensures an ethics that implies not making use of the imaginary power that transference grants.

Now, the WAP would follow the path of Lacan's foundation, but, as we see in 1998: far from being a true community of experience, it repeated the model of the IPA; it is what Colette Soler, in *Psychoanalysis in the Face of One-track Thought*, defines as the reverse of the orientation. This World Association had been created with a function that is defined as the right to supervise analytic nominations, which implied, to a certain extent, the resurgence of the same apparatus that had operated in Lacan's directive of excommunication. It was then a question, I go on quoting Colette Soler, of the power of a directorate to grant or deny the analytic guarantee, specifically in this case under the decision of a single person who proposed himself as a measure of the analytic thing. This domination of the hierarchy of political power over the qualification of the analyst was precisely what Lacan, in inventing his School and the pass, strove to proscribe. The reverse of Lacan's project was launched under the name of School⁴.

So, the bet is to be able to situate the politics of the School contrary to the collective political ideal around the One and the power of that One; even one that is oriented by the one-track thought. That is the point at which the IF and its School have taken the step to found, no longer in solitude, but as a product of collective consent. The bet was to create a multiple, diverse, international, multilingual School, that is, a School with politics against the grain; the aim was not to preserve the *automaton* that preceded it but something new. If we consider the events that gave rise to the creation of the Lacanian Field and that are reviewed in the book, *Psychoanalysis versus single thinking*, one might think that, precisely, it is a matter of promoting an objection to the discourse that sutures, that prevents questioning and criticism, that works against provoking the desire for psychoanalysis, because what it promotes is identification and mass or, in any case, it reintroduces the logic of the group.

The movement, then, is that of a new bet: "This is what is at the beginning of the dissidence whose history, we have written, was like a great tidal wave tending to preserve the very conditions of analytical thought and, therefore, also those of analytic practice."⁵

From solitude to solidarity

Now, although the act, the analytic act and creation imply solitude, we have introduced a new logic: to move from solitude to solidarity. According to *the Charter*:

The Forums therefore operate according to the principle of initiative, which is limited only by the principle of solidarity. The principle of initiative is easily understood: it ensures that bureaucratic operation does not stifle new ideas and is not an obstacle to novel projects when they are compatible with the purposes of the Forums. The principle of solidarity rather recalls that in a whole linked by a common project, the acts of one, whether of a member or of an entire Forum, commit the whole of these by their consequences. It therefore calls for consultation at all levels and for the responsibility of everyone. These are the principles of the IF, but question: do those of the School necessarily go further? If the essential dispositifs of the School are the Cartel and the Pass, do these principles apply in the same way?

³ J. Lacan, "The Direction of the Cure and the Principles of Its Power," in *Ecrits* New York, Norton, 2002

⁴ C. Soler, L. Soler, J. Adam, and D. Silvestre. *Psychoanalysis, not a single imposed thought. History of a singular crisis*. Soon to appear in English by Cuerno Verde Press.

⁵ C. Soler, L. Soler, J. Adam, and D. Silvestre. *Psychoanalysis, not a single imposed thought. History of a singular crisis*. Soon to appear in English by Cuerno Verde Press, p.6.

Assiduous criticism

To conclude, I want to introduce some reflections on the function that Lacan gives to the School in his creation. I return to it in the Act of Foundation: the School as the place where work must be carried out that returns psychoanalysis to its rightful place in the world through an "assiduous critique" that denounces its deviations and the concessions that degrade its use⁶; we know this because we repeat it by heart every time we return to the act of foundation. That is the task of the Lacanian School. In 1980, in the *Letter of Dissolution*⁷, he resumed the task he had undertaken. Did the School fulfill its function by then? It seems that it did not and he dissolves it, while announcing that he maintains his commitment. That is to say, he perseveres in it and with that commitment he founds the Freudian Field with those who wish to continue that cause.

The question then is, how do we understand this today in our School or what do we call assiduous criticism? To say assiduous means "frequent, punctual, persevering".

In the context of Lacanian psychoanalysis, "assiduous criticism" refers to the constant and rigorous practice of examining and questioning the foundations and developments of psychoanalysis, both inside and outside the School. This critique does not seek simply to point out errors, it is not to "criticize", in the imaginary sense of the term, the practice of colleagues, but rather to maintain the vitality and relevance of psychoanalysis, denouncing deviations and compromises that may hinder its progress. Criticism in the imaginary sense directed at the ways of working of colleagues would itself explode the institution. It is another modality then.

Its function is to protect psychoanalysis from petrification and from losing the original force of psychoanalysis. That is, that it can restore the cutting edge and, consequently, prevent it from becoming a dogmatic doctrine, ensuring that it remains a living and constantly evolving practice. We know very well that Lacan addresses and specifically challenges the analysts who are members of the School.

What can be the means? Criticism is manifested through discussion, debate, the reinterpretation of concepts and the application of psychoanalysis so that it can restore its place in a world that increasingly tries to exclude it. However, maintaining this constant critique is essential to ensure that psychoanalysis remains a useful tool for understanding the complexity of human experience and for addressing the problems of subjectivity.

In Lacan's definition it seems fundamental to me to highlight what is related to the "concessions" in *The Letter of Dissolution* he called them "deviations and compromises". What does he mean? I make my own hypothesis and I suppose that it refers to all the exchanges that are made with the other incidences of the *psi* in order to preserve not the specificity of psychoanalysis, but "the homeostases of professional fraternities."⁸

It seems evident, to a certain extent, that today psychoanalysis does not have a guaranteed place in the social context either in the universities or in the clinical field where, on the one hand, the offer of neurosciences is emerging with increasing force, and, on the other hand, the legalization of psychotherapies and other therapeutic practices that are offered as fast and efficient to respond to the clamor of humanity. Among them, the offer of analytically oriented psychotherapy or brief psychotherapies based on psychoanalysis and even a version of "neuropsychanalysis", etc., appears as a weak phantom, so as not to disappear or, at least, to gain entry into institutional or state spaces. Colette Soler says: "The least that can be said is that today the lack of a status of the psychoanalyst sufficiently founded in his practice to be

⁶ J. Lacan, "Acto de Fundación". in *Otros Escritos*. Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 2012. p. 247.

⁷ J. Lacan, "Carta de dissolution", in *Otros Escritos*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 2012. p. 337.

⁸ C. Soler, *Political Incidences of Psychoanalysis 2. Texts, essays and conferences* Barcelona, Ediciones S & P, 2011. p. 810.

credible is evident. So obvious is the threat of confusing him with psi of all kinds, that States intervene in his affairs and that certain analysts applaud in the hope of a professional status granted by the State. In the absence of validation, a protected space is requested.⁹ "

We confirmed this in one of the latest surveys we conducted at the International Laboratory of Psychoanalytic Politics (LIPP) in the last half of 2024. Area by area we have been able to verify the state of affairs; The problem is, very clearly, how we can respond with psychoanalysis without degrading. Concessions that amortize their progress by degrading their employment. I will summarize with a question that brings me back to the title: then, how can we pass from repetition to creation, to the new – as I have said in passing a little earlier – without entering into deviation? Or turning into militants? What are the possible means of change?

A somewhat ironic rule proposed by Colette Soler in the lecture given for the Federation of Forums Spain, FFCLE F8, which I will paraphrase to conclude: If for the analysand the fundamental rule is that of free association, the rule for analysts could be "forbidden to quote Lacan, not forbidden to read Lacan", it means to speak with their own vocabulary, being analysands, it is not simply a matter of seeing that something has to be rectified¹⁰. It is necessary to see if there are ways to rectify it.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

⁹ Ibid, p. 815.

¹⁰ C. Soler, *Even with Lacan*, unpublished, Seminar School of 14 February 2025

THE PASS : EXPERIENCE AND TESTIMONIES

12 JULY 2025, VENISE

EUROPEEN CONVENTION SCHOOL MEETING

ARGUMENT

Experience:

From time immemorial, philosophy has endeavored to determine the relationship between experience and knowledge: that which precedes it, or even conditions it, that which is deposited in it and that which can be transmitted from it. The debates and polemics have bounced back and forth from century to century, without ever concluding that one takes precedence over the other. Any mediation that provides access to the experience will remain on the side of the semblant, and nothing will exhaust its reality. But science, by establishing experimentation as a possible measure of truth, has not been able to establish a discourse that is not semblant.

"Experience" is a polysemous term, and its German translation reflects its different values: "Erlebnis" refers to the lived experience and its contingency, "Erfahrung" indicates its value as a process, and "Experiment" denotes experimentation. The psychoanalytic experience involves these different dimensions. The event Freud introduced into the world a new knowledge, the unconscious, on the basis of an experience, conceived by him as an experience of speech. He developed an "experimental" dispositif ordered by the process that Lacan would emphasize as the "Freudian process", involving the structural effects that transference uncovers.

The operation of the "analyst" can lead to a subversion of the relation to knowledge and jouissance that this transference displaces. Lacan's teaching, which seeks to bear witness to what he emphatically calls "the experience of analysis", specifies its conditions, formalizes its structure, implies its effects, and deduces from it the matheme of the Discourse that establishes it. From this he draws out what can be produced from the experience as an end, from which he distinguishes the 'experience of the pass', the passage from psychoanalyzed to psychoanalyst, a condition for the future of the analytic act. The proposal for the pass dispositif bets that this experience will not be ineffable and that the School will be able to collect any testimonies of it.

Testimony :

«testimonium» in Latin to give testament, to attest, to contest, to protest... all these derivatives clearly indicate a performative impact that is found in the Saying of the testimony, as an act of enunciation that would have the value of proof. To bear witness is to transmit the "knowledge of experience" of a lived experience by one person alone, summoned to speak out in order to assert this unique experience before another who is supposed to validate this reality, or not.

Justice and history have placed the function of testimony at the heart of their trials, while at the same time highlighting its paradoxical aspect: how can the experience of one person establish certainty?

Wars, the Holocaust and trauma in general throw testimony into another dilemma: between the impossibility and the urgency of saying.

Pass :

In proposing the pass as a clinical event and as a the dispositif of “guarantee” of the analyst, Lacan proposes a knot between experience and testimony, trial and proof. The unheard-of experience of the passant suddenly presents itself as the urgency of a testimony that takes the School as witness. Passeurs too are surprised by this knot between testimony and experience. The cartel in turn, though appointed a jury by Lacan, does not emerge unscathed from the experience it witnesses, and for which it must give an account.

The EPFCL European Convention in Venice offers us another opportunity to put our community of experience to the test.

TRUTH, TESTIMONY AND ACT

Didier Castanet
AME
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*Through writing, I have learned that happiness
does not consist in writing a poem,
but in being written by something or someone we do not know.¹*

For us psychoanalysts, the question of testimony is misplaced because it raises the problem of how to attest to an unspeakable truth that Lacan calls ‘the real.’

In his ‘Preface to the English edition of *Seminar XI*, Lacan asserts that truth dabbles with the real. It is tied to the real, to the real of the unconscious that no knowledge can dry up. This fiddling is that of knowledge and truth. Lacan takes this up again at the beginning of chapter IV of his *Seminar XXIV*.

The witness is always the one who must speak, but first there was a time of silence, of which he retains the trace and the memory.

To address this question of testimony in a general and rapid manner, I returned to Giorgio Agamben’s book, *Remnants of Auschwitz*.

This book is an ethical cartography of testimony. It is important for Agamben to highlight the ‘ethical and political significance of extermination’ by denouncing the confusion between the categories of law and ethics, judgment and truth, which, in my opinion, veil its meaning without our knowledge.

The question of testimony comes up against an unrepresentable conception of truth, ‘facts so real that nothing else, in comparison, is true.’ Such is the aporia of Auschwitz: historically determined facts do not coincide with a truth that transcends them.

With Nazism seeking to eliminate a people and destroy their humanity, a technique of power was used, according to Agamben, to create a category of prisoners whose human degradation was such that they would be incapable of bearing witness to their enslavement and the violence they suffered. Such was, according to the accounts of some other prisoners, the ordeal of those who were called ‘Muslims’ in the concentration camps.

Some former deportees, such as Primo Levi, testified to what the actors themselves were unable to testify to, since the aim was precisely to strip them of the human capacity to bear witness.

Agamben tells us, ‘Auschwitz constitutes the moment of a historical debacle, the traumatic experience where the impossible is introduced by force into the real. It is the existence of the impossible, the most radical negation of the contingent—and therefore the most absolute necessity.’ [3]

However, with regard to this real, neither the rules of law, nor morality (i.e., the feeling of guilt or shame), nor cultural references, such as those of Greek tragedy or its Nietzschean transcendence, will succeed in expressing what is beyond all testimony, when the only one

who could speak, the one who has been stripped of even the dignity of his own death, the 'Muslim', the one who is 'in charge of managing the crematoria and gas chambers', can no longer do so^[4].

In part 4 of his book entitled *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, Agamben starts from Foucault's method in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, modifying the perspective to re-examine the question of testimony. He tells us^[5]: 'It is not, of course, a question of returning to the old problem that Foucault intended to eliminate: how can the freedom of a subject find its way into the rules of a language'; but rather to situate the subject in the gap between the possibility and impossibility of speaking (*dire*), by asking: 'How can something like an enunciation occur on the level of language?'

In other words, it is no longer a question of identifying, as Agamben^[6] tells us, 'the obscure margin inscribed in all discourse, which defines and limits all concrete speech', nor of observing the disappearance of the subject in the anonymous murmur of 'anyone who speaks', but of showing how the subject is constructed from its 'contingency', that is, from the possibility it has had 'to have or not to have language'. To speak is to choose language each time, based on this contingency. If impossibility is forcibly introduced by some system, then contingency is denied, and with it the possibility of any testimony.

I am quoting here from a reference I have just read recently. It is Alain Fleisher's book, *Aller-Retour dans la langue que parlait mon père*^[7] ['Round Trip in the Language my Father Spoke'].

Without being able to elaborate, I would also like to mention this reference from Vladimir Jankélévitch, *L'imprescriptible*^[8] ['The Imprescriptible'], a short work in which he reminds us that the memory of horror is a moral obligation.

What does it mean to bear witness to one's analysis? The signifier of testimony is certainly linked to the idea of truth. If we return to Freud or Lacan, testimony is linked to the written word: Freud in elaborating on his discovery, and Lacan in rereading Freud's texts literally. Lacan identified the difference by pointing out the value of the 'objectified testimony' of Schreber's text^[9]. Referring to poetry, Lacan states that it is 'the bearer of the creation of a subject assuming a new order of symbolic relation to the world'^[10].

In a testimony of the pass, the dimension of creation responds to this effect of truth in speech, but the expected testimony would rather reveal a truth cleansed of its imaginary adhesions, leaving only a logical and convincing thread, accounting for the drying up accomplished in the treatment.

The definition of the act is simple, but this simplicity contains many layers. Lacan describes the transition from the analysing task to the position of psychoanalyst as a psychoanalytic act. It is the act by which the analysand, authorizing himself and being authorised by a few others, authorizes himself to receive analysands and to be paid for it. When Lacan made this proposal, he emphasized the responsibility of those who take on the risk of occupying the place of the analyst. This also highlights the necessary dimension of solitude. The analyst's solitude is that of being alone with his act. There is the act on the part of the analyst and the act on the part of the analysand. The analyst's act is the one that initiates the experience, and it is this that will operate throughout the treatment. The analysand's act is the act by which the analysand engages in the experience. It is to be distinguished from the demand for analysis. Then there is the act by which the analysand decides to separate from their analyst. Subsequently, he will have the choice, if he so desires, to take the place of the analyst. It is the act that commits a psychoanalyst. In other words, an analysis prepares the analysand for the encounter with the act. The act is necessary because it implies a crossing over for the one who will authorize themselves as an analyst.

We cannot anticipate when an act will be an act. It is in this regard that Lacan speaks of the aporias of the act. This is, of course, to evoke the after-effect of the act.

For Lacan, we cannot anticipate an act, that is, when an act will be an act. We cannot therefore anticipate the effects of the act either. This is why he uses the expression ‘aporias of the report [*compte rendu*]’ in relation to the act. This therefore raises the question of the aftermath. It means that we only know that an act was an act in the aftermath. Because, unlike the passage to the act, the subject will remain the same; after the act, there is a transformation of the subject. In other words, the subject is no longer the same.

There is a before and after the act, and what matters are the consequences of the act, the mutation, the crossing that it provokes for the subject. Quoting Rimbaud’s *À une raison*, Lacan says that this is the formula of the act, that of provoking a new desire.

In 1976, Lacan offered a new interpretation of the passage from the analysand to the analyst, no longer in terms of authorizing oneself, but of *hystorizing*^[11]. The ‘Preface to the English edition of *Seminar XI*, published in 1976, contains a new and final version of truth and the pass. Truth is described there as *lying truth*. ‘There is no truth that, in passing through attention, does not lie.’^[12] Passing through attention to the real gives a lying truth. ‘It lies’ because it passes through attention, which misses the emergence of the real of the unconscious – the true – by proceeding to an elucubration of knowledge about it, which can be qualified as symbolic insofar as it puts signifiers in relation to other signifiers. Attention focuses on ‘the esp of a lapse’, the space of a lapsus, shifting from the real of the unconscious to the symbolic of the unconscious, the Other as the place of truth. This shifts the true as a half-saying of the real, outside of meaning, to the true as a structure of fiction, from the real ab-surd (discordant) surprise of the one-blunder [*l’une bevue*] to ‘the subject’s realization of his history in his relationship to a future’. This is what Lacan, in 1976, calls *hystorization*.

