VIth Encounter of the School:

The School and the discourses: What joy do we find in that which makes our work?

Barcelona September 13, 2018
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EDITORIAL

The International College of the Guarantee (2016-2018) has reached the end of its period in office in bringing together, in this number of *Wunsch 19*, the presentation of the works that were delivered on September 13th 2018, during the VIth International Encounter of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field (IF-SPFLF), the theme of which was “The School and the Discourses” with the subtitle “What joy do we find in that which makes our work?” We have added the short texts that comprised, in the form of an *intermezzo*, the afternoon of the Symposium on the Pass on September 12, 2018.

We hope that these readings will have significance for our community during the debates, which will follow.

OPENING OF THE VI\(^{TH}\) ENCOUNTER OF THE SCHOOL

*Marc Strauss*

Dear Colleagues and friends,

We are here to try and respond to Lacan’s question: “What joy do we find in that which makes our work?” That does not exclude the difficulties, but it must bring us some joy. What sort of joy does our analytic discourse deliver?

When I say “our discourse”, I am certainly thinking of us as practitioners, but I am also thinking of us as members of the School.

Our joy in our work as practitioners remains, and we hear it, a passionate question. But this is another joy, which also seems to me to be passionate, but perhaps more complex, which does not mean less crucial: what joy do we find in our work for the School? I am certainly not speaking about administrative tasks that I do recommend, particularly the ICG, as a way of getting to know the internal workings. And there are other agencies of the same kind, the CRIF, the local agencies, etc.

No, I am speaking of the joy we find in coming together as members of the same School to speak about psychoanalysis, to reflect together on this curious practice, to try and elaborate the experience and even to guarantee it for some.

This joy exists, I have experienced it, and have also found it sometimes a little brief. It’s true, we never have the time to think again about the presentation of a colleague, to feel the weight of it, taste it.

Certainly the essential aspect of each person’s reflection happens beforehand, in the preparation of his or her work, and the texts will be accessible to all at a later time, but it is not because there is a very short session that the exchanges between us must be compressed to the point of being stifled. It seems to me that there are fundamental
questions about psychoanalysis and the political imperatives of an association that come together there.

Thus I suggest that our reflection today leads to a concrete proposal: that at the next Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF another way of working might be attempted which establishes more “breathing space” with the time for discussion at least equal to that of the presentations, and also that the debates on the points of doctrine that our School’s current functioning poses, be prepared – why not – by the international cartels.

There is no lack of possible points for debate – I have a very precise one in reserve for possible discussion – and we can be sure that it will be always be so. But above all, I want to hear my colleagues speak on our theme and I wish everyone a good day, a day of joy, obviously.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

I. THE ANALYST OF THE SCHOOL AND THE DISCOURSES: EXPERIENCE AND TRANSMISSION

But where does the joy in our work come from? From the joy of 67 to the joy of 76

Carmen Lafuente-Balle

Introduction, Study Day on the Psychoses

Lacan, in his address at the Study Day on "The psychoses of the child" which took place on October 22, 1967, a few days after the "Proposition", refers to an affect: Joy, which is a counterpoint to the sin of sadness, and he considers that it characterizes him: "Everyone knows that I am gay, even a kid it’s said: I’m enjoying myself. In my texts, I always end up engaging in jokes that are not to the taste of academics. It’s true. I’m not sad. Or more exactly, I’ve only had one sadness over the course of my career, and it is that there are fewer and fewer people to whom I can give reasons for my gaiety, when I have it.” (1)

Lacan tells us in this address that what makes it possible to get away from the sin to do with the unconscious, that of sadness, is a virtue that he calls “gay savoir” [‘gay knowledge’]. He calls himself gay, joyful and, although he is referring to himself, we can apply it to each of us, analysts. Of course, it’s the knowledge of the analyst, that of the analytic discourse, that made him gay, and make jokes, be child-like, play word games that were not to the taste of academics. The joy of Lacan is that of kidding around, joking, word-games, interpretation via the equivoque.