For Lacan in 1976, this term was the key to reading the passage from analysand to analyst. ‘Hence my proposition that the analyst historicizes only from himself: an patent fact’. This is followed by ‘I have therefore designated as a “pass” that putting of the hystorization of the analysis to the test, while refraining from imposing this pass on all, because there it is not a question, as it happens, of all, but of scattered, ill-assorted individuals. I have left it at the disposal of those who are prepared to run the risk of attesting at best to bear witness to the best to the lying truth’^[13].

In 1976, ‘hystorizing oneself’ replaced ‘authorizing oneself’. It refers to the act, including the testimony, of passing from analysand to analyst, an act that asserts itself by bearing witness (a saying [*dire*] correlative to the action). The testimony is caught up in the lying truth. There is no truth about the truth.

At this level, it seems important to me to take into consideration Colette Soler’s remark, made in her 1999-2000 course: ‘The analytic act does not historicize itself. It allows the subject to historicize itself, but the analytic act does not historicize itself. On the other hand, the political act historicizes itself, as the creative act and the moral act do. The fact that it does not historicize itself means that there is no memory of the analytic act in the sense that memory is an inscription. The act operates, it has effects, there are traces of the effects, but these traces and effects are on the side of the analysant. On the side of the one who supports the act, there is no trace, no memory’^[14].

In conclusion, is there anything that can be transmitted?

If we talk about symptomatic remnants, then we are referring to the jouissance of the symptom that cannot be resolved and does not change. Freud recommended that analysts return to the couch every five years. With Joyce, Lacan found a new solution to conclude the analysis without seeking to eradicate those symptomatic remnants, but rather to develop a ‘know-how to deal with one’s symptom’.

However, at the end of his life, Lacan concluded that psychoanalysis cannot be transmitted because we cannot say everything about the experience of the real.

Despite this negative observation, Lacan proposes a path: that of invention. He tells us: 'If I said in Lille that the pass is for this very reason, for the fact that each psychoanalyst must reinvent, based on what they have managed to glean from having been an analysand for a time, that each analyst must reinvent the way in which psychoanalysis can endure'^[15]. It is precisely here, it seems to me, that the A.S. is expected to step in. To say something of their own invention concerning their experience as an analysand, what it has taught them, what it has changed but also what it has not changed, and it must be added that they talk about it with others so that our School remains alive. Our School with the pass as its key.

Translation : Silvia Rodríguez

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- [1] Agamben, G. (1992) *What I saw, heard, learned...* Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- [2] The relevant passage reads: 'Why, then, should we not put this profession to the test of that truth of which the so-called unconscious dreams, with which it dabbles?' In Lacan, J. (1979) Preface to the English-Language Edition of *Seminar XI*. In *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. London and New York, Penguin, p. viii. [Transl.]
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- [13] *Ibid.*, p. ix.
- [14] Soler, C. Course at the Collège de Clinique Psychanalytique de Paris, 'La politique de l'acte', 1999-2000, p. 144.
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Translated by Silvia Rodríguez

NOTHING IS THE SAME

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"The Truth cannot convince,
knowledge passes in act."¹
— Jacques Lacan

In 1970, to close the congress on teaching, Lacan said: "What saves me from teaching is the act, and that which testifies to the act." Indeed, from the creation of the device of the pass, Lacan never ceased to put to the test this very particular form of speech that is: the testimony. It is the proposal Lacan makes in order to associate those who will take part in the renewal of psychoanalysis: he proposes to found the status of the psychoanalyst from the act and three positions—testifying, testimony, and witness. Different positions at three moments of the device.

Let us recall that one of the principal reasons for the proposal of the pass was to emerge from the sleep and intellectual inertia that reigned at the end of the 1960s. In fact, all the analysts lived under an atmosphere of conformist terror² from the hierarchy of psychoanalysts, that had as effect an all-pervasive silence. The pass sought to break the silence proper to the effects of identification in groups.

The analytic experience is singular, unique, but the styles, the forms of testifying to it are multiple. In the face of malaise, what is to be done? Nothing, said Lacan in *Radiophonie*, except testify to the unconscious that speaks³. Or again, in *L'étourdit*: to testify to the existence of a subject that says no to the phallic function⁴; and speaking of Joyce, it is for the analyst to testify to what fascinates or to the jouissance of the symptom.⁵ With the pass, Lacan inverts the places that exist in the university discourse: the analyst can only be taught insofar as his knowledge allows, and he can only teach in order to instruct himself—but on condition that "one knows where the psychoanalysand is⁶", for the pass rests on the testimony of the passer. The passante decides to renounce the "I" of enunciation, to submit to a procedure that retains only the statements of the passeur. The pass marks the passage from speech to discourse, a paradoxical act because it implies a change of place, a displacement, a destitution of the analysand, instituted by an act.

The testimonies of the pass are vertiginous moments put into abyss (*mise en abyme*) where the places and sites of speech are completely shattered. The passeur speaks by delegation, in the place of the passante, by virtue of a juridical principle. It is the passeur who holds the

¹ J. Lacan, « Allocution sur l'enseignement », dans *Écrits*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1966, p. 305.

² J. Lacan, "The situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956", *Écrits*, Noryon, 1966, pp. 384

³ J. Lacan, « Radiophonie », dans *Autres Écrits*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2001, p. 432.

⁴ J. Lacan, "L'étourdit", *Ibid.* p. 493

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 570

⁶ J. Lacan, « Allocution sur l'enseignement », dans *Écrits*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1966, p. 303.

testimony. Speech and silence find their place of enunciation in the figure of the passeur and in his statement. In the pass, there is no subject of the testimony. The pass offers, to those who so wish, the chance to measure the path traversed, but it depends on the one to whom one testifies, for it is he who will evaluate the value of what has been said. The force of testimony resides not in the truth, but in its incompleteness. The pass is an experience of speech, it concerns the possibility of the saying (Du Dire), and the impossibility of saying everything.

Often the reason that drives the passante to testify is a certain urgency, a haste. This urgency is proper to the analytic discourse, linked to the logical time that shapes but also produces effects. Haste interprets, it tends to “erase the sense of things from which the subject suffers.”⁷ This erasure produces an effect described as a loosening, an untying, which strangely marks both an end and a beginning, simultaneously. The analytic experience often concludes with a sensation of lightness, linked to the notion of non-being (désêtre). Moment in which “nothing is the same,” a moment of the pass where, with patience, one seeks to find the most minute difference, where nothing is repetition, briefly, as Lacan said, “*effacements of being*”⁸ that are linked to the moment to conclude and to the being of the subject: “I hasten to affirm myself in order to be.”⁹

Where Freud envisaged the end as a weakening of repression and a pacification of intrapsychic conflicts, Lacan overturns the perspective. For Lacan, analysis is not aimed at attaining a harmonious ego, nor an adaptation to the real, but at allowing the subject to confront the real kernel of his desire and to situate himself otherwise with respect to the Other, to language, and to jouissance. Not because everything has been “resolved,” but because the subject’s relation to his division, to his fantasy, and to his symptom has been displaced. This displacement implies an act, which occurs once, at the end of an analysis. Lacan writes: “To be a psychoanalyst, everyone knows, begins at the end of an analysis.”¹⁰ It is something difficult to grasp. For indeed, the beginning, the commencement, is tied to the analytic act. Analytic act and beginning are bound not only in time but also in space. It is on this point that Lacan invites us to fix our attention, on the moment where one ceases to be analysand, without becoming analyst, for the analyst exists only in the act. It is not simple to comprehend, for the analyst “is” analyst only in his act. If one arrives at the end, once, this once is linked to “the beginning of all the times.”¹¹ Lacan puts it beautifully: the first time only occurs once. But Lacan reminds us that in relation to what is called the real, there is no

⁷ J. Lacan, « Entretien au magazine Panorama », <https://ecole-lacanienne.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/1974-11-21.pdf>

⁸ J. Lacan, *Séminaire l'identification*, inédit, séance du 6/12/61 : « Il faudra d’abord que nous distinguions le signifiant du signe, et que nous montrions en quel sens le pas qui est franchi est celui de la chose effacée. Les diverses « effaçons » - si vous me permettez de me servir de cette formule - dont vient au jour le signifiant, nous donneront précisément les modes majeurs de la manifestation du sujet »

⁹ J. Lacan, « Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty », *Ecrits*, Norton, 1996, p. 171.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XV, L’acte psychanalytique*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2024, p. 99.

¹¹ J. Lacan., *Le Séminaire, Livre XV, L’acte psychanalytique*, Paris Le seuil 2024, p. 99. « On est arrivé à la fin *une fois*, et c’est de là qu’il faut déduire le rapport que cela a avec le commencement de toutes les fois. On est arrivé à la fin de sa psychanalyse *une fois*, et cet acte si difficile à saisir au commencement de chacune des *psychanalyses* que nous garantissons, ça doit avoir un rapport avec cette fin, *une fois*. »

assignable beginning; what marks a beginning is the opening of a new field, if there has been an act, there has been “creation.”¹²

Its logical structure makes it such that if it was the end, then each time there is an analytic act it is the first time, for the analysand. This first time is marked in the testimonies of the pass by diverse phrases that say: “Nothing is like before.” Or: “Everything is different now.” Or: “Nothing remains identical.” “Everything has changed.” “It is no longer the same.” At the end of analysis: “nothing is the same.”

Haste, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, goes beyond mere temporal precipitation. It incarnates a subjective tension, a movement toward the act, particularly striking at the key moments of the cure: the entry into analysis, the end of it, and the passage to the position of analyst through the pass. In his text *Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty* (1945), Lacan introduces haste as a decisive moment in the structuring of the subject. He distinguishes three times: the instant of seeing, the time for understanding, and the moment to conclude. The latter, marked by haste, is not an irrational rush but a subjective decision that engages the act. Haste thus becomes a logical function, allowing the subject to emerge from indecision and commit himself in an act that constitutes him. At the entry, there is an act on the side of the analyst, and at the end, there is an act on the side of the analysand, who, by producing an analytic act, ceases to be analysand and enters into the analytic discourse.

The end of analysis, according to Lacan, is not summed up in the disappearance of symptoms. It implies a transformation of the subject's relation to his desire and to his jouissance. Here haste intervenes as a motor, pushing the subject to conclude his cure by assuming an ethical position in relation to his desire. This haste is not dictated by the analyst but emerges from the subject himself, when he is ready to confront the truth of his unconscious and to separate himself from alienating identifications.

The pass rests on the testimony of the passante, who recounts his analytic journey to two passeurs. Haste plays a crucial role here: it marks the moment when the subject feels ready to assume the position of analyst. This decision, taken in haste, is not rushed (*n'est pas précipitée*) but the outcome of a thorough analytic process. Haste, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is an essential function that accompanies moments of subjective decision. It allows the subject to move from understanding to act at the moment of concluding his cure and, possibly, to become analyst. Far from being a rush, haste is a logical urgency, a tension toward the act that structures the analytic path.

Over the course of the analysis, the subject encounters, through interpretation, the fundamental signifiers that determine him. But this is not enough. What Lacan calls the end is the moment when the subject ceases to believe in them, when he sees that the fantasy is a fiction, a protection against the real of non-knowledge; it is ceasing to be the object of the Other's desire and reappropriating the position of subject. It is not a voluntary act but a logical effect of the analytic adventure. The fantasy does not disappear; it is de-substantialized, placed at a distance. The subject is no longer fooled. At that moment, nothing is the same, for the relation to the world, to the body, to language is altered: one no longer seeks to incarnate the lack of the Other but to live with one's own. This precise moment, Lacan, in Seminar XV,

¹² *Ibid.* 10/01/1968 : « commencement est donc bien effectivement renouvellement. Ce qui ouvre la porte, même pas par la voie d'une opposition, à ceci *qu'il est concevable que l'acte constitue...si l'on peut s'exprimer de cette façon, sans guillemets ...un vrai commencement*, qu'il y ait, pour tout dire, un acte qui soit créateur et que ce soit là le commencement. Or, il suffit d'évoquer cet horizon de tout fonctionnement de l'acte pour s'apercevoir que c'est bien évidemment là que réside sa vraie structure, ce qui est tout à fait apparent, évident, et ce qui montre la fécondité, d'ailleurs, du mythe de *la Création*. »

The Psychoanalytic Act, calls the “leap of the pass,”¹³ which seeks a resurgence of truth¹⁴ once the supposition of knowledge has fallen.

Another marker of the end of analysis for Lacan is what he names subjective destitution. It is not a matter of reinforcing the ego or achieving mastery, but on the contrary, of renouncing the position of subject-supposed-to-know—even for oneself. During analysis, the subject attributes to the psychoanalyst a knowledge of his desire. This transference allows production of sense, but it also becomes an obstacle: as long as the subject believes another holds the truth about him, he remains alienated. The end comes when this belief collapses. This destitution is an act, a passage: the subject renounces being “analysand,” that is, to always be in demand of interpretation, and accepts the contingency of his own position. It is not about knowing who one is, but about living with what one will never fully know, the leap Lacan speaks of. Lacan speaks of subjectivation of the unconscious but also of dis-identification: what I believed to be “me” comes undone.

Thus, the end of analysis is not an accomplishment but an assumed void, a sustainable non-knowledge. It is that moment when one no longer expects a solution, but where one ceases to take the symptom as complaint and instead assumes it as a mode of *jouissance*. The *sinthome* is no longer to be interpreted but to be knotted, sustained as a singular solution to subjective division.

Where classical analysis aimed at the lifting of the symptom, Lacan affirms that the *sinthome* is what one no longer wants to relinquish, what makes consistency, beyond analysis. At the end of analysis, the subject no longer speaks in the Name-of-the-Father (au Nom-du-Père), but from the point where he has knotted his own version of lack. He no longer seeks to “adapt,” but to invent a way of sustaining himself in the world.

That is why, after the end, “nothing is the same”: it is not that the symptom has disappeared, but that it has become bearable, style, a writing of oneself. Lacan says: “the *sinthome* is what is most real in a subject.” There is no Other to guarantee the sense— only the bricolage of a knotting that holds. Lacan does not propose a happy or normal end of analysis. He proposes an ethic, that of the real, which supposes renouncing the illusion of a recovered harmony. At the end, the subject no longer recognizes himself in his old chains but assumes his division. “Nothing is the same,” not because everything has been healed, but because the subject has ceased to believe in completeness. He knows that language fails, that love lacks, that the body enjoys otherwise. He no longer seeks truth as an answer but as an effect of an act.

The end of analysis, for Lacan, is thus not a closure but a beginning: that of a new position in the world, without guarantee, without solution, but with a desire less alienated, freer, more inventive. Subjective destitution and the invention of the *sinthome* are the compasses of this adventure. And after? What remains is to live with that, to speak otherwise, to love without believing in it, to enjoy without being enslaved, to exist where before one repeated. For Jacques Lacan, whose teaching rearticulates psychoanalysis with the structure of language and

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 163. « L’ouverture reste, si l’on peut dire, béante, de comment peut s’opérer - comment allons-nous l’appeler ? - ce « *saut* », ou encore, comme je l’ai fait dans un texte à proprement parler de *proposition* d’explorer ce qu’il en est de ce « *saut* », ce que j’ai appelé plus simplement *la passe*. »

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 175. « L’aventure analytique, si loin qu’elle ait permis d’articuler les choses, très précisément ce qui s’appelle l’inconscient, le désir humain est peut-être d’apporter quelque chose qui redonne son regain à ce qui a commencé dans une certaine pente de crétinisation qui est celle qui s’est accompagnée de l’idée de progrès obligatoire à la traîne de la science. Ce regain de vérité, il faudra voir où il se situe, je veux dire si c’est ainsi que se définit l’expérience analytique d’instaurer ces défilés, d’instaurer cette formidable production qui s’installe où ? Mais dans une béance qui n’est pas du tout constituée par la castration elle-même, dont la castration, bien sûr, est le signe, et je dirai enfin le tempérament le plus juste, la solution la plus élégante. »

desire, the end of analysis does not reside in the disappearance of symptoms but in a radical transformation of the subject's position. "Nothing is the same" - expresses this rupture. It is not an appeasement but a change of place. The subject who concludes his analysis is no longer the one who began it. The world is the same, but his relation to desire, to jouissance, and to knowledge is irreversibly displaced. It functions as a screen against the real of lack, against the gap of non-knowledge. The word "désêtre" appears in Seminar XX and is distinct from "non-being": it is not a question of inexistence but of active detachment, an ethical position. The effect of non-being (désêtre) is what, at the end of analysis, is produced when there is no longer a being to attach to the subject.

This effect arises when the subject renounces sustaining the imaginary identifications that structured him from childhood: being a good son, a virile man, a desired woman, a suffering subject, and so on. This désêtre is also the fall of the subject-supposed-to-know: the moment when the analysand understands that the analyst does not hold the truth of his being. There is no Other that can guarantee the sense. Lacan speaks in several seminars of the effect of désêtre, a key notion to think the end of analysis. Forged as a counterpoint to "being," it evokes a radical experience: detachment from the imaginary of being, renunciation of making oneself "one" in the mirror of language or the gaze of the Other. What the subject loses at the end of analysis is the illusion of being, of having an essence, a completeness. But this loss is fertile: it authorizes a new relation to desire, to jouissance, to existence itself.

Désêtre is therefore not a nihilistic void: it is the acceptance of the real, that is, what does not cease not to be written, that which resists sense. The lightness at the end of an analysis is not a promise, still less an aim. It is a possible effect, a testimony of the subjective transformation achieved. In Freud, it resembles a relief of neurotic suffering. In Lacan, it is the consequence of a renewed relation to desire and to the symptom. In all cases, it marks an exit: not from the human condition, but from the trap of a fixed identity. An opening, in short, to a *je ne sais quoi* lighter than the weight of past contingencies.

The phrase "Nothing is the same" may at first seem a banal statement about change. Yet it contains a profound paradox: if nothing is the same, then this absence of resemblance itself becomes a form of uniformity—a new norm of inequality. This paradox, coupled with the notion of the end—whether it be the end of a cycle, a life, or a psychic state—opens a fertile field of reflection in psychoanalysis. What does this paradox reveal about our relation to the real, to identity, to repetition, and to death?

Philosophically, the phrase "Nothing is the same" affirms a generalized discontinuity. It denies repetition, denies identity. Yet, if one affirms that everything is different, then this very difference becomes the only constant, which amounts to instituting a new form of equality in difference. It is an ontological paradox: the desire to escape repetition or identity creates another form of uniformity. For Heraclitus, change is the only permanence: "One never bathes twice in the same river." The statement "Nothing is the same" seems to echo this, but it pushes the idea to the brink. It denies all stability, even psychic. Yet for Deleuze, this repetition of difference—the difference in itself—constitutes a mode of thought: it is not identity that grounds the real, but the perpetual movement of differentiation.

In psychoanalysis, particularly in Freud, repetition plays a fundamental role in the psychic process. The individual repeats, often unconsciously, painful patterns, as if to master an initial trauma. Thus, the idea that "nothing is the same" may be the expression of an unconscious desire to rupture with the same, to escape the cycle of repetition. But Lacan complicates the matter: the subject is never identical to himself; he is divided, marked by language and by lack. From this perspective, "nothing is the same" is not rupture, but the very structure of the subject. He cannot be identical to himself, since his identity is always other. What changes is the form of the same: difference is the expression of the unconscious.

The end, in this context, would be the cessation of repetition, but also the threat of dissolution of the subject: who am I, if I am no longer what I repeat? The end thus becomes as much a liberation as an anxiety. The paradox of the phrase “Nothing is the same” reveals a tension between the desire for novelty and the fear of loss of meaning. In psychoanalysis, it manifests the conflict between repetition and desire, while in philosophy the tension plays out between identity and alterity. Coupled with the notion of the end, the phrase becomes a meditation on the becoming (le devenir), the metamorphosis, and the rupture. Thus, nothing is the same—and perhaps that is the only stable point in human existence: its instability.

Translation by Daphné Tamarin

THE EFFECTS OF AFFECTS IN THE PASS

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What emotions favor the transmission of testimony in the pass, and which ones hinder or even prevent it?

There are many types of emotions. The subject is affected by emotions that produce effects on his subjectivity. Emotion and effect have different meanings in Spanish. In this short text, I will focus on the emotion of enthusiasm.

In the Italian Note, Lacan tells us, “From then on (having sifted through the horror of knowledge), he will know how to be a reject. That is what the analyst should at least have made him feel. If he has not led him to enthusiasm, there may well have been analysis, but no analyst, no chance¹ ». The affect of enthusiasm is the affect that must come about for the analyst's desire to exist. In this, he is emphatic.

I link the affect of enthusiasm primarily to transmission. Transmission, whether in the pass, in a forum, or in a clinical college, when someone expresses themselves with enthusiasm, it reaches the listener. Transmission is enhanced by the style of the person who testifies and tries to transmit.

When talking about teachers or members of forums or the School, you may ask yourselves, what does this have to do with the pass? It has no direct relation to the dispositif of the pass, but it has a direct relation to transmission, to going beyond what is said. Beyond what is said are the sayings, what is inferred from what is said.

Saying is what is extracted from what is said, from speaking. In an analysis, the sayings are extracted from what the analysand says, speaks. Interpretation leads to this.

How do we understand knowing how to be refuse? Refuse or residue from the analytic operation. Refuse from “the aforementioned humanity²». Humanity does not want to know, it rejects knowledge. Psychoanalysts move toward knowledge in its different modalities. In knowledge, there can be desire if the horror of knowing that one is an object for the Other has been sifted out. If it is sifted out without remaining in the jouissance of repetition, it is a step toward the analyst's desire.

It is a paradox, but it works. It works in the sense that it does not remain as refuse, as residue, but rather enhances its desire.

In my experience in the cartel of the pass, if the transmission contains affection and enthusiasm, something is transmitted. If it is not there, the transmission is incomplete. In any case, I must point out, based on the six passes I have heard, that some passeurs have transmitted without the passant being named. Therefore, transmission, enthusiasm, and the analyst's desire are not correlated.

In the passes mentioned, there was a “*courteous decline*” since they were not named. There was no encounter with the sayings of the passant.

¹ J. Lacan, “Nota Italiana” en *Otros Escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2012, p. 329

² *Ibid.*

The enthusiasm must be in the *passant* since, if there is no enthusiastic, joyful, convinced transmission, the affect of sadness, or a disaffected affect, or an overly emotional affect passes.

An important point is to differentiate enthusiasm from mania, from euphoria. Nothing to do with it.

Enthusiasm exudes desire, joy, lightness. The desire that arises is a desire to know that correlates with the analyst's desire. A desire that continues.

The *pass* is the hystorization itself, the explanation by the *passant* to the *passeur* of their impasses in their analysis, of the subjective changes, of the gliding of signifiers.

Lacan wonders what drives someone to demand the *pass*. We must bear in mind that Lacan had many problems with the *pass*, as there were defections from his School. And there are still Lacanian Associations without the *pass*. Lacan's disappointment is evident in his later texts.

Effect and Affect

Although at the beginning of their teaching both Freud and Lacan assimilated affect and effect as if they had the same meaning: affect and effect of the structure of language, this first thesis is completed, not annulled “by the effects of discourse and, moreover, strongly modified by this element that we call ethics³ » Colette Soler tells us.

At the level of ethics, “affect is no longer a simple effect, but a sign, a manifestation of a personal position or a dark choice of the being that is not a simple structural element⁴».

It is from *Encore* onwards that Lacan changes the concepts and affect acquires the value of an index of the real, of the real of *jouissance*. It is no longer deceptive, since the real of *jouissance* never deceives; it is and remains. The question is what to do with this real. Hence ethics.

The real of *jouissance*, the *jouissance* substance, takes on relevance in Lacanian teaching. It moves from the unconscious structured like a language to the real unconscious with *lalangue* and the ones as strikes that remain marked on the body. The concept of the unconscious is expanded and knowledge is deposited in the ones of *lalangue*. It is no longer just the deciphering of signifiers. The knowledge deposited in *lalangue* is not deciphered, it is and remains. *Lalangue* affects the body since it is composed of the first sounds received by the baby tied to bodily care.

In *Encore*, Lacan tells us: “The speaking being allows us to account for the extent of the effects of *lalangue* by the fact that it presents all sorts of enigmatic affects. These affects are the result of the presence of *lalangue* insofar as it articulates things of knowledge that go far beyond what the being who speaks can bear of the knowledge enunciated⁵ »

The modality of affects is expanded with the real unconscious.

“I speak with my body,⁶» he says in this same seminar. In the *pass*, one speaks with the body, and *lalangue* has its particular impact. *Lalangue* is always particular and individual, of the One.

³ C. Soler, “La serie Lacaniana”, “Los afectos de nuestro “malestar” en *Los afectos lacanianos*, Buenos Aires, Letra Viva, 2011, p. 81

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 81-82

⁵ J. Lacan. Seminario 20 Aún, Buenos Aires, Paidós, p. 167

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 144

How is it possible, then, for what is spoken to reach the passeur and from there to the cartel of the pass? This is the challenge.

“It is up to their peers to ‘know’ how to find it⁷» Lacan points out. This knowledge is in quotation marks because it does not imply knowing, but rather that the members of the cartel of the pass know how to find the mark, since they should be marked by the analytic experience having reached a certain point.

Loves to knowledge and desire to know

To remain in the loves of knowledge is to remain in the enjoyment of knowledge and more specifically in academic knowledge. Academic knowledge differs from the desire to know linked to the analyst's desire. Love responds to demand, not to desire. To love is to want to be loved. To love knowledge versus to love truth. The affects linked to truth in transference, truth that lies in the fantasy.

What does not lie is the real, which is stripped of lack. The real is. The real is identical to itself. “The lack of lack makes the real⁸».

The function of the passeur is to capture the presence of the real of jouissance. To capture it, since it cannot be explained. Can it be transmitted? I think that something can be transmitted in the modality, in the style.

“There is no analyst if that desire does not come to him, that is, if he is already the waste of the aforementioned (humanity)⁹». Humanity rejects knowledge, unlike the analyst who wants to know despite how unpleasant that knowledge may be. The knowledge in question is incomplete, full of holes. If it were complete, it would be impossible to desire.

It is important to differentiate between denying knowledge, rejecting knowledge as a defense against the horrors of humanity, and knowing that knowledge is full of holes, that it is incomplete, with *learned ignorance* as an attitude.

To conclude, two notes: satisfaction in the end. Enthusiasm in conveying.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

⁷ J. Lacan, “Nota Italiana”, p. 329

⁸ J. Lacan, “Prefacio a la edición inglesa del seminario 11” en *Otros Escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2012, p. 601

⁹ J. Lacan, “Nota Italiana”, p. 329

KNOW HOW TO DO WITH THE SYMPTOM, KNOW HOW TO DO WITH LALANGUE

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The title I have given this paper refers to observations made by the cartel of the pass, where I was a member from 2008 to 2010. Certain testimonies showed that the encounter between the intern and lalangue produced a limit to the deciphering of the unconscious. Likewise, this know-how with lalangue allowed for a know-how with the symptom.

Some Ones of lalangue, without meaning but not without jouissance, provided evidence of the subject's approach to the real unconscious. In the pass, in which we as a cartel pronounced ourselves on an AE nomination, it was noted how these Ones emerged in the form of a signifier outside the chain of deciphering. Listening to these passes in the testimony of the passeurs, their elaboration in the cartel, and the subsequent reflection in the CIG, allowed me to work on the end of the analysis, just as the analyst's desire can arise at this end. A time of ending, as Lacan said in "The Moment to Conclude", Seminar XXV, "The end of analysis can be defined. It is when you have passed twice through the same place, finding that which you were a prisoner of.¹ ».

This know-how with lalangue has, in analysis, with the reference I have from the passes heard in the cartel, as well as in other testimonies from AE, a consequence that is the bursting and detachment of some equivoques that had accompanied the subject until then, which constituted a part of the lying truth. On the other hand, Lacan will theorize an end of analysis as a *savoir-faire* with the symptom, where the subject identifies with a remnant of jouissance that is linked to the core of his symptom.

The first question: Knowing how to deal with lalangue: We see this unfolded by Lacan in Seminar *Encore*, in 1972, when he says: "Language is a lucubration of knowledge about lalangue. But the unconscious is a knowledge, a knowing how to deal with lalangue² ».

The second question: Knowing how to deal with the symptom, is addressed in the 1976 Seminar *L'insu*. This is when he says that at the end of analysis it is a question of "*Knowing how to deal with your symptom*." In this regard, he says: "What can one identify with at the end of analysis? Knowing how to deal with your symptom is the end of analysis, and we must recognize that it is a little succinct³ »

So the questions that arise for me are: How do these manifestations become evident in order to arrive at that *savoir-faire* with lalangue? How can we situate the signs of that *savoir-faire*?

These manifestations are revealed through an effect of surprise, in a saying that emerges from among the sayings and touches on something real. A saying in the form of equivoques,

¹ J. Lacan, *Séminaire Le moment de conclure*, inédit, leçon du 10 janvier 1978.

² J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XX, Encore*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 127.

³ J. Lacan, *Séminaire L'insu*, inédit, leçon du 16 novembre 1976

fabricated by the subject at an early age, in response to the Other's speech, modulated by jouissance. In the cartel of the pass, the testimony transmitted by the passeurs gives an account of that saying which produces in the passant a savoir-faire with a remnant of the jouissance of the symptom, starting from that limit of the real. This is what we call identification with the symptom, in its different modalities. This limit brings about a redistribution of jouissance that is different from what existed before and can allow for an analytic practice guided by the analyst's desire. We have a paragraph in L'etourdit that shows how the subject is submitted to the equivoque through lalangue. "This statement stems solely from the fact that the unconscious is structured like a language, that is to say, by the lalangue it inhabits, it is therefore subject to the equivoques that distinguish each of them.⁴».

Colette Soler calls *epiphanies* that saying that emerges, translating with this name what Lacan says with regard to being in the Unconscious lalangue, Real, when that word no longer has any meaning. In the Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI, he says: "When the space of a lapsus no longer has any meaning (or interpretation), only then can one be sure that one is in the unconscious. One knows this⁵ ».

Another question is: How can the signs of this know-how with lalangue manifest themselves? Lacan tells us in the Preface that it is through an affect of satisfaction at the end of analysis, reducing the symptom to the nonsense of the Real Unconscious and not just to deciphering. But one must be able to undergo this part of nonsense, without the Other, and sometimes it is difficult to bear. In the cartel of the pass in which I participated, in one of the cases of the pass that was heard, this satisfaction at the end could be found. The first concerned the fantasy and its traversal, with the signifier that represented it and that had crystallized by "surprise," to which she had been able to give meaning based on a misunderstanding that had struck her as a mortal feeling throughout her life. The first one about the fantasy and its traversal, with the signifier that represented it and crystallized as "surprise," to which she was able to give meaning based on an equivoque that had struck her as a deadly affect throughout her life. The second one was about the horror of facing death and not backing down. This allowed her to access the feeling of satisfaction at the limit point of no longer having to veil or sustain the Other, which resulted in a change in her clinical practice as an analyst.

In this case, there was a nomination of AE. See Contribution of Cartel No. 2 (2008-2010) in Wunsch No. 8, as well as the text by Patricia Dahan in Wunsch No. 10.

In the text of the Preface, Lacan tells us with regard to the satisfaction of the end of analysis: "The mirage of truth, from which only lies can be expected, has no other term than the satisfaction that marks the end of analysis." (6). However, all passants show signs of satisfaction throughout their analyses marked by an effect of separation, whether from the fantasy, the object, the analyst, or the symptom with which they had come to analysis. So, what distinguishing feature could this satisfaction at the end have? It can be said that it is a satisfaction marked by a different relationship with jouissance than the one that existed before the approach to lalangue. This produces a change in the subject's jouissance, without submission to the search for truth, and to the Other that the subject implied in that truth, in turn producing a know-how with their symptom.

Translation : Gabriela Zorzutti

⁴ J. Lacan, « L'etourdit », dans *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 490. Paris.

⁵ J. Lacan, « Préface à l'édition anglaise du Séminaire XI », *Ibid*, p. 571

Wunsch n°26

Other references

Wunsch n° 8 Contribución del cartel 2 (2008-2010)

Wunsch n° 10 Patricia Dahan. *Le pas de sens de l'interprétation*

Wunsch n° 23 Cartel 4 (2021-2022) Colette Soler. *¿Dé-fossiliser lalangue de la passe?*

Wunsch n° 23 Sidi Askofaré. Réplique à “Dé-fossiliser lalangue de la passe”

THE EXPERIENCE THAT MAKES EVERYONE SPEAK

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Psychoanalysis: Just Words?

The syntagm “psychoanalytic experience,” which Lacan opposes to technique, implies the possibility of testimony. On this point, why not mention the fact that Lacan did not hesitate to compare his *Écrits* to the testimonies of the mystics? ...“The best one can read,¹” he says. In fact, they speak of the same thing: of the signifier of the barred Other. However, it is not the same to enjoy it as it is to extract it as a point of structure, to turn it into theory. Perhaps this is an indication: to give a testimony capable of withstanding verification implies having acquired a knowledge—acquired because it has been previously enjoyed. Lacan is firm on this point².

The departure from the sexual reality of the unconscious, set in motion during the cure, implies a form of knowledge. It is not achieved through the elimination of an affect, but rather through a moment to conclude. A moment of syllogism. Furthermore, it should be noted that satisfaction—the satisfaction of the end—is a conclusive affect in itself. It ranges from the most common pleasure principle—which verifies the limited, even limiting, aspect of desire—to the analytic act itself.

This conclusive aspect means that transmission is not an initiation. Lacan speaks of mental weakness in relation to any initiation³. Analysis does not lift the veil of Isis, that obscurantist myth of a nature that likes to hide itself. Analysands, for their part, may expect revelations. However, whatever they obtain as a surprise effect can only be attributed to a decipherment that plays solely with the crystal of language. Interpretive saying neither reveals nor conceals; it makes signs. Furthermore, the idea of a nature that conceals or unveils implies the sexual relation: Lacan, when referring to initiation, refers to the nuptial rite⁴.

There is nothing initiatory or mysterious about our experience, even if there is something obscure and ineffable about it. Freud himself, in a text on dreams, warned us against the “mysterious unconscious.” We must not overestimate its value, he says, and points out that a dream, even if correctly interpreted, is usually nothing more than a thought like any other. A dream can deceive us. Lacan generalizes: the unconscious can be exercised in the sense of deception⁵. Thus, we observe a form of *jouissance* that is pure encipherment, having nothing to do with the truth of the symptom. There is no reason to be dazzled by the mysteries of the unconscious.

¹ Lacan, Jacques. *On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, 1972–1973 (Seminar XX)*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998., p. 92.

² Ibid. p. 117. « ... car la fondation d'un savoir est que la jouissance de son exercice est la même que celle de son acquisition », the translation is not exact [NR]

³ Lacan, Jacques. *The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016. p.166.