The true antidepressant, he tells us in Television, the only one that does not distance itself from the unconscious, is ‘gay knowledge’, the free knowledge of lalangue, that of the words: “not understanding, not a diving at the meaning, but a flying over it as low as possible …” (2). This is what I will call the joy of 67.
He then says in the address that for the psychoanalyst, it is not a question of being for death as in Heidegger, but of being for sex, i.e., castration, and for this reason psychoanalysts must be determined to maintain the position and to be joyful. This obviously concerns us.

Lacan sings the praises of joy and highlights it as a necessary affect for the psychoanalyst, but he asks himself in what does this joy consist and leaves us, at the culmination of that study day, the following question: What joy do we find in the work we do?

**Equivocal Concepts: Joy and Work**

We'll begin by highlighting the ambiguity of these two concepts: joy and work. We're going to start with joy, which cannot be the joy of those enchanted mornings that Lacan himself has seen lead many people to suicide, not the joy that is empty of content, that of neurotic hope, which denies the impossible of the real. In addition, affects are deceptive, so joy tells lies, one can weep from joy and get depressed when things go well, as Freud has shown us. So this is about another kind of joy.

Lacan, contrary to some opinions, has not neglected affects, which he considers as effects that can only be understood by thinking about what produces them, i.e., the unconscious, desire, the drive. In this way we can consider that the joy that causes the work of the analyst is the product of the desire of the analyst, which is not unrelated to jouissance, as we know.

All this led me to think about what gives me joy in my work as an analyst and I would like to highlight some things. So, the novelty of each case which brings us to the encounter with what is unprecedented and which propels invention, the joy that produces an opening of the unconscious, albeit elusive, the joy of causing the desire of the analysand although it bears within it a constituent transience \([\text{caducité}]\)?

But all this is accompanied by other positions or functions that are not always gay because, as Lacan says in the lecture at Yale: "Being an analyst is a Job, and in fact, very hard work. It is unusually tiring work.” I will highlight some points: to withstand the demand, to go against meaning, to deny the sexual relation, to disappoint with regard to the master, to lose the agalma, to support an unprecedented desire, to accept being refuse, with enthusiasm!!!

In other words, the joy of the analyst does not go without other affects that are less amusing, and for that it must be understood as a joy that is ‘not-all’.

**Affects of the End**

In order to think about the joy of the psychoanalyst as linked to his desire, let's recall Lacan's references concerning the affect of satisfaction that is produced at the end of the analysis and that Colette Soler worked on in her studies on the affects.

- In the “Proposition of 9th October 1967”, he evokes the mourning due to loss of the analyst, followed by peace.
- In “L’Etourdit”, 1972, the end of the mourning for the object "a" embodied by the analyst.
- In the “Italian Note”, 1974, the enthusiasm that comes after having circumscribed the cause of his horror of knowledge, which will enable him to know how to be a waste object.
This leads to enthusiasm, without which there could have been an analysis, but the analyst, not at all.

- In the American Lectures, 1975, "When the analysand thinks he is happy to be alive, that suffices."
- In the “Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI”, 1976, he deals with a specific satisfaction that allows the analysis to conclude. The satisfaction that marks the end of the analysis is an effect of the real. This satisfaction has no other definition than that of putting an end to the other satisfaction, that generated by meaning and truth. “To give this satisfaction is the urgency that the analysis presides over.”

Generally, the positive affects are those of the end of the analysis, but are they the affects of the work of the analyst? No, the analyst has gone through these affects, he must have experienced them, lived through this change in jouissance, in order to want to bring others to this moment of satisfaction which is conclusive.

**The work of the analyst**

The second question to think about: the work. Can we talk about work that refers to the analyst? We can recall some characteristics that make his activity something far removed from what is commonly considered work: the constitutive transience of the analyst and his dis-being; as he is a waste-product he does not have to answer to anyone; the act is not refundable; and after having finally devalued all objective representation, can we still call it work? (3)

So what does the work of the analyst consist in? We’re going to see two levels of the question:

1 – What is realised in the treatment, can one call it work?

Lacan says that in the treatment, the one who works is not the analyst but the patient and principally his unconscious, which takes charge of the whole weight of the experience. His function as analyst, his work, is to cause the work of the analysand.

2 - What he realises when he reflects on analytical questions.