⁴ Lacan, Jaques, Seminar: *Les non-dûtes errent*, unpublished classes of 11/20/73 and of 1/8/74.

⁵ J. Lacan, Jaques The Seminar, Book XI, The four fundamental concepts of Psychoanalysis, New York, Norton Press, 1978. p.41.

It is true that Lacan spoke of the real, identifying it with the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious⁶. But how does he frame this? This answers the question posed at the beginning of the “Encore” seminar: what drives us to bed? Now, in the animal kingdom, only humans reproduce, and I quote, thanks to a misunderstanding of their jouissance⁷, let us say phallic jouissance, thus excluding jouissance of the Other’s body. It is here that he first evokes the “speaking body.” The mystery lies in this exception within the animal kingdom—a mystery for the life sciences more than for the analyst. The preceding paragraph states that “only mathematization attains a real⁸”.

In his *Ecrits*, he goes so far as to say that “The experience of the unconscious, taken at the level at which I situate it, is indistinguishable from physical experience. It is also external to the subject... in the traditional sense... Language is as real a medium as the external world⁹”. In fact, the structure of language—which, incidentally, has no alternative—can make the experience communicable and its results verifiable.

However, he distinguishes¹⁰ the Freudian unconscious from the symbolic order, as articulated, for example, by Lévi-Strauss in his *Elements of Structural Anthropology*. An order of determinations that can be perfectly formalized through the mathematical theory of groups. The Freudian unconscious locates the cause elsewhere: in the gap [béance]—in the evasive, in what fails. However, Lacan’s construction is anything but empty: the cut inherent in the structure of language adapts to the topological cuts of the body to situate the cause there.

In this way, he revisits the thesis he had already put forward in the seminar on anguish¹¹ : science, with its equations that take values over a continuous or, at least, exhaustive set, manages to fill the void, the gap between cause and effect. Thus, it abandons the category of cause, which is reclaimed and returned to its true origin: there exists only the cause of desire. The cause affects only speaking bodies, not celestial bodies!

This is our “objectifiable” field; it is time to say so. On the other hand, Lacan’s realist creed extends to the knot: the Real, the Imaginary, the symbolic, the symptom, as well as their possible knotting, are real. He insists.

This objectification would allow us to identify the fantasy in a fairly articulated manner in the testimonies.

However, the absolute singularity of the moment of the pass is a given fact. If Lacan posits a logic of the fantasy and speaks only of the analyst’s desire, it is because he bets on what is transmissible in a particular experience.

⁶ Lacan, Jacques. On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, 1972–1973 (Seminar XX). New York: W. W. Norton, 1998 op. cit. P. 158.

⁷ Lacan, Jacques. On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, 1972–1973 (Seminar XX). New York: W. W. Norton, 1998, op. cit. P. 146.

⁸ Lacan, Jacques. On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, 1972–1973 (Seminar XX). New York: W. W. Norton, 1998 op. cit. P. 158.

⁹ Lacan, Jacques. “Brief Discourse to the ORTF.” In *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, edited by Joan Copjec, translated by Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, and Annette Michelson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990., p. 241

¹⁰ J. Lacan, Jaques The Seminar, Book XI, The four fundamental concepts of Psychoanalysis, New York, Norton Press, 1978, op. cit., p. 25 and following pages.

¹¹ J. Lacan, El SEMINARIO, LIBRO 10, La Angustia, 1962-1963, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2006, p. 301

This is not possible without a work of reduction. A sort of Occam's razor is needed to precisely limit the scope of historicization in favor of logical articulation. To recount is neither to show nor to demonstrate. Borges, in his *Universal History of Infamy*, uses the procedure of reducing a man's entire life to two or three scenes to sketch his fictional portraits. And why not, ideally, to a single one that would summarize childhood neurosis?

The symptom remains beyond the moment of the pass. Here, too, we must resort to Lacanian semantics: "language, he says in 1971¹², in its function as existing, it ultimately signifies nothing more than the impossibility of symbolizing the sexual relationship...", the impossible to write. Beyond the effects of sense that situate the object fixed in the fantasy, language refers only to phallic signification. The jouissance obtained instead of the expected one makes every symptom, from the most transient to the most fixed, a metaphor. At least in its function, if not in its sense. What can be said of this irreducible metaphor?

Freud had already noted a resistance of sense: the demands of the id, the deregulated thermostat of the superego, primary masochism, "incorrigible" character types, the demonic in repetition.

There is a gap between the unconscious and the symptom.

Our experience is not a search. In every search, there is a religious sense. Lacan adopts Picasso's maxim: I do not seek, I find. The discovery in interpretive speech does not so much lift the veil as it is rather creationist. The just prevails over the true. Freud refers to fairness [justesse] in terms of the effect obtained: "The fish of truth has been caught thanks to the hook of lies¹³". An addition that is not intended to restore the narrative's continuity. It is possible that a remembered event is, in turn, interpretive. A dream on its own or barely interpreted. Above all, there are "lightning" moments: "I never thought—or would never have thought of that¹⁴". Those moments of discontinuity, of poetic fulguration, in the most prosaic sense, are perhaps at the heart of the testimony on the therapeutic effect.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

¹² J. Lacan, *El SEMINARIO LIBRO 18, De un discurso que no fuera del semblante*, 1971, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2009, p. 138.

¹³ S. Freud, "Constructions in Analysis" in *The Complete Works*, Volume IX, p. 3368. A direct quotation from W. Shakespeare taken by Freud from the advisor Polonius, who analyzes the methods he uses to spy on and uncover *Hamlet's madness*. A metaphor explaining how to uncover a hidden truth through indirect means, since access to the unconscious truth—which is unbearable as it is—involves distortions or lies, and its approach requires a false construction (the lure of lies) to express unconscious desires or traumas

[NR]

¹⁴ *Ibid.* P. 3369

TESTIMONY, EXPERIENCE, OBLIVION

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I would like to address the question of testimony and experience in the pass from the perspective of what seems to stand in opposition to them: forgetting. For in the field where the pass, testimony, and experience are situated, that possible—and even inescapable—veil of forgetting always looms on the horizon. This refers, of course, to the forgetting of the act—in particular, the act of the passage from analysand to analyst.

Lacan emphasized on several occasions this ever-present possibility of forgetting, perhaps even tinged with a hint of reproach, of warning. The dispositif he established aims precisely to counteract this forgetting of the act, since this can lead to a decline in the work of analysts, even “among the best¹”, he used to say.

We might then ask ourselves, as children do, whether forgetting is wrong. Lacan observed, when he created the pass, that analysts in existing societies paid for “their status by forgetting the act that establishes it²”. Thus, he sought to bring that act—by which someone authorizes themselves as an analyst—under scrutiny, since it is not something obvious. Not only is that passage not obvious, but it also tends to be forgotten.

In that same text, the “Discourse at the EFP,” Lacan stated that he wanted to gather the testimony of the non-practitioner before they plunged into the experience, where they would experience, and I quote, “as *seems to be the rule*, a kind of amnesia regarding their act³”. Now, what caught my attention is precisely that phrase: “seems to be the rule.” That “being the rule” suggests, in my opinion, something that can be generalized—even something structural. I won’t dwell here on the semantic nuances between amnesia and forgetfulness⁴; I will limit myself to a brief distinction: amnesia refers to “a weakening or loss of memory,” whereas “forgetting,” derived from the Latin verb *oblivisci*, means “to stop thinking about something, to lose sight of it⁵”.

I think it is easy to conceive that the act—by its very structure, in the sense that the subject is not present in it—might slip into oblivion, due to the lack of any possible representation. But—because there is a “but”—an act is measured by its consequences, which are indeed detectable; hence the testimony. Moreover, Lacan emphasized that one should not wait too long to gather it. Now then, what is testimony, if not statements that account for a before and an after, perhaps allowing us to infer that there was an act?

¹Lacan, Jacques. “Founding Act.” Translated by Jeffrey Mehlman. *October* 40 (Spring 1987): 96–105.

² Lacan, Jacques. “Speech at the École freudienne de Paris (December 6, 1967).” Unpublished translation (circulating in English).

³ Ibid., p. 288. the italics are mine

⁴ On this point, I recommend reading two articles by Sol Aparicio: “The Pass *Counters* Oblivion,” *Wunsch* no. 14, December 2014, pp. 18–22; and “Questions About an Ephemeral Experience,” *Wunsch* no. 20, May 2020, pp. 5–8.

⁵ It is a term from the same family as *oblinere*, “to cover with a coating,” from which the verb “to erase” or “to cross out” is derived. A. RAY (ed.), *Dictionnaire Historique de la langue française*, Paris, Le Robert, 2010.

So, if this kind of amnesia exists—and it seems to be the rule—what is it that is forgotten when it is forgotten? Is the impact the act had forgotten? Are its consequences forgotten? Or is the account that gave an account of it forgotten?

It is clear how Lacan, in his “Proposition,” relied on “recent” testimonies to counteract that slippery slope toward oblivion. The *hystorization* of analysis in the pass thus constitutes an effort at transmission that seeks to halt that slide, fixing—even if only for a time—the logic underlying the experience that led to that act. But does the fact of having *hystorized* that experience in the pass constitute an effective and definitive remedy against amnesia? And if so, for whom? For the passant? For those who collect that testimony? For the School?

Now, every testimony is woven with signifiers that—by the very effect of the analysis—have already largely lost their trace of *jouissance*, if I may put it that way, and will likely continue to lose it... The analyzed subject tends to disinvest in their own narrative; that is erased. So, we might ask ourselves: does the very act of testifying within the *dispositif* contribute to that erasure? Or, on the contrary, might the pass participate in a sort of reification—even a fetishization—of the narrative and its findings, precisely where forgetting would be rather desirable? I leave the question open, while I reflect on the virtues of forgetting, so dear to Nietzsche⁶.

Each person’s relationship with memory is singular, and it cannot be otherwise. On the other hand, what Lacan seems to have set the pass against is the forgetting of the act that, collectively, would lead to the “exhaustion of the work⁷” of analysts once they are comfortably established. He said, in his “Proposition,” that “there is a real at stake in the very formation of the psychoanalyst,⁸” and added: “We must therefore interrogate the real to understand how it leads to its own ignorance, and even produces its systematic negation⁹”.

Through the pass and the testimonies that sustain it, do we, as a School, succeed in counteracting the forgetting of that act and in keeping open the hole in knowledge that the real at stake implies? In 1978, during the Conference of the Parisian Freudian School in Deauville, dedicated to “The Experience of the Pass,” Lacan concluded that the pass was “a complete failure”; that he had wanted “to have testimonies” and, he added, “naturally I had none—testimonies of how that came about¹⁰”.

Even today, we may wonder what the nature of that “failure of testimony” is to which Lacan referred. This cannot be explained solely by our supposed inability to transmit, nor by the idea that no passant would know anything about the fragment of knowledge drawn from their experience.

That “naturally none” to which Lacan refers may be related to what “remains forgotten¹¹” of an ex-sistential saying – that of analysis – which the pass attempts to sift. To attempt... and to

⁶ Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Untimely Meditations*. “On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

⁷ Lacan, Jacques. “Founding Act.” Translated by Jeffrey Mehlman. *October* 40 (Spring 1987): 96–105.

⁸ Lacan, Jacques. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School.” Translated by Russell Grigg.

⁹ Lacan, Jacques. “Première version de la ‘Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l’École.’”

¹⁰ J. LACAN, Assises de l’École freudienne de Paris : « L’expérience de la passe », Deauville, *Lettres de l’École*, n°23, 1978, p. 181.

¹¹ Lacan, Jacques. “L’Étourdit” (1972).

Wunsch n°26

fail; perhaps therein lies its sole and true function. Otherwise, an experience or a testimony would be set up as a model, and that would indeed be the most dangerous form of forgetting: the one that would cover up the hole of the absence of guarantee in which the analyst's function rests.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

BEING IN THE BREACH

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AE 2024-2027
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Nothing is the same.

There will be new words for the new story.

And we must find them before it is too late.

Word upon word. Ángel González

We are called upon to work on AE's position as the one who is imputed '(...) *they are on the task, or at least in the breach (...)*'¹, with regard to the crucial, living points of his analysis, these being related to psychoanalysis itself. The link between a singular and unique analysis and the crucial problems of psychoanalysis. A necessary but complex knot, because how to convey an experience remains somewhat vague.

A question from a passeur: 'How do you think your experience of analysis can contribute to the progress of the School?' In this journey, there is a certain urgency to want to demonstrate, to share the certainty of what this analytic experience has meant for me. This desire to demonstrate comes from a signifier of the Other, *vague*. Transcending imprecision, vagueness, was a desire. To demonstrate the transformation as a subject, to give indications of the passage from analysand to analyst, as if wanting to be a support for analytic discourse. Not a comfortable place, but the only one possible to make transmission possible. So, demonstration of that performance (prelude Radu Turcanu), as creation and invention together with others, albeit with a character that is ephemeral, captured in what passes to the passeurs and to the cartel of the pass.

The expression *estar en la brecha* (to be in the breach) has several meanings: to be especially committed to a cause, fighting for it, but also to be in a crack, in a gap, in a state of not knowing. A breach in the body, for example, refers to a cut that needs to be sutured. To be in the breach, then, refers to being in a compromise and being in a crack, in a fault.

If psychoanalysis deals with anything, it is precisely with what does not work, with what fails. In short, it is about approaching the crack, the void, and trying to find what appears there: light coming in, air circulating...

Lacan points out in Seminar XXIII, *The Sinthome*, that in analysis one deals with *joints and sutures*. There is no Other of the Other, one therefore sifts through the fact that there is no *jouissance* of the Other, suturing between the symbolic and the imaginary, between the imaginary and unconscious knowledge, in order to obtain sense. And he notes: "*with this splice we make another at the same time: between the symbolic and the real. That is to say, in one way or another we teach the analysand to splice, to perform a splice between their sinthome and the parasitic nature of jouissance*"². We hear a sense, *jouissance* sense ("*jouis sens*"), which leads us to know about that knot and to tie it well thanks to an artifice. If anything characterizes the analytic operation, it is making this *jouissance* possible, hearing a sense.

¹ J. Lacan, *Proposition of October 9th 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School*, unpublished.

² J. Lacan, *Seminar, book XXIII, The sinthome*, 2016, Cambridge, Polity, p. 58

An artifice that involves finding a shred of knowledge in that hole of impossibilities faced by one in analysis. In turn, that shred of knowledge has a vivifying effect, it lightens... The encounter with deceit, lying truths and the impossibility of enjoyment, the symptom, the relationship with the other sex, the jouissance Other, all of this produced a gain that I want to emphasize. The satisfaction and lightness resulting from that transition from tragedy to comedy.

My small or large tragedies, the junctions and sutures found in my analysis allow me to find that lightness. One of the gaps in my biography, the loss of a child, produced a significant crack, a hole that had to be emptied of so much pain, of feelings of loss... A difficult process. Encounter with the real of life, an unnameable loss, which leads me to seek out other analysts (there have been three journeys, one prior to this event) in order to be able to address the real that analysis confronts you with, a different real since it is a product of analysis and has very different effects. Surprise! My fantasy was taking me elsewhere in terms of the possible attainment of the analytical experience.

A dream crystallizes this: I am in my bedroom, for some reason it is full of rubble, the walls have fallen down, only one is still standing, and the bed and bedside tables remain. At first I think I have to fix it, that I will be able to. In a moment, I manage to say to myself: this is impossible! Satisfaction, lightness, for the good humor that this produces.

Where did I find the gain? At that moment, therefore, not without the temporal, where I was able to tie together impossibility with contingency, something crystallized there, having that effect of transformation. The transition from what *never ceases to be unwritten* to what *ceases to be unwritten*, meant a pause in the search for truth, with effects of satisfaction and the emergence of a new desire.

Lacan points out that it is in contingency, in this singularity of experience, where 'what cannot be conceived in our idea of the real can be done only in terms of a kind of crystallisation (...) it is there that the points of knotting (...) of precipitation can occur, which will finally bring the analytic discourse to fruition'³. With a hole-like effect, this time it pushes me to wake up, to wake up to the real, in another way. One of the impressive events that has taken place is the recovery of memories of past events in my life, insignificant in some cases, which had apparently been halted by the traumatic.

Contingency, what may not be, there is a vanishing point in the discourse that bears witness to the real. That crystallisation, that shred of knowledge, allows me to stop chasing the impossible, ceasing what *never ceases to be not written*.

A dream: I am in bed, I see my legs from the knee down bruised, as an effect of trauma, the sight is horrific, but I tell myself they no longer hurt, I can walk...

Those glimmers of knowledge in the face of the real, since the Ics cannot be reached, remnants of my cartography, my archaeology, my own language, become what allows me to stop pursuing the truth. At the end of my analysis, faced with a dream, the question arises: when will this end? It does not finish, it is one who has to put an end to it.

A signifier in coalescence with jouissance: *amátrida*, which I write as a-mátrida, situates my position as an object in front of the primordial Other and at the same time marks my jouissance: the one who finds no place of her own, no country (*patria*), no *matria*⁴ since she was destined to take care of that Other. Mark of my position and of my jouissance.

³ J. Lacan. *Lettres de L'École Freudienne*, n°15, 1975, Paris, p. 80

⁴ *Matria*: word that can refer to having one's own place, according to Julia Kristeva

This S1 becomes a signifier that I recognize as the master signifier of *jouissance*, regulating the *jouissance* of my symptom. An embodied signifier different from other signifiers coming from the discourse of the Other, from ideals, from the phallic and the recurrent.

This opens the door to working on my condition as a woman, another of the holes that led me to the final analysis, giving femininity a place in my life. There I was able to conclude that for me it is about an identity without a fixed identity. In a dream I see my passport, my father had given it to me in another dream so that I could fly, where on each page there is a photo of different women, attractive, unknown...

Something that allows me to situate the importance of the voice in my life is the approach-discovery of what I consider to constitute *lalangue* in my case: *bo sera. Spokesperson*, says the analyst. A signifier that ego used to say when I was very young, alluding to a sound with which I tried to alert my mother to something.

Undoubtedly a discovery when I realize that the voice is in dance. A voice that is a real delight when it moves me, emerging in my continued and persistent attendance at the opera since the death of my son. A voice that was also present in the choice of my last two analysts, in some of the poems I can write on occasion.

A subject that is there in dance, reduced to a being of speech, a simple *parlêtre*. Language as the passage from private language to language with others. And the instinctual nature of the voice, a pure perforated object.

The voice will leave a residue, signifier and *jouissance*, a residue that will take the path to form the raw material of the unconscious. And, on the other hand, linked to the temporal dimension, the voice is not speech, and speech is not the voice, '*since it can be scansion...*'⁵, Lacan points out in Seminar 21, *Les non-dupe errent*.

The voice as the incorporation of alterity, the Other is a void and resonates there; as an object, it is something other than resonance, *a voice is incorporated, it is not a-simil-ated*⁶.*

Presence of a gap.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

⁵ J. Lacan, seminar *Les non-dupe errent*. Unpublished, Lesson of April 9th, 1974

⁶ J. Lacan, The seminar, Book X, Anxiety, 2014, Polity, p. 277

* Semantically, a-simil: towards the fellow other.

THE AE HOW DO THEY TESTIFY TO THE CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

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AE 2022-2025
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I would like to thank my colleagues from the previous ICG for inviting me to this table and for the opportunity to participate via Zoom.

I attended the last European Convention; I had recently been appointed AE and on that occasion I gave testimony of the moments of transition in my analysis until its final dissolution. Today, after a period of transmission and nearing the end of this function, I have the opportunity to reflect a little on what it means to give testimony and what the AE testifies to.

What does it mean to “give testimony”? To give testimony is to declare that one has seen, heard, and/or experienced something. Testimony is closely linked to knowledge acquired through experience; it is proof. Testimony is also the confirmation of a truth, subjective, of course.

However, this concept has been closely linked to issues of law or religion. Jean-Philippe Pierron¹, proposes a detour through the etymology of the word “testimony” to deepen an interpretation of it and move away somewhat from the meaning provided by these two fields.

The etymology of the word testimony has its roots in both Greek and Latin.

In Greek, it goes back to *martys*, which means martyr, which in turn comes from *mrty*, the root from which *mermera* is derived, meaning anguish, care, concern; *mermerizô*, to be busy, to suspect; and *meriminaô*: to think, to meditate, to suspect.

Following this line of development, we can say that, first of all, the witness would be a martyr; not in the religious sense, but in the sense of embodying, in a more radical way, the experience and transmission, sealing the testimony with one's own body/blood, that is, the testimony is the witness himself.

Secondly, Pierron points out that the Greek etymology emphasizes the ethical dimension of testimony, promoting a shift from the objectivity of a third party to the subjectivity of the one who testifies.

If we take the Latin etymology, *testis* (testimony), *terstis*, we encounter precisely this idea of a “third party”—which is the current idea in law—of the witness as an impartial third party who can provide reliable information. However, according to Pierron, another dimension can be revealed from this idea that goes beyond the event: “*If testimony has the status of mediation, it is because it survives the event (...) testimony intervenes as mediation and a remedy for separation experienced in relation to the principle*”².

¹ Pierron, Jean-Philippe. *Transmissão: uma filosofia do testemunho*. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2010.

² *Ibid*,

Following this line of thinking about testimony as separation and the act of a third party Agamben³ adds that testimony is an act of an author, an author-witness who, through his capacity for initiative, and I would say, through his distinction, is capable of transmitting something.

In his “Proposal of October 9,” Lacan addresses the question of testimony and transmission by saying that passers will gather the testimony of the passer from what they themselves have experienced in their own analysis. It is in this resonance of the living testimony in the lived experience of the passers that the nomination is decided, according to Lacan, and that, therefore, this jury, which listens to the passers, does not constitute itself as judges, but rather, and also, as witnesses⁴.

What does the AE testify to?

In general, AEs testify to the turning points in their analysis: the separation from the Other and their subjective destitution.

It is the AE who *"can bear witness to the crucial problems, the nodal points concerning the analysis"*⁵

We could ask ourselves what these nodal points would be, and I would add: what, from my experience, can be conveyed that can address the crucial problems?

In my own journey, one of the nodal points was the transition from truth to knowledge, with the decline of belief in the true version of the Other to versions and, consequently, to the development of knowledge that had value as truth, subjective of course, *half-said*.

This pivotal point in my analysis, that is, believing that the version of the Other was the only true one, reinforced imaginary identifications. It was necessary to undo it so that another knot could *satisfy*.

Imaginary identifications are a problem for societies and schools of psychoanalysis. If we are not careful, we run the risk of becoming a community rather than a school; a community in the sense that we could have everything in common. In a psychoanalytic school, it is different; we have almost nothing in common and we need to be aware of this! Lacan said at the end of his Seminar 19: “... Or worse,” if we have something in common, if we are brothers, it is because we are children of discourse⁶.

Lacan also warned us that these imaginary identifications can lead to processes of segregation. And that is precisely why the dispositif of the pass, like that of the cartel, is necessary for the functioning of the School, because they are what guarantee the existence of the unpaired dispersed and the experience of the School. That is why Lacan, when dissolving his School, says that he dissolves it, but maintains the experience by reaffirming the practice of cartels.⁷

³ *Ibid*, p. 31.

⁴ Lacan, Jacques. Proposição de 9 de outubro sobre o psicanalista da Escola. In: Outros Escritos, Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2023, p. 261.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 249.

⁶ Lacan, Jacques. O Seminário, livro 19, ...ou pior. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2012, p. 226. Class of June 21st 1972.

⁷ Lacan, Jacques. D'e[s]colagem. In: Nos confins do seminário. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2022, p. 65.

The nomination of an AE marked by this difference, that is, with their singular invention for the original failure⁸, demonstrating that “*Y a d’Un*” - *There is of the One* -, constitutes a living testimony of separation and distinction, hole in the structure⁹.

This testimony brings together the two etymological aspects I mentioned at the beginning (Greek and Latin), that is, it is both what concerns the most singular aspect of the subject, which is his relationship with anguish—his martyrdom and solution until separation!—and it is also the living demonstration of this separation.

Therefore, beyond what is attempted to be conveyed in the testimony, there is another dimension, that of the witness who shows themselves to be the product of the deformation produced by experience; as Lacan says, there is a narrative, a testimony that can be produced “without any recourse to content”¹⁰

To conclude these considerations, I would also like to emphasize that the AE also attests that analyses have an end: a final point and a purpose. A final point, insofar as there is a logic at play in the course of an analysis; there is something that repeats itself and that can be drawn from this repetition of the series that tends toward infinity; what is drawn, extracted, from this repetition is what can limit the series. As for the purpose, it can “*become responsible for the progress of the School, become a psychoanalyst of one's own experience*”¹¹.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

⁸ Lacan, Jacques. O Seminário, livro 23, O sintoma. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2007, p.144. Class of May 11th, 1976.

⁹ Lacan, Jacques. O Seminário, livro 19, ...ou pior. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012. Class of April 19th, 1972.

¹⁰ Lacan, Jacques. O Seminário, livro 18, de um discurso que não fosse do semblante. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, p. 107. Class of May 12th, 1971.

¹¹ Lacan, Jacques. Proposição de 9 de outubro sobre o psicanalista da escola. In: Outros Escritos. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2003, p. 248.

POETICS OF BREATH

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Being on the brink does not mean being comfortably settled; the brink is “the groove,” says the dictionary, and “the notch from which the splinter has broken off.”

The splinter, which, in French, encloses the small *a*.¹

More anchored by fantasy, then, no more hypnotic siren song. With the crystal of language, diffraction of sense, sonorous cut. “I definitely play with the crystal of my language,” says Lacan, “where I refract the signifier to decompose the subject² ». With scansion, punctuation that gives us the chance to dilute, to detach meaning, to make a new one audible, the unexpected, non-invited but inviting itself in, a diffraction of the Real. With equivocation, the crumbling of blind belief in my fantasy, discourse is no longer mortified, fixed by fantasy, no longer petrified by meaning. From the service of fantasy to out of service, it does not disappear but it no longer serves me. A cut in the systematized automatic. The gap makes a passage.

On the brink, it is therefore from a place, from its edge, that cannot be mapped, that AE stands, it is topos-logic (logic of place). Division of the subject. So, it is by standing on the brink, where knowledge is lacking, that “it is not futile to stand³ », ethical position.

The brink could be the gap between signifier and signified, a chasm rather than a connection. There is no S2 to its S1; we repeat canonically, “there is no sexual relationship.”

It is therefore with and because of the impossible that there is a chance for invention, the invention of the One, irreducible singularity. The limit acts as a lever, a chance for knowledge to “renew itself⁴”. It is not a question of parroting, of producing sclerotic knowledge eroded by frozen textbook repetition, but rather a knowledge that instead of blocking, opens up, creates space. The brink. Not something that puts you to sleep but something that awakens you, not true or false—knowledge is full of holes—but something that sets you in motion. Desire, to know. Knowledge that cannot be known but can perhaps be sifted from the edge, in the direction of the grain*, of the periphery.

So, perhaps, an attempt to know based on a finding. An attempt to know, I borrow Paulhan's “essay of enthusiasm.” An attempt to know is the opposite of the master's discourse; it is a proposal to put the work on the loom, analysts, workers-artisans of psychoanalysis.

¹ Trans. note: in French L'écl(a)t

² J. Lacan, *Radiophonie*, Autres Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 1970, p. 426

³ J. Lacan, *Le séminaire L'acte psychanalytique*, Paris, Seuil, 1967, p. 35

⁴ J. Lacan, *Ornicar 17/18, Transfert à St Denis, Lacan pour Vincennes*, 1978 p.278

What constitutes a finding for me is often the emergence of a new arrangement of language. An arrangement that moves, takes us elsewhere. A reflection of the crystal of language to which my analysis has made me very sensitive. In physics, reflection is a sudden change of direction, or of movement, an opportunity for something new. We only have speech as a tool, which both enables and prevents, an oxymoron. Can the trou-vaile, the one that carries the hole, create a knot between intention and extension? In any case, the knot is only possible with the chipping. With the trou-vaile, the réson, echo of the void.

We resonate because we have experienced it, where reasons are not enough. “Meaning is a plug.” “It doesn't go very far⁵” Lacan has said. Analyzand who pushes his rock, Sisyphus of meaning, infinity announced. The absurdity of the world and of our condition speaks, but the why, in perfect duo with the because, is metonymic, perpetual gliding. Words are impotent. The Real has no sense: the most intimate and the most foreign, this “internal exclusion⁶».

With the cure, one is warned, warned that there is something elusive and irreducible, the nucleus of the subject, silence is inscribed at the heart of the subject. The unformulable by definition, which the subject, via fantasy, knits into a magic formula to try to bring the relationship into existence, a quest for meaning, begging from the Other. But meaning does not absorb the Real, words carry fantasy, the Other does not respond. With the cut, the automatic unknown (l'insu) passes to the known(un-su) of jouissance. Known (Un-su) is not Other known. Reversal.

Finitude to infinity! title of my first testimony of the pass.

So, starting from the impossible, the unspeakable, what can pass? Can what is not said be heard? Heard in its absence? Is there a scope for the ab-sense, a gap where meaning unravels, where language fails to say, in fact?

What is said cannot go unsaid. “There is no statement without enunciation⁷ ». If the statement belongs to the dimension of the said, then we can propose that the enunciation, in turn, belongs to the dimension of the saying. The dire-mention, that is, the mention of the saying in the said, or rather beyond or before it, and which does not belong to what can be deciphered. The mention, in its definition, is what designates, not what says, a question of body and not of word. The word “designates” in French encloses the sign. The mention, following the definition, is what signals, signals what lies outside, what exists according to Lacan. An interval of language that carries what is not known, an irreducible mark of structure, yet one that resonates. Another realm, another relief of words than that of sense, that speech sounds to the body from the new knowledge that has marked the body, of which only sound remains, vibrations of jouissance, excluded from sense, inarticulable. I have testified to this on other occasions, the *sign-ifire*, a neologism that is the contraction between signifier and sign, a word that fires and does not form a chain, therefore the *sign-ifire* that arises and concludes, touches the body, an event of the body. A word that signals, no ambiguity there, a word that, with an effect of meaning, takes meaning out of play. At that moment, a great joy invades me with the sensation of a light, cool breath in my chest. The enjoyment of

⁵ J. Lacan, Séminaire *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*, unpublished, Class of April 19th 1977

⁶ J. Lacan, *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 861

⁷ J. Lacan, *Silivet 2/3*, Paris, Seuil, 1970 p. 233

life. “The echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying⁸.” To paraphrase Lacan, I propose: The AE is its enunciation.

It is this question that interests me, that of enunciation, what is carried and conveyed by what is said. Moebian place and reverse? What could pass? What has a chance of carrying, that is, of making a cut.

The AE as the bearer of a perforated statement? The pierced density of a saying that hits home? An effect in the saying itself? A certain use of *lalangue*?

I choose the statements I use to address you, I calibrate them, I pick and choose my words, but the saying, the utterance, is beyond me. It is without me and at the same time it is most mine, one could say at the same time with a play on words inside and outside: the most intimate and the most ex-timate.

Enunciation is an effect, the effect of breath, the resonance of the void, the revival of life. Speaking involves breath, the alternation of voice and silence, scansion then. Silence emerges when meaning falls silent, when the cry of demand to the other has ceased, when the quest for narcissistic knowledge is obsolete.

Silence has no words; it inhabits a body. It cannot be said, but it produces the interval, the interstice, that allows breath to return.

I quote Celan, who says poetry; I could replace it with analysis: “poetry goes all this way (...) only to reach such a turning point in breath⁹ ». The new breath changes the use of speech, from significance to direction, the word caught in the body. And that changes the way we inhabit it. Each one is a poem—unique—woven, traced, stamped with words and their material sound, a poem with skipped, crossed-out lines. Something can be breathed mid-word, but not all, the use of the poem.

So, with what cannot be said, at the limits of language, emerges the Well Saying. Well saying and not saying well, it is not about making beauty, beauty can dazzle, return to the screen, nor bluff the gallery with the power of rhetoric, but saying it fair. Fair does not mean true, the true covers the Real. No more gaps to stand in!

Well-saying, neither sensical nor sensational. Well-saying does not add meaning, it shaves it down. It is to say as closely as possible, as close as possible to the thing.

Well-saying is found in poetry, which “is an effect of sense but also an effect of hole¹⁰ Poetry: the word caught to the letter, the letter catching the word. Dimension of the said and dimension of the saying. There is meaning in poetry, but it also harbors the foreign without naming it, the unnameable. It conveys and resonates with the untranslatable, the absent, not

⁸ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire Livre XXII, Le sinthome*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p.17

⁹ P. Celan, *Le méridien et autres proses*, Paris, Seuil, 1960

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *Séminaire L'insu que sait s'aile à mourre*, unpublished, Class of May 17th 1977

by saturating it with meaning but by grooving it. And Lacan points out: “all analytical language must be poetic¹¹ ».

I take up the dictionary definition of “a notch from which the splinter has broken away,” the broken splinter becoming the cause of desire. Poetics of breath. Being in place of cause and not sense, “right style” which is a gamble for transmission.

From understanding to bodystanding, body taken, standing on the brink, poethics¹² of breath.

Yet not without the resonance of language.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

¹¹ J. Lacan, *L'âne N°48*, François Cheng et Jacques Lacan, oct-déc 1991

¹² Exchange with Claire Montgobert

UN-DO

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“The AE, which is accused of being (...) in the breach” of resolving “the crucial problems at the live points where they are found for analysis” not only for itself, but also for psychoanalysis”¹

I pause at the first part. The AE, which is accused of being in the breach. Accuse has a force that deserves our attention. In Spanish, it means to attribute responsibility for a reprehensible act to someone. What responsibility? What reprehensible act?

The scandal reveals the perceived failure of the subject supposed to know. The reprehensible shows that separation from the norms of the Other. Neither transgression nor disobedience, but rather, through his analysis taken to its final point, he has proven the inconsistency of the Other. The analyst authorizes himself, not through the Other. However, this does not imply a self-declaration, but rather acquires the dimension of responsibility and seriousness that links him to a School.

The task is psychoanalysis. The fine-tuning of a desire that drives the other. It is brought to the fore that there is a gap between the analysand and the analyst. There is no continuity. It is that moment of break-in, of turning point, that the dispositif tries to use as a beacon. This brings us to the relationship with the analytic cause, which is the foundation. The breach is not the act. In the latter, its logic is that of consequences, from the first ones to occur; only a posteriori, through its effects, will it be possible to know about it. There is no preparation for the analytic act; it is not of the order of the subject. A crucial point emerges. On the one hand, the act is that by which the psychoanalyst commits to responding to it. On the other hand, psychoanalysis depends on the analytic act.