Lacan tells us (4) that psychoanalysts are masters of a knowledge without being able to talk about this knowledge, but curiously, in practice, they talk a lot, they look for meeting places in order to exchange with others, and this experience can be gay. Lacan points this out in “The address at the Study Day on the Psychoses of the Child”.

This statement by Lacan, that psychoanalysts are knowledgeable about a knowledge they cannot talk about, raises the question of transmission and the conditions of its possibility. It is possible to transmit knowledge, but it is much more difficult to transmit what can be extracted from the unconscious, the real of jouissance, because it does not speak. The real, insofar as it escapes the symbolic, is not transmitted. The real is separate from knowledge, but the real has effects and they can be shared.

The proof that the analyst has experienced the real, the opaque jouissance of the symptom, is indirect, it is the satisfaction of the end. One can share this experience in the dispositif of the Pass, which is intended for that. To share that with others, in my case, is always gay. Why? Because the psychoanalyst cannot be alone with this knowledge, there is sense in
sharing it, because although the real supports his misrecognition, the knowledge of the consequences of the encounter with the plug of the real pushes to speech and the shared experience of the School. The encounter with the real which produces the end of the analysis, pushes to speech, as well as to writing and that can allow a link in the School for the ‘odd ones out’.

In my case, being able to share with others, as a result of the fall of the surmoitié, has produced a relief and a flexibility in my relations with others and has connected me in another way with the analytic community. Each space of transmission shared with my colleagues has assumed a considerable enrichment, always a joy.

The dispositif of the Pass is intended for this and has allowed me to gather the effects of the experience with the real, the satisfaction of the end, and to institute a different ‘know-how’ that includes the School.

The joy of 76

If at the beginning of this text we had developed the joy of gay savoir, that of 67, we would have now pointed out that in Television, in the year 73, Lacan warns us that this joy does not consist in understanding, but in emptying out meaning as far as possible, and so that the jouissance of deciphering not be transformed into something that sticks, it must fall at the end of the analysis.

But it is especially in the “Preface”, where Lacan will make the definitive theoretical turn in which the end of the analysis is not for gay savoir, knowledge of the truth, of the transferential unconscious, but on the contrary and because the jouissance of deciphering has no end, the end of the analysis will consist in un-subscribing to the unconscious. It’s the real unconscious. This end is manifested only by a displacement of the libido, by a change of satisfaction which has the value of conclusion.

If this satisfaction did not exist, the analysis would leave the analysand in the impasses of the final phase of the analysis which are disappointment and anguish owing to the impotence of truth and horror of the real which goes beyond the subject and deprives him of the most important therapeutic effect which is the effect of the end of the analysis.

Without this end, how could one honestly impel, push a subject into an analysis? As Colette Soler says, to make the offer of an analysis the analyst must have experienced the exit from his love-affairs with truth and the fall of the subject supposed to know. He must have weighed it first in his own analytic experience and afterwards in the analyses he conducts.

When the analyst has finished his love-affairs with truth, then he will be able to become the analyst, without reservation, the servant of the transference and its illusions because he is sure of the possibility of the exit. It's only a possibility but it's a lot. (5) And that gives joy. Without it he remains captive of the transferential postulate that he continues to share with his analysands and he can only promise an analysis without end that finishes with a termination through weariness and does not allow the satisfaction of the end.

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1 Translator’s note: surmoi (superego) + moitié (half).
This joy of 76, different from that of gay savoir, is the one we find in the “Preface” with the function of the real unconscious that will be able to orient the analyst and bring his analysands to conclusive satisfaction.

References in the text:

3- Pellion, F.: « Note à la joie », Pretexto X Cita Internacional IF- EPFCL.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

Summertime Sadness
Nicolas Bendrihen

In his “Address on Child Psychosis”, in which the CIG found the subtitle for our Journées d’École – “What joy do we find in that which makes our work?” – Lacan spoke of his frequent states of joy, but also of his sadness, which was more rare in him. He even told us what made him sad: “There are fewer and fewer people to whom I can tell the reasons for my joy when I experience it”.

This text is dated from 1967 … a key date in the Lacanian opus, since it coincides with the proposition on the pass. I propose today to envisage, with these few words, the dispositif of the pass as a place where a subject can say his reasons to be joyful. There are perhaps fewer people to whom one can tell this, as Lacan lamented, but in the end, two people are enough for that on the condition however that they are chosen at the right time and that they are disposed to receive, and even grasp, the reasons for that joy.