Gap. It calls for the enunciation of the real at stake. If in the denial of this real we find the cause of the halting of psychoanalysis, the sustainability and future of psychoanalysis are at stake in its recognition. It is to place at the center the future of psychoanalysis, which depends on the experience of the real. To bring it as a School is to highlight the importance of this being manifested, again and again.

We can link the word *proof* to *accuse*. To have proof, to give proof? Of that point of finitude, of the impossible? Because there is no definition of the analyst, since it is not of the order of the obvious, Lacan enunciates his Proposition² to try to illuminate that shift. To grasp beforehand. There, an passant, not an analyst. His Proposition, too, is placed *across*³, tilting the path to emphasize that the analyst's instituting act cannot be separated from the analytic act. A paradox of the dispositif begins to emerge, the wager through words to give proof of what words cannot achieve, to account for what doesn't fit into the account.

¹ J. Lacan, “Proposición del 9 de octubre de 1967 sobre el psicoanalista de la Escuela”, en *Otros escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2016, p. 261.

² *Ibid.*

³ J. Lacan, Lacan, “Discurso a la Escuela Freudiana de París”, en *Otros escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2016, p. 286.

From the above, it follows that there is no need to recognize what has no recognition. This makes it clear that guarantee is not recognition. In the latter case, we would be under the illusion of a course that, once completed, would certify that we are ready. The psychoanalyst is neither an expert nor a specialist. The only possible recognition is that he or she recognizes their responsibility in sustaining psychoanalysis. Thus, those who have taken that decisive leap can turn to the School and want to become responsible for its progress. The School appears as a witness. There is no analyst without a School; the hermit who locks himself in his office is just a crab⁴. The letters AE express a link between analyst and School.

I share a question: Can we think of the *dispositif* of the pass as an opportunity? An opportune moment for what? An opportunity to turn to the work of a School of psychoanalysis, a plot constituted in another way since it introduces the act. An opportunity-port⁵, does not cease to arrive only to remember that its time to go out again, to recommence.

Two times: there and a posteriori. On the one hand, a work is put together in the *dispositif*. It is put together, it removes the subject, emphasizing that it is without calculation. Each of those involved finds themselves in a working position for psychoanalysis, which is tied to their own experience in analysis, to that real thing at stake. It can foster grains of light that illuminate that moment of passage and cause the analytic community to move in the direction of knowledge in the making. A posteriori, as an expansive effect? Yes, if we understand it as a work in relation to psychoanalysis that could extend to the members of our School. Expansive effect introduces the temporal dimension in relation to the work of the analytic collective. Incalculable effects. An expansive effect that calls for thinking about psychoanalysis. A different way of thinking, which focuses on the act and where the vital aspect of psychoanalysis lies. I head for the exit and, surprise, I find the entrance transformed, allowing for another declination. *Accuse* has as its synonym *Cross out*. Which leads me to another word, *undo*.

Cross out and *undo* are two verbs that can be conjugated, which shows that we are in a different place from the act. I express this subsequent work as *undoing*, a doing that undoes in the same movement, in the production of the School. It makes present the breach, the rupture, and what relaunches the task. With *undoing*, I highlight a function and the commitment to continue weaving this fabric, emphasizing that it does not close in a whole and that it is necessary to ensure that its weave, that of the experience of the real, is maintained. With *undoing*, it takes on a dimension that is a work that must always continue. We must be aware of breaking with any habit, routine, or predictability in order to move toward a production that revives. This is a responsibility that connects to the School.

On the other hand, it also points to each person keeping in mind that moment in the cure where everything is undone and a possibility opens up; a void that makes an act possible.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 281.

⁵ Etymologically, the word opportunity comes from the Latin *opportunitas*: composed of the suffix *ob-op*, referring to “in front of,” and *portus* (port), which designated an opening for transport.

FROM PASSANT TO ANALYST OF THE SCHOOL: A FRUITFUL FAILURE

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Regarding the dispositif of the Pass and nomination, the question of what an analyst is, as well as matters concerning the relationship with the School and the problem of transmission, remain fully relevant, insofar as the singularity of each testimony brings the real of the analytical experience back into play, one by one.

In my experience of the end of analysis, the end point was not reached through a final interpretation or the revelation of a repressed truth. The exhaustion of the combinatorics of the unconscious and its decipherment inaugurated the possibility of a new status of knowledge.

The traversal of the fantasy implies a collapse of signification that can give rise to an opening toward a different logic. It is a shift in the economy of jouissance, a transformation in the subject's relationship with knowledge, in relation to what insists outside of sense.

Beyond sense, a path opens up that, from the absolute signification of the fantasy to the void of signification of the end of analysis, constitutes a radical subjective experience. This emptying—which is a lack of knowledge that leaves a mark—yields a residue, an object that stands out as that which does not fit into the chain of signification, which cannot be translated, yet operates.

At the end of analysis, that object does not disappear: the analysand separates from it as a fantasy support, which entails a modification of jouissance, yet recognizes it as a structural element of their mode of jouissance.

Unlike the fantasy, which can be traversed, the object *a* cannot be interpreted: it is isolated. And its isolation allows the subject to invent a singular way of inhabiting their jouissance, without being captured by its deadly slant.

At that point, the structural inconsistency of the Other is revealed, confirming that it existed only as an effect of the subject's supposition, trapped within the apparatus of language.

From there, events come to a head, giving rise to a subjective mutation, for the object *a*, as a logical operator, allows for a shift in position that destitutes the subject with respect to their experience in the cure, from which there is no turning back.

That moment marks a limit and opens a gap: a before and an after, a different relationship with knowledge that shifts in register and perspective, and where the cause of the malaise, of the symptoms, is re-situated, destituting the subject.

The non-existence of the Other also implies the collapse of the fantasy, as a framework of sense and as a substitute for the impossible relationship.

The experience of the end of analysis, far from closing that encountered gap, recognizes it as structural: there is no Other of knowledge, no guarantee of desire, no complementarity between the One and the Other. However, from that non-relationship, something can be done and said.

There is no writing that guarantees a proportion between the sexes; there is no instinctive complementarity nor predetermined harmony. What the Pass seeks to bring about is not what unites, what establishes a relationship between S1 and S2. It is what separates them, producing a cut with sense, with the fantasy, with the demand, with the ideal of the Other.

Human sexuality is marked by this structural impossibility. Jouissance does not find its law in the Other, nor in the grammar of the unconscious. An inconsistency already inscribed in the forgotten *lalangue*, which introduces a different logic.

A logic riddled with holes that no longer allows one to take refuge in the narcissistic mirage of love. It is not merely that there is no sexual relationship that can be written; but also that the real cannot be spoken. It is only possible to skirt around it.

The unconscious itself manifests through equivokes, slips, or lies. The truth cannot be fully spoken, and as Lacan reminds us, “it also lies.” The real, differently, “does not speak,” “is identical to itself,” and “always returns to the same place”; there, nothing is missing.

When the real imposes itself, it is no longer possible to aspire to a definitive point of closure, nor to the completeness of knowledge, nor to the guarantee of the act. There is, instead, a possible invention based on what is missing, which cannot be standardized, but which can be made to pass as the testimony of an experience.

It is not a matter of knowing everything—that is impossible—but of inventing a singular response to what cannot be fully said. Consequently, the knowledge produced in an analysis can only be applied as a know-how, a knowing how to deal with it. To construct a new ordering with the marks rescued from *lalangue* linked to jouissance.

Lalangue, which affects and leaves effects of jouissance on the body and also on the symptom. There, what language fails to say becomes audible... nonsense. The analytic act, in this regard, will not seek to restore the lost sense, but rather to make the equivoke resonate, producing a rupture and a cut in the unity of language. There begins another possible knotting, where jouissance is no longer veiled by signification and knowledge is ordered around a void.

Analysis ultimately produces knowledge, but it is not just any knowledge: it is incomplete knowledge, merely a fragment of knowledge. In that sense, the Pass does not guarantee a universal truth. What is at stake there is an enunciation that responds to a subjective truth, where the subject’s relationship with knowledge, with jouissance, with desire, and with what remained as a residue once the experience was traversed, is articulated.

In that relationship with the unspeakable, betting on keeping open the distance between what can be said and what always escapes. That place where knowledge failed, but desire was sustained in relation to the analytic cause.

The testimony aims to bring something of that saying into a common space, which constitutes itself as a place for the elaboration and transmission of the logic of the unconscious.

Another way of hosting and sustaining analytic knowledge, via a transference of work: through the shared interest in the knowledge of the unconscious. A political act because it establishes a different, non-imaginary bond among the members of the School, sustained by the possibility of transmitting a not-all knowledge.

From the One-alone of analysis toward the one-by-one of the School, where something can be inscribed that, far from aiming at identification, tends to provoke questioning, to undermine the belief in a constituted knowledge.

Only analytic discourse offers the possibility of hosting the irreducible nature of that structural gap between the sexes. A fruitful failure, which reveals a trait of humanity, a new form of social bond, of relationship with the real of life, which, without excluding the existence of its finitude, includes satisfaction.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

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ABERRATION

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I could have titled this piece “Psychoanalysis despite the laws of physics” to talk about how subversive analysis can be. Gravity, for example, doesn't work; you can walk over a hole without falling in. It's a strange thing, ~~stafela~~, this business.

So, a subject begins the analysis trivially with “that's not it”; how does he end up talking about physics, holes, desire, reality, and falls that don't hurt? Aberration!

The word aberration comes from the Latin *ab-errare*. The verb to err¹ means to stray from the truth, to be mistaken, to embark on an adventure. Aberration, then, is a deviation from the expected norm, a deviation from common sense or from habits of thought or feeling, taken as the norm.

I will take as my starting point a quote from Lacan: “A psychoanalyst knows that thought is aberrant by nature, which does not prevent him from being responsible for a discourse that welds the analysand [...] to the analysand-analyst couple²».

Thought is aberrant by nature, and an analyst knows this. The fact that an analyst knows indicates knowledge there; more particularly, knowledge proper to the analyst, obtained in analysis, thanks to analysis. What is this knowledge?

Being knowledge, it is not supposed. To speak of thought is to speak of free association, of the analyzing speech that seeks meaning. To know that thought is aberrant is to have experienced in analysis that thought, free association, does not conclude. An impasse ~~as to the end of analysis~~.

Despite all expectations, and there are many in analysis, identifying the fantasy is a revelation that delivers no meaning. It reveals no truth on the side of meaning, except *joui-sens*. “I think, therefore I *jouis*.³». Although it has always been played out by his unconscious, the subject knows this through the identification of the fantasy. Acquired knowledge. He is not where the unconscious plays him. “The unconscious presents itself as a thought that is not I⁴ ». Division. The divided subject is not where he thinks he is. The unconscious introduces an alternative that breaks with Descartes' cogito. Either *I do not think* or *I am not* ⁵.

Fantasy unmask a truth that lies instead of telling the truth. “Truth is not knowledge⁶ »; But this is knowledge and even a reversal of what common sense would expect. The fact that fantasy no longer has any meaning means that the analysand, who is invited to associate and

¹ It comes from the Greek ἐρρω.

² J. Lacan, *La troisième*, November 1974, on the website of Patrick Valas, www.valas.fr.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre XIV, La logique du fantasme*, Paris, Seuil, 2023, p.131.

⁵ Or “where I am, **I do not think,**” or “where I think, **I am not.**”

⁶ J. Lacan, *Séminaire Le savoir du psychanalyste*, unpublished, class of November 4th 1971.

express their thoughts freely, ends up at an impasse. This has an effect on the space of transference, with the fall of the subject supposed to know and a fall of the jouissance attached to sense.

Thought is aberrant by nature, but this knowledge produced in analysis is not natural. Aberration?

It is through analysis that the possibility opens up for a subject to refuse to be dazzled by the love of truth and fantasy that masks the real. Thought wanders and does not allow for conclusion. The fall of the subject supposed to knowledge opens up a new perspective of error for the subject, which is not disorientation. On the contrary. It can lead to a new meaning, "the meaning of the symptom" as Lacan defines it in *La troisième*, namely the real. It opens up to a knowledge that concerns the subject's jouissance, knowledge without a subject. It opens up the possibility of the pass to the analyst. In my view, this moment is one of abandoning the why (which is the search for and expectation of meaning) in favor of the how; the passant testifies to this passage in the dispositif, trying to demonstrate how and not why.

"There is no need to know that you are in love with your unconscious in order not to err; you just have to let yourself go, be duped by it. For the first time in history, it is possible for you to err, that is, to refuse to love your unconscious, since you finally know what it is: knowledge, annoying knowledge. But it is perhaps in this error, *e, two r's, e*, [...] that we can bet on finding the Real a little more in the sequel, realize that the unconscious may indeed be disharmonious, but that perhaps it leads us to a little more of this real than to the very little reality that is ours, that of fantasy, that it leads us beyond: to the pure Real ⁷ ».

Thus Lacan suggests that we wander in order to find a direction, one that departs from common sense, which I write as "*One*" since the master's discourse wants it to be *One* for all, when in fact it can only be *One* for each *One*. There is no harmony.

Be fooled by your unconscious, but not by the master's discourse. ~~An analysis oriented towards the real, which is not caught up in aberrant thinking.~~ This elective moment of the pass to the analyst, which opens with the fall of the subject supposed to knowledge, is the moment when we assume the act.

If the act does not occur under transference, it is the act that allows its institution. It authorizes the analyzing task, in other words, the entry into free association, where the subject is invited to wander in his thought, before he ends up realizing his aberration himself. The task already implies that the subject supposed to know is destined to fall.

So if the analyst accepts that the analysand institutes him as the subject supposed to knowledge, it is with full knowledge of the facts. Semblance. He uses the subject supposed to knowledge and (ab)errant thinking, because it is the only way he has to weld the analysand to the analysand-analyst couple. It is the only way that allows the subject to enter analysis, to lose the thread by wandering, thus having a chance that a passage oriented towards the real will open up. Nevertheless, the fact that the analyst uses free association and transference says nothing about what drives him to do so. It is a question of cause.

"The act is conditioned by the fall of the subject supposed to knowledge. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition. There must be a desire that allows the act to be endured, despite the

⁷ J. Lacan, *Séminaire Les non-dupes errent*, inédit, leçon du 11 juin 1974.

untenable, despite the horror. The analytic act is at the mercy of the psychoanalyst's desire. The two, act and desire, are inseparable⁸».

If entering into free association already implies its impasse, if the subject supposed to knowledge is destined to fall, coming to know that thought is aberrant seems to be a logical end to analysis. On the other hand, the analyst's desire is not an automatic, normal consequence of the process. It is contingent. Lacan proposes the pass for this purpose, that is, to give the AE the task of clarifying the step he has taken in taking the place of the analyst⁹.

This experience of the pass is simply what I propose to those who are devoted to exposing themselves to it for the sole purpose of informing themselves about a very delicate point, which consists in asserting in the most certain way that it is completely a-bnormal—object a normal—for someone who is undergoing psychoanalysis to want to be a psychoanalyst. It really takes a kind of aberration that is worth, that was worth offering to anyone who could gather testimony. That is why I have provisionally instituted this collection of trials to find out why someone who knows what psychoanalysis is through its didactics might still want to be an analyst¹⁰ ».

The analyst's desire is an unpredictable response from the subject when faced with the knowledge that reveals their fantasy and a truth that does not speak the truth. The fall of the subject supposed to knowledge, the devaluation of meaning, the horror of knowledge surpassed, lead the subject to a subtraction, a realization: *all that for this*. What color is this *all that for this* for an analysand? This will determine whether or not they will take up the option of analysis, whether or not they will want others to benefit from this experience that was worthwhile for them.

In my experience, it is elements, traits, specific to the subject that keep them attached to this desire. Traits that were there even outside of analysis and that come together with it. Coalescence? These are discoveries that are specific to the subject, linked to their history, their signifiers, what drives them. Something inherent in the subject resonates with the process. I would say that when faced with this revelation of fantasy and its consequences, when faced with the identification of their own “I don't want to know anything about it” once it has been overcome, the subject finds something appealing that keeps them hooked.

However, the fact that an element of the subject is in this encounter does not make it a predictable or transparent response in hindsight. It does not explain the reason for this particular encounter. An obscure decision. The subject does not necessarily recognize it, or not entirely. The thick shadow remains, and the experience of the pass responds to this need.

“Can the pass effectively highlight, for those who offer themselves to it, as a flash of lightning can, by shedding a completely different light, a certain part of the shadows of their analysis? This is something that concerns the passant¹¹». From experience, I would say yes.

To conclude, and following today's line of thought, the experience of the pass is that of a passant who attempts to demonstrate the transition from a thought that proves to be aberrant to an aberration, which is the analyst's desire. An AE attempts to shed light on the step

⁸ C. Soler, *La politique de l'acte*, Course 1999-2000, Collège Clinique de Paris, p. 152.

⁹ J. Lacan, « Discours à l'École freudienne de Paris », in *Autres Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 276.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *Séminaire Le savoir du psychanalyste*, op.cit., class of June 1st 1972.

¹¹ J. Lacan, « L'expérience de la passe », in *Ornicar? bulletin périodique du champ freudien n° 12-13*, Paris, p.121.

towards this aberration. He will never succeed sufficiently. And the pass will remain a question and a test of an **Aberration Éclairée**¹² (**AE - Aberration Éclairée**).

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

¹² Trans. Note: Éclairée: enlighten, illuminated

PAPERS OF A NEWCOMER : ACCOUNT OH AN EXPERIENCE

Agustina Cedolini
AE 2025-2028
Argentina

"Written in a village where newcomer status, once acquired, is never lost (...) so one must quickly shed one's late newcomer status, every first-time arrival (...) hastens to give a highly educated lecture (...) three days after disembarking. This works; it is understood that such a prompt lecture on such a subject is not the colossal fatuity and ignorant meddling that is often suspected, but rather the anxiety to get rid of the patina of newcomer status as soon as possible."¹

When asked to testify about having gone through the experience of the pass, my answer was a clumsy, hasty 'yes,' but one fueled by a strange enthusiasm. However, I felt the need to take refuge under the label of 'newcomer,' which appeared before me as if by magic or free association, which has nothing to do with magic. Why the need for cover? It is possible to feel a little sense of cold when it comes to saying things that matter, in distant lands, before strangers; and when you have just disembarked. One is not usually in a comfortable position when one is cold, or so I believe. I realized, badly and too late, but without regrets, that the short time – almost two months – that has passed since the cartel of the pass made its announcement, does not free me from the urge I feel, nevertheless, to bear witness to what I experienced, to how vivid and lively it was for me to go through the process of the pass.

Since I applied for admission to the *dispositif*, something extremely singular has happened, which may allow us to reflect on some nuances of the so-called experience. Throughout the entire process (*Erfahrung*²), I had the clear impression that there was something about the order of the experience (*Erlebnis*) that took on a course of its own, independent, advancing much faster than my ability of theoretical elaboration or comprehension of it. It became present, more clearly than ever, a dimension other, which moves, alone, independently of the ego, independent of the subject. I will be precise: that experience revealed, with unprecedented clarity, a dimension other, which seems to slip through words but is not itself in any of them, which touches bodies—not only that of the passant—in the most concrete and real way, which generates surprising and paradoxical effects when it appears, that generates a kind of domino effect of various affects: anguish, enthusiasm, hope, despair.

Suspect, if you like, a name, a word for it; I don't think it will take you much effort. For my part, I will dwell around it, without saying it.

There are questions that, I believe, it would not be futile to ask. Does an analysis end? How can we know? What does this have to do with the possibility of taking the place of the analyst for others? What is the purpose of the pass?

¹ Fernández, Macedonio (1967) *Papeles de reciénvenido*. Extracted from <http://200.111.157.35/biblio/recursos/Fernandez,%20Macedonio%20-%20Papeles%20de%20Recienvenido.pdf>, p.4

Note: 'recienvenido' is a neologism used by the author, Macedonio Fernández, to refer to someone who has just arrived somewhere, who has come recently, very recently.

² The terms 'Erfahrung' and "Erlebnis" refer to two possible meanings of the term 'experience' in German; they imply, respectively, experience as a process and experience as something lived, in encounter with contingency. Taken from the program of the IV European Convention of the IF-EPFCL, School Day: 'The pass: experience and testimonies'; extracted from <https://www.forumlacan.it/iv-convegno-europeo-if-epfcl/es/programma#la-passe>

That analyses have a possible end has already been said by Freud and Lacan, although with substantial differences between the two. I will not go into details; the idea here is not to transmit theory. That an analysis ends is something I can attest to, without a doubt. There comes a point when one can say enough; this far is good, in the course of an analysis. It is a strange sensation. In general, it is a place where one has gone for many years—it does not matter if there are intervals in between, changes of analysts, or other ups and downs. It is also a space where, at least for me, one finds out certain things. These things that one finds out profoundly change different aspects of life: one's relationship with one's own body, with work, with love, the way one inhabits bonds, the way one deals with discomfort, suffering, and even anguish. One may learn things such as the following: anguish is an affect that we cannot avoid or suppress in life, but it can be experienced in many different ways; and, moreover, it is like a kind of marker in the pages of a book: if it is there, it is because it indicates something important that needs to be read.

More things are found out in analysis. There is a point of irremediable loneliness, where one is completely alone, and this is not due to one's own inefficiency or the inability of others to accompany us; it is simply impossible. Words, their games, riddles, misunderstandings, puzzles, the ones that kept us there for so long, turned out not to be such a big deal after all. It is not, because after a long time talking, one idea appears: 'I could stay here, talking, for years, but... what for?' Not being able to find a 'what for', a purpose in continuing to talk, is not a lack of creativity; rather, the experience of translating a text from a dream is experienced: 'enough is enough'. Just like that, in another language, in a language I thought I knew, but which is foreign; just like that, without any further sense, 'enough is enough', the signifier that bites its tail. This is as clear as the disappointment it causes: and one who had chosen to work with words, who had devoted oneself to them, who had been fascinated by them for so long, like someone who idolizes a god, who is known now to be as much a pagan as an impostor! The altars are empty, a disappointment that brings relief.

Even more things happen in analysis. Things are found, and things are lost, and others appear or do not. It seems that there was a novel, a myth, a spectre or phantasm that structured the whole of life and was expressed in these words: 'the girl who does her homework well'. That girl decides to leave childhood behind, saying goodbye to it in her dreams, in an irreversible way. 'Doing her homework well' implies that there is someone who determines it, who monitors and judges the homework done with tyrannical rigor, which will always be insufficient, leaving the author of the homework also insufficient. A gaze that weighs more than lead. Words are worth what they are worth, but the advantage is that they allow for equivocation, especially when writing. The proper name no longer represents, it does not say much. The poems I write say more, in which everyone will read whatever they want. Suddenly, a flash of lightning illuminates: I am, like my poems, an ambiguous reference. The girl with the homework is lost, the equivoque is found, which, rather than looking, is heard, is said. The gaze then weighs a little less, a little that is a lot.

Things like this are found in analysis, and things like this are lost. A courage appears that was unknown until then. One gains momentum, takes courage, and says, in solitude, with a crazy certainty, with sorrow, without glory: it's over. On the other side, the listener—who accompanied the entire journey, who sustained it and made it possible—is in absolute silence. It hurts, the soul feels it hurts, but in a kinder way. One senses something that must be similar to freedom. It ends, an analysis, indeed, does end.

Now one issue remains, and it is not a minor one: a profound disenchantment with words has taken hold, having proven themselves insufficient for some things, that no matter how many twists and turns we make them take, that is as far as they go, an insurmountable limit. But as I said, we work with words, listening to others who, in general, speak in words. Then a pendular movement begins, one climbs into a swing, which, at one end, makes one's toes brush against

the deepest disappointment with language; and, at the other end, one touches again on the clear perception that it serves some purpose. As one swings back and forth between disappointment and consolation, one suspects that the fate that awaits us is the same as that which the analyst himself has encountered: to be left behind, just like that. The question then becomes inevitable: why would I, knowing what it entails, want to take that place for others? I have no doubts, but I cannot even mumble the reasons. How can one be so convinced of something one does not even know? This indeterminacy lasts for several months with their respective days.

Until—there must always be an ‘until...’ for the story to move forward—one finds the answer, a possible way out. Where? Precisely at the level of experience, in one's encounter with a contingency. One fine day, I see a patient for the first time; she sits down without introductions or protocols and speaks. She only talks about things that others might find crazy, very crazy: clones, kidnappings, supplanted family identities, and there she sits, hugging her certainty. At one point in that interview, it becomes present—without even knocking on the door—and settles in me, an enormous anguish that leaves me on the verge of turning to stone. That speaks; me, anguish. The interview ends and once again the question insists, but more strongly than ever: why am I doing this? What motivates me to occupy this place that is often anything but comfortable? I think I don't want to see any more patients, then I think I do. Again, the swing; I go, and I come back. Will I have to return to analysis to do something about the anguish? Silence, deep, radical; silence of thoughts and affects. At that moment, I decide to ask for the pass and write to request admission to the *dispositif*, with surprising confidence for something that does not exactly have any sense for me, I just know, I know I want to do it. Analysis is no longer a place to return to, as no knowledge would be expected of the analyst; in that experience, a know-how with anguish has been constructed, which now does not stop, but serves to set something in motion.

The *dispositif* itself is a most singular, unique experience. It has minimal indications for its functioning, but there is a large part of what happens there that is not only subject to numerous contingencies, but is left in the hands of those who compose it to determine how it is done. It is an experience that revealed something with great clarity: knowledge is not found in any of those involved; all of them are traversed by a not-knowing. The passers do not know that they may perform that function; it will be decided by drawing names from a list that they do not even know they are on. The *passant* does not know who his *passeurs* will be, nor does he know what he will say—the *dispositif* is based on occurrence. The *cartel* does not know what, nor whose testimony they will hear... in short, no one knows. And yet, despite this, they take a chance on operating with what is unknown.

This is not complete ignorance; something is known: that which has been constructed in each one as experience of their own unconscious; one knows how to operate with that.

Once the *dispositif* is set in motion, something happens: in an interview with one of the *passeurs*, she asks something—I don't remember exactly what—about the nomination of AE (‘Analyst of the Escuela’). The only thing that appears with the sound of those letters is something else: a writing slip, which arose in childhood and which I never took to analysis, because it wasn't something that bothered me too much. The slip of the pen consists of the fact that, when writing, quickly and without thinking, I interchange the A for the E or vice versa. And there I come up with a new interpretation, constructed without the interpretation of an analyst—because the position of the *passeur* is not identical to that of the analyst. The A is the first of the vowels, the E the second, that is, they imply a place in a series, an order. A is the first letter of my first name and the first letter of the name of a brother, the eldest, who died when I was just over a year old. I always said that I was the eldest of my siblings, not counting the brother who is no longer with us. I, who am the second, occupy the place of the first, like in the slip of the pen, the places are exchanged. At the same time, there is something

of an identification with that dead brother that colors all of life. In that slip of the pen that had insisted on it for so long, I was being reminded of that which I wished to omit: a death that marked my life and the identification with a somewhat sinister place. At the same time, I found in it a way out, a possible change of position, which meant less suffering. The slip contained within itself a liberating answer, a possible margin of choice: to equivocate was the right thing to do. I went from the dead [la muerta] (which in Spanish ends with A), a word that implies me entirely, a kind of all-dead, to death [la muerte] (which ends with E in Spanish). Death is a part of what is on the horizon, for me, as for all human beings. I can find myself not-all dead, but only with death as an irremediable fate, one that leaves the space of life open. I go from muert-a to muert-e. 'A' that is lost, that loses, that makes one lose, that falls. The construction of this interpretation in the pass was deeply moving for me.

I can then, through experience, sketch out an answer. That is what the pass is for. For my part, there is one thing I know how to do: equivocate with letters, equivocate with writing. One of the things I do well is equivocating, and I found a profession in which that is valuable. The function of the analyst is also to equivocate with spelling, with writing; in doing so, they open up possibilities before destinies that seemed closed, written in indelible ink. Part of our destiny will be like that, unchangeable; but another part can equivocate a little. In turn, the analyst's place implies being able to take the place of the dead, but for that, one must be very much alive!

To conclude, I will point out another curious aspect. Being nominated as AE also has for me the echo of the equivocal reference, of the slip of the tongue. After the nomination, I have the sensation that there is something of a scam in it. There are others who demand that I share a knowledge that I am supposed to have, but I do not believe I have. Am I a fraud? The subject supposed to know is a scam, a fundamental one, a scam in that it cannot hold its promise forever; it will be disappointed. What can I tell other analysts who seem to have a great interest in hearing I have no idea what? As you can see, neurosis cannot be cured. But after a period of dizziness and confusion, the following idea occurs to me: to return to the certainty, crazy and strange, that led me to ask for admission to the dispositif. I know something, but not everything. But in this knowledge that I was able to piece together—in analysis, in the pass—there is an enormous challenge: it is no longer just about the theory of psychoanalysis, about articulating quotes from Freud, Lacan, or whoever; it is not about the accumulated time spent working in the clinic; it is about authorizing myself based on knowledge built on experience, which makes that experience enormously valuable.

From that desire that causes me to occupy the place of analyst, I could have been left with that feeling that arose at the end of the analysis of 'I have no proof, but I also have no doubts.' However, I believe that the question is to set about producing that proof, and something of that can happen in the pass: 'I have no doubts, I will set to work to generate the proof'; not only for me, but also for others, for the School. This is because we share, perhaps, an interest in ensuring that psychoanalysis is not reduced to just a bunch of things that are said, but in demonstrating that this experience has consequences; consequences in terms of how someone, whether a newcomer or not, might want to become an analyst.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

CONCLUSIONS

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Together with Rosa Guitart-Pont, we will take stock of the theme proposed by the CIG for this School Day: «The *pass*: experience and testimonies». A theme in which also resonates both the “passing of the baton” in the biennial series that continues with this IV European Convention of the IF-EPFCL in Venice, and the perspective of the XIII International *Rendez-vous* of the IF-EPFCL: «The ethics of psychoanalysis and the others», from July 23 to 26, 2026, in São Paulo, Brazil. In the meantime, we are summoned to the *Journées Nationales de l'EPFCL-France*: «The psychoanalytic adventure and its logic», in Paris, November 29 - 30, 2025. The experience of the *pass*... testimony of an adventure?

From the impossible testimony, a new desiring one?¹

From the preliminary *Replies* and from the very beginning of this School Meeting, the question has been raised of the testimony of an experience which, for the psychoanalyst, consists in attesting to a truth impossible to say — because precisely in this impossibility, truth concerns the real². The psychoanalytic act, never noted before, is what we suppose at the elective moment when the analysand passes to the analyst — every other condition remains contingent. The transmission of the particular experience thus collides with the aporia of the account, because neither desire nor act can function as predicate. In conformity with the “analytic structuring of experience”, it is on the impossible testimony that Lacan grounds the *dispositif* of the *pass* on the desire and the act of the analyst. Despite the recalled “virtues of forgetting”³, Lacan constructed *the pass against forgetting*⁴, with a *dispositif* that opposes it, in order to counteract it. The *dispositif* of the *pass* is such as to open the closed field of analysis to the collective, establishing a point of junction between intension and extension. To avoid the extinction of psychoanalysis, Freud had taken the risk, still relevant today, of a certain arrest, by promoting the “analytic societies”. To counteract the inertias of groups⁵, Lacan advanced with the dispositive of the *pass* in the School: betting instead on the singular saying of the *passant* and on the collective elaboration that may follow from it.

With the *pass* and the testimonies that nourish it, are we, as a School, able to counter the forgetting of this act, to “stand at the breach”⁶ and to keep open the hole in knowledge that

¹ C. Soler, *Un désirant nouveau ?* Éditions *Nouvelles* du Champ lacanien, Paris 2023, pp. 79-81.

² Cf. D. Castanet, «Truth, Testimony and Act», Meeting School: «The Pass: Experience and testimonies», IV European Convention of the IF-EPFCL, Venice, July 12, 2025.

³ Cf. E. Thamer, «Experience, testimony, forgetting»; D. Kolonia, «Aberration», Meeting School, *cit.*

⁴ S. Aparicio, «*La passe contre l'oubli*», in *Wunsch* n° 14.

⁵ Cf. Armando Cote, «Nothing is the same», Meeting School, *cit.*

⁶ Cf. Ana Maeso, «Being in the gap»; Cristelle Suc, «*Poethics* of breath», Meeting School, *cit.*

the real at stake implies?⁷ Although the series of contributions we have heard proves that the experience of the *pass* has endured for over fifty years now! The analytic function sustained by *a multiple dispositif — à plusieurs: passant, passeurs, secrétariat, cartels, AE* — has an effect of “push to association”. Lacan developed the real fundament of this “push to association” of the psychoanalyst, who finds himself in an untenable position with those who share with him this knowledge only on condition of not being able to exchange it, about which they cannot talk⁸.

«It is necessary to take the measure of the paradoxical knowledge of the analyst which is not, of course, the knowledge of the unconscious. It is the knowledge concerning the analytic act, which also conditions the act.»⁹ The analytic act does not identify, it allows the subject to historicize himself, but the analytic act does not historicize itself. That it does not historicize itself means that there is no memory of the analytic act in the sense that memory is an inscription. The act operates, produces effects, there are traces of the effects, but these traces and effects belong on the side of the analysand. On the side of the one who supports the act, there is no trace, no memory. The psychoanalyst’s knowledge, as knowledge about the act, is thus a knowledge without text.

Where there is knowledge being elaborated, in psychoanalysis as in science, knowledge and ignorance go together: the more one grows, the more the other extends. The elaboration of unconscious knowledge begins from the naivety of the one who does not know — does not yet know, that his hopes will crash against a real. An analysis, a didactic one, will be necessary to have some chance of progressing in ignorance, of passing from the crass to the learned as he learns from his own analysis. If the result were only this, would it be so appreciable? Would psychoanalysis continue to rise in the market?¹⁰ One could say, yes certainly, since the difference compared to all the others is that the knowledge of the unconscious, even if it is a hole-ridden elaboration of knowledge, is proper to each one, not universal, singular, and each one is therefore concerned by it in the most intimate way, unlike the knowledge of science.

Nevertheless, Lacan pointed out that the fascination with not-knowing, even the most learned, has a meaning: to avoid the real at stake in psychoanalysis. Now, this real is not reducible to that of language which logic allows us to approach, but rather to the effects of the real of language on one’s body of *jouissance*. In psychoanalysis, the words to say this real are: desire, drives, and symptom. It is the register that Freud called economic, and it’s at this level that there is a passage to the act of the analyst, if the desire of the analyst produces *a new desiring one*¹¹.