Obviously, it is rare that an analysis begins with joy. In the palette of affects that make the subject suffer, it is rather anxiety or sadness that pushes one to encounter an analyst. In that respect, I was not very exceptional myself. A few years before consulting an analyst, a real loss that occurred at the heart of a joyless summer had for a long time obscured my horizons. This real loss was barely evoked during my first course of analysis. It took the decided desire and a thunder-like interpretation by my second analyst for me to start treating this loss in my analysis, a loss that had remained traumatically frozen until then. A first know-how resulted from the treatment and particularly from that precise point: the saying should not back down when faced with an irreparable loss. Because in what has been lost forever, one can identify and explain for oneself what has also been lost in the other and in oneself, beyond the person and beyond what was torn off in the disappearance.

This was not sufficient, of course. It took years of analysis in order to extract what this loss, paradoxically, had left intact: a history, a fantasy, a screen on which the subject had let a story live on – although it was not his – but one in which he believed and in which a neurosis and its subsequent suffering in the form of a symptom in the body, thrived. It

took one slip of the tongue however, using a simple word for another, in a formidable contingency with the place in which it occurred, to change everything. In this flash of lightning, the horror of a knowledge that had been solidly repelled all these years found its way through, and ended in a saying. So did the scene of the fantasy with which the subject surprised himself when enunciating it an hour after the slip of the tongue, this time in the analyst’s room. He never thought of that scene, without however having completely forgotten it. There were unpredictable consequences after this stumbling of speech: the immediate detachment [décollement] from that story, in a mixed effect of relief, emptiness, and also shame for having let himself be taken by a story that he had thought was his and which faded away as soon as he told it. Detachment also from the other and what the subject thought he was asking of him. What a relief did the traversing of that fake news [in English in the text] bring!

After this incredible time of traversing, everything changed. As I’ve already said elsewhere, this point of traversing marked for me a true beginning, which now regulates my relation to psychoanalysis, my own analysis and the ones I lead. This did not sign however the end of the analytic treatment but it oriented après coup all what had been said until then and it directed it even more firmly towards the end.

What lasted only an instant had major effects on my treatment but also on my life. These effects were knotted in my opinion and were, I believe, rather interdependent. The most immediate one was a rapid deflation of the transferential relationship, which allowed – second effect – a different kind of way of practising as a psychologist, and then as an analyst. This was because for me, practising as an analyst before that moment – which I could not predict – was never put into question. My authorisation only happened after that moment of traversing – I can say, après coup, that I could authorise myself only after that moment and after its consequences took place. Finally, a third type of consequence touched on something that was more difficult to locate, linked to the affect, but not only that. For lack of any better term, I wanted to name it a summer sadness, which is a slight oxymoron that evokes the instant in which one grasps a moment of joy right when it disappears, when it escapes us, as do the last sunrays at the end of a beautiful summer day. It is a moment in which beauty inscribes itself right at the end of that moment, as does the ephemeral splendour of the Japanese cherry trees when they are in blossom, or of so many similar places in the world.

In his “Note to joy”, Frédéric Pellion evoked joy as a state in which it is impossible to decide whether it celebrates a reunion or it commemorates a loss. To have to make do with this impossible decision [trancher], to consent to both sides [tranchants] of joy is not the least one can learn from an analysis.

After this flash of lightning and until the conclusion of analysis, a work of deduction took place, in the form of a reduction of a neurosis down to what in the structure and in life does not pertain to the analytic operation: the real we are made of and also the real which occurs and which we have to make do with.

I resuscitate today one of Lacan’s old formulae, from so many years before the pass, when he evoked the end of analysis where “(…) the subject achieves his solitude, whether in the vital ambiguity of immediate desire or in the full assumption of his being-onto-death.”

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3 Bendrihen, N. « Ça commence à la fin », Toulouse le 1er juin 2018.
4 Pellion, F., « Note à la joie », préliminaire à la VIème rencontre internationale d’École.
This is not the most up to date reference in our discourse on the end of analysis, however doesn’t it tell us in such a pertinent way what is at stake at the end of the analytic experience? It is a living drama, which without a doubt is replayed now and then. The long period of time that has passed since the turn of the pass has shown me that the frame of the fantasy can slowly be rebuilt according to the contingencies of life; and this is where the acquired know-how of the analyst allows, in a new flash of lightning, the undoing of what is newly braided, without the analyst and without the transference, however not without analysis. It is, by the way, in such a moment that I decided to do the pass.

So, a School is a place that makes a dispositif possible and operational, where one can say the reasons for one’s joy, which, as you have certainly gathered, “does not constitute the end of a sadness”, as Clement Rosset, a recently deceased philosopher, wrote in his last text. And without a doubt, the analytic discourse, among all the other discourses, is the only one that is able to welcome, in an appropriate way – without covering the real – a simple stumbling in speech, a slip of the tongue, a dream upon which the subject decides to conclude the treatment, a remainder of jouissance – as banal as these manifestations can be – which however make an analyst in all his particular banality. The fact the passers can grasp these shiny fragments as they are themselves taken up in and by their own pass - and they are in turn able to transmit them to a few others who will know how to hear them, is something fragile, never assured, precious and so opposed to the notion of “quality assurance” that the present discourse tries to regulate. To preserve this, to make this stay alive, isn’t it the joy we find in what makes our work in the School?

Translated by Chantal Degrêl

The time of the saying

Adriana Grosman

What saying or what time of the Saying? Lacan starts from the locution “it doesn’t work without saying,” to say that the said [dit] doesn’t go without the saying; it is necessary to talk, to throw the saids for the saying, recognizing there the Freudian cause, “that one says” [qu’on se dise] from the saying to speaking. The subject says, speaking, where he went and got entangled, he with his inseparable symptom; the saying is something else, it is in what escapes what is said, it is to trust in something that probably deceives us. “But not being deceived by it is to pay the consequences of the non-deceived (non dupe), what he called “erring” says Lacan, for it doesn’t go without making mistakes, we could say.

For there to be an analysis, it is necessary to err, to throw the dice, or to risk oneself in the saids; an analysis is a process where one picks up the challenge, as in the manoeuvres at the start and ending of the noble game of chess, as Freud said. The subject appears during its waning, which makes every departure singular. In the beginning there is a subject supposed to know, and at the end, there is checkmate. It all depends on how the game is conducted but what we know about the end is that it is already on the horizon and also about the wager of the analyst at the beginning.

9 Freud, S. (1913), On beginning the treatment. SE XII, p. 123
The analyst animates the said during one moment, not very short, in order that the analysand can bump against the limits of speech and what it can make heard, in order that something of the saying can resound there.

But how to transmit what happens in this new experience of the Pass? How to make myself heard in what I recognized as being the instant of the Saying that led me towards the Pass, of this time that one puts aside for saying something? “What is it that is heard between the lines, between the sentences and between the words? What is it that seeks to be made heard? (…) Who has not hoped, wished, dreamed of making oneself heard as a speaking being”, a difficult question and one dear to Lacan, for her never ceased asking it throughout his teaching.

I have selected three moments that marked me in this butting up against the real that I have called “the time of the Saying”. When I chose this title in fact, I made allusion to the pass, and it is only after an instant that I realized that it would be better to speak of “the times of the Saying”, of moments in the plural, which shows once more that the writing of an analysis is a work in progress [English in the original].

That said, in the first moment I speak of the horror that appeared in the body, then, of an instant of finishing analysis, and finally, of the demand for the Pass.

First of all, I will speak of the body since in order that the saying resounds, the body must be able to feel. How to listen to these drives?

In my process of analysis, it is a body (a feeling body) that reveals to me that “something has been seen”; it was an anguished body, which presented itself then, as well as new affects. Surprise and horror were what I was feeling, if I can so summarize the number of affects that filled my analysis since the crossing of the fantasy.

Surprise from beginning to end, perhaps more so at the end, the surprise of the end, of the knowledge of the end and of non-knowledge. Surprise also about the road travelled, my advances, the new subject at the end, the contingency that advances towards the dispositif of the Pass, speech addressed to the passers with the news that something new had passed