I take up a question raised by Colette Soler in Madrid which, “should call out to us, I think, coming as it does from the one who invented the *Pass*, just as Freud invented the unconscious.” It says that it is the not knowing that counts in the end — and it’s not that of the unconscious. [...] in the passage to the analyst the subject changes place «in order to operate like someone who has operated for him», the analyst then — so far so good, the phrase is

⁷ Cf. E. Thamer, «Experience, testimony, forgetting», Meeting School, *cit.*

⁸ Cf. J. Lacan, “Psychoanalysts are the sages of a knowledge about which they cannot converse.” [*Trad. N.S.*] «*De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité*», dans *Autres écrits*, Seuil, Paris 2001, p. 359.

⁹ C. Soler, *La politique de l’acte*, Cours CCP-Paris 1999-2000, p. 143.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *Italian Note* [1973]. <https://www.champlacanien.net/public/docu/2/LACAN-Note-italienne-english-2021-09.pdf>

¹¹ Cf. Nota ¹.

merely descriptive — but he adds, and I quote, «while he knows nothing of the operation»¹². And this is perhaps the ignorance or the new naivety of the end that matters: “it’s not the non-knowledge of the unconscious but the non-knowledge of the ‘operation’ for the one who has just engaged in the analytic act”¹³.

The not-knowing of the “operation” for the one who comes to assume the analytic act has effects — which resound with *æ*ffects — of the real of language on one’s body of *jouissance*. Lacan points to the enthusiasm¹⁴ and the satisfaction¹⁵ that marks the end of analysis¹⁶. Through his own unbelievably way of «*ferrer, elle lalangue, faire-réel lalangue*»¹⁷, these *æ*ffects set a limit on the “making-true” of analysis, to the dream of truth with its promise of infinity. Lacan writes that to give the satisfaction that marks the end of analysis is the urgency presided over by analysis, and he adds, «an urgency that one cannot be sure to satisfy, unless one has weighed it»¹⁸. Weighed it when... if not in the preliminaries? Rather than initiation into the mysteries of not-knowing, it will be a matter, then, of «Concluding the preliminaries»¹⁹.

The experience of the *pass...* testimony of an adventure? Each time, an adventure of... *a* newly-arrived!²⁰

Translation: Dayanna Solis

¹² J. Lacan, « Discours à l’École freudienne de Paris », dans *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 277. [Trad. N.S.]

¹³ C. Soler, «Point of view», in *Wunsch* n° 25, p. 87.

¹⁴ J. Lacan, *Italian Note* [1973], op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁵ Cf. P. Seretis, «The experience that makes one speak», Meeting School, *cit.*

¹⁶ J. Lacan, J. Lacan, « Préface à l’édition anglaise du *Séminaire XI* », dans *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 573.

¹⁷ J. Lacan, « *ferrer, elle, lalangue, ce qui équivoque avec faire-réel* » [which equivocates with to seize (*ferrer*) and to make-real *lalangue* (*faire-réel lalangue*)], dans *L’insu que sait de l’une bévue...*, Leçon du 19 avril 1977.

¹⁸ J. Lacan, « Préface à l’édition anglaise du *Séminaire XI* », op. cit .

¹⁹ C. Soler, «Concludere i preliminari», *Come iniziano le analisi*, in Atti del Campo Freudiano, Scuola Europea di Psicoanalisi, 1995, pp. 70-7. <https://www.praxislacaniana.it/shared-files/17271/?Concludere-i-preliminari-Colette-Soler-1.pdf>

²⁰ Cf. A. Cedolini, «The pages of a new birth: the testimony of an experience», Meeting School, *cit.*

PUNCTUATION

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Secretary CIG 2025-2026 for Europe
France

To punctuate this School Day, I will make a few brief comments on what has been discussed, beginning with the modifications observed by *passants*, which show that after analysis, as has been pointed out, “nothing is the same”. Lacan theorized these modifications, emphasizing this or that aspect, depending on the moment in his teaching. To put it briefly, let's say that they result from the assumption of symbolic castration, the traversal of fantasy, subjective destitution, and identification with the symptom.

If these modifications are part of analytical theory, it is because they are common to subjects who engage in the experience of the couch, at least to those who see it through to the end. And if they are common, it is because they result from the assumption of a universal lack due to the structure of language. But because these changes are expressed in a unique way in each analysand, we can say that what the *passant* can testify to, is his or her unique way of assuming the structural lack, which is universal.

Nevertheless, these modifications do not account for the desire that drives an analysand to take up the place of the analyst, which is ultimately what led Lacan to invent the device of the pass. It should be noted that in Freud's time, the analyst's desire was already the question underlying the notion of countertransference. But it is not the same desire that Lacan questions. Freud warned against the dangers of countertransference, because, by mobilizing the analyst's unconscious, it could hinder the analysis of his patient. On the other hand, the desire that Lacan questions is not the one that hinders analysis, but on the contrary, the one that makes it possible. What he questions, therefore, is a new desire, one that only emerges at the end of analysis and which is not supported by the analyst's fantasy.

The problem is that this desire cannot be affirmed. This desire can only be inferred from the analytical act, and this act can in turn only be inferred from its effects. In other words, as soon as we question this shift in a testimony, where the analyst's desire emerges, we are confronted with an aporia, because this desire can only be verified after the fact. This aporia was mentioned this morning, and it was associated with Giorgio Agamben's reflections on the aporia of Auschwitz, which confronted those who testified about their experience in the death camps. If these two aporias can be compared, it is because, as Agamben points out, the question of testimony comes up against an unrepresentable conception of truth. This amounts to saying that Truth with a capital T is barred. This fits in very well with Lacan's oxymoron of a “lying truth,” which is, in the end, what we testify to in the pass.

It is identification with the symptom that puts an end to lying truth, producing a shift in the economy of *jouissance*.

This shift, which implies the fall of the subject supposed to know, takes place when the analysand realizes that only his symptom knows what he is. In other words, this identification at the end of analysis is antithetical to any axiology. This is why Lacan argues that the analytical experience is “without value.” Values come from the Other, and belong to the

symbolic, while identification with the symptom belongs to what is most real in the subject and owes nothing to the Other.

But how can the *passant* bear witness to this identification, when the real is by definition not meant to be known and transmitted? Here we are confronted with another aporia. Therefore, the only thing that can prove that this identification has taken place is satisfaction at the end of analysis. It is not a statement that provides proof, but an affect. This was reiterated today, while specifying that the enthusiasm that is at the origin of the analyst's desire can be added onto to this satisfaction at the end of analysis. Now, if it is indeed important to take these affects into consideration, it is because they testify to the fact that not only has the subject recognized himself in what is most singular about him, namely his mode of *jouissance*, but that he knows how to deal with it... well enough to be satisfied with it.

This “knowing how to deal with it,” far from indicating that one masters the real beyond meaning, simply means that one gets by. And it is this getting by that Lacan suggests, it seems to me, when he says that if he had undertaken the pass, he could have said: I am a poem and not a poet, but I sign it. We could then say that one of the challenges of the cartel of the pass is to hear the poetic beyond the aporetic, and to identify whether the *passant* has signed the poem that he is, which implies a certain ethic. However, as was also pointed out this afternoon, it is by being on the lookout that we can hear the “po-ethics of the breath,”

To be on the lookout is to be lying down in waiting for what is happening on the other side. And what allows one to be on the lookout for the “po-ethics” in the other, is to have previously heard and signed the poem that one is oneself. This prerequisite is indeed necessary to support the act that the analyst abhors, as Lacan pointed out, insofar as it is conditioned by the fall of the subject supposed to know. But this still does not tell us why the fact of having experienced, in one's own analysis, the ensuing shift, induces the desire to experience it in others.

In “The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst” (lesson of June 1, 1972), Lacan says, “It is completely abnormal—object *a* normal—for someone who undergoes psychoanalysis to want to become a psychoanalyst. It really requires a kind of aberration [...]” And it is precisely this aberration that Lacan hoped to shed light on through the testimonies of the pass.

In other words, Lacan's bet on the pass was based on the expectation of a knowledge *in progress*.

What was finally emphasized this afternoon is that thought is aberrant by nature. Knowing that aberration comes from *errare*, we can say that thought wanders because it does not allow for conclusion. It is the fall of the subject supposed to know that stops this wandering, opening up to a knowledge without a subject that concerns *jouissance*. And it is this that opens up the possibility of the pass to the analyst. However, what testifies to this pass is still an affect, namely enthusiasm, which implies that the horror of knowing has been overcome. This is why Lacan made this affect the sign of the analyst. It should be emphasized that this affect does not arise automatically. It too depends on the ethical position of the subject in relation to what he has discovered and which transcends him. In other words, the enthusiasm that is at the origin of the analyst's desire depends on what Lacan calls the obscure decision of being.

Finally, I echo the question raised by the previous ICG, which cannot fail to make us wonder: “How is it that there are so few nominations?” I obviously don't have the answer, but I will keep this question in mind in order to examine what guides the cartels of the pass in appointing, or not appointing, an AS (Analyst of the School).

In the meantime, I believe that the best we can hope for, beyond nominations, is that the experience of the pass continues to teach us about desire and the analytical act, so that theorized knowledge does not become a dead language. And what we should be careful about is that this experience, where the *passant* testifies to “authorizing oneself,” does not become an

“autori(tuali)zing oneself.” Lacan already warned against this danger, implicitly, in the “Italian Note.”

This ritualization, which can always occur, both on the part of *passant/passeurs* and on the part of the cartels of the pass, is obviously the opposite of invention. It would therefore put an end to the hope of a knowledge *in progress*, in favor of a common refrain, in the sense of everybody being “*likeOne*” [fr.: *commeUn*]¹, Let us therefore bet on the enthusiasm of each and every one of us in order to avoid this pitfall and to ensure that the analytical experience remains alive, whose specificity is to welcome absolute difference, beyond the structural law to which we are all universally subject.

Translated by S. Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

¹ the neologism combining like and One, *commeUn* in the French is evocative of *commun*=common

UPCOMING EVENTS

« The ethics of psychoanalysis and the others »

XIII° Rendez-vous of the IF-SPFLF

« The pass to the analyst: aporias of testimony »

IX° International Meeting of the School

23-26 July 2026 - São Paulo, Brasil



IX SCHOOL MEETING OF THE IF-EPFCL, JULY 23rd, 2026

Pass to the analyst: aporias of the testimony

Argument

Rosa Guitart-Pont

«¿What can emerge in someone's mind to authorize oneself to be an analyst?^{2*}».

The analyst's desire is an unprecedented desire which, as Lacan points out, only arises at the end of analysis. The novelty of this desire is that it is not sustained by fantasy, since the end of analysis implies its traversal. It remains to be seen, then, what this desire is based on. And this is precisely the question that Lacan posed to the peasants willing to participate in the experience, whose procedure he invented in 1967.

Despite the interest of this experience, it must be acknowledged that the peasants' testimonies are confronted with various aporias. One of these results from the fact that, in the analytic act, the analyst does not operate as a subject.. Rather, it assumes 'that crazy risk of becoming what that object *a* is³'. But this requires that to have identified the cause of his horror of knowing. 'From there, he knows how to be a residue,' says Lacan in 1973, in the *Italian Note*, adding: 'If he does not feel carried away by enthusiasm, there may have been analysis, but no possibility of an analyst⁴'.

Lacan therefore considers enthusiasm to be a necessary premise of the analyst's desire and associates it with knowing how to be a rejected residue, that is, the object *a*⁵. If this object is rejected, it is because of the horror of knowing that it provokes, due to the fact that it destitutes the subject. Unlike the subject – which is the effect of the signifier – this object refers to what is most real about the subject, to what is outside the symbolic and therefore outside sense. We could then say that the transition from the horror of knowing to enthusiasm occurs when the analysand finally realizes that only this rejected object (in the unconscious) knows what he is as a "being of jouissance". The recognition of this knowledge in the real, which is accompanied by the transference fall of the subject supposed to know, is what allows the analysand to authorize his 'absolute difference' and be satisfied with knowing how to deal with it.

The enthusiasm expresses, however, something more than 'the satisfaction that marks the end of the analysis⁶', which Lacan discusses in 1976. Originally, the word enthusiasm, which derives from the Greek '*entheos*', referred to the ecstasy caused by a divine revelation. Based on this etymological meaning, we could say that enthusiasm, at the origin of the analyst's desire,

² Lacan J. (1978) Closing remarks to: *The experience of the pass*, in Deauville, Published in "*Lettres de l'École*", 1978. N° 23

* The English translation has been rendered by Gabriela Zorzutti

³ Lacan J. (1977) *Regarding the experience of the pass and its transmission*, *Omicron* ?N°12/13, p. 120

⁴ Lacan J. (1973) *Italian Note*, *Autres Écrits*, Paris, Seuil 2001, p. 309

⁵ Lacan J. (1974) *Le non dupe err*, Seminario XXI, lecture given on April 9th

⁶ Lacan J. (1976) *Preface to the English language edition*, *The four fundamental concepts*, Seminar Book 11 p. viii, Norton, 1978

results from a revelation, not of the divine word, but of the words spoken on the couch. This enthusiasm generates, in some, an unprecedented desire to transmit this revelation that transcends the subject. This desire to transmit refers, on the one hand, to the theoretical elaboration of the knowledge extracted from the analytic experience, which permits the School to go on. However, this desire concerns, first and foremost, the implementation of the conditions necessary for revelation to take place individually, on the couch, on a case-by-case basis.

What the cartel of the pass must therefore question is what in the *passant* bears witness to this desire, which implies that he has taken into account the knowledge without subject that lies in the real. The problem is that the real is not made to be known and transmitted. Hence the *aporia* I have evoked. Transmission is, in effect, the act of a subject who thinks. But as soon as one thinks, one is no longer in the real unconscious.

The only thing that can be testified to is the “lying truth”. This oxymoron, introduced late in Lacan's teachings, reflects the evolution of his thinking. Thus, at first he speaks of the unconscious as the truth of the subject. He even specifies that the unconscious tells the truth about the truth⁷. On the contrary, his latest developments show that truth does not reach the real to which it aspires. Another result of this Lacanian ‘work in progress’ is the realization that it affects (enthusiasm, satisfaction) that bear witness to the acknowledgement of knowledge in the real.

By proposing the pass, wasn't Lacan betting on a collective ‘*work in progress*’? Shouldn't this experience, which brings together unique testimonies of the pass to the analyst, help to ensure that the knowledge deposited in the *doxa* does not become the litany of a *commOne* knowledge?

The School Day on the 23rd of July 2026, in São Paulo, will offer us the opportunity to question the relevance of the pass, taking into account its *aporias*.

⁷ Lacan J. (1965) *Science and truth*, in *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil 1966, p. 868

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorial, par *Dyhalma Ávila-López* 3

**INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM SCHOOL MEETING
REINVENTING PSYCHOANALYSIS
A SCHOOL TO ACTIVATE WITH REPETITION, THE NEW**

ARGUMENT	5
OPENING , <i>DYHALMA ÁVILA-LÓPEZ</i>	7
TABLE 1. TIMES OF THE AE : AFTER HAVING TESTIFIED, WHAT ?	11
CONTINGENCY COUNTS , <i>ADRIANA GROSMAN</i>	11
MYTHO-LOGIQUE , <i>CHRISTELLE SUC</i>	14
D'ES-CUELA WORK , <i>CONSTANZA LOBOS</i>	21
FROM THE ONE TO THE , <i>DIMITRA KOLONIA</i>	25
TABLE 2. WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SUBJECTIVE DESTITUTION ?	
THE ACT OF RESTITUTING ONESELF OF SUBJECTIVELY , <i>IDA FREITAS</i>	30
<i>MATIAS LAJE</i>	36
TABLE 3. REPETITION, THE NEW	39
I DO NOT THINK, I FIND , <i>SILVIA MIGDALEK</i>	39
THE EXPERIENCE AND THE REPETITION , <i>SONIA ALBERTI</i>	43
FROM REPETITION TO REPETITION, FROM AUTOMATON TO THE THYKÉ , <i>CLARA CECILIA MESA</i>	45

**EUROPEEN CONVENTION SCHOOL MEETING
THE PASS : EXPERIENCE AND TESTIMONIES**

ARGUMENT	51
TRUTH, TESTIONS AND ACT , <i>DIDIER CASTANET</i>	53
NOTHING IS THE SAME , <i>ARMANDO COTE</i>	57
THE EFFECTS OF AFFECTS IN THE PASS , <i>TERESA TRIAS</i>	63
KNOW HOW TO DO WITH THE SYMPTÔME, KNOW HOW TO DO WITH LALANGUE , <i>CLOTILDE PASCUAL</i>	66
THE EXPERIENCE THAT MAKES EVERYONE SPEAKS , <i>PANOS SERETIS</i>	69
TESTIMONY, EXPERIENCE, OBLIVION , <i>ELISABETE THAMER</i>	72
BEING IN THE BREACH , <i>ANA MASEO</i>	75
THE AE HOW DO THEY TESTIFY TO THE CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS , <i>ELYNES LIMA</i>	78
POETICS OF BREATH , <i>CHRISTELLE SUC</i>	81
UN-DO , <i>CONSTANZA LOBOS</i>	85
FROM PASSANT TO ANALYSE OF THE SCHOOL : A FRUITFUL FAILURE , <i>PASTORA RIVERA</i>	87
ABERRATION , <i>DIMITRA KOLONIA</i>	90
PAPERS OF A NEWCOMER, ACCOUNT OF AN EXPERIENCE , <i>AGUSTINA CEDOLINI</i>	94

CONCLUSIONS, <i>DIEGO MAUTINO</i>	98
PONCTUATION, <i>ROSA GUITART-PONT</i>	101
UPCOMING EVENTS	104
IX° SCHOOL MEETING - ARGUMENT	105
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	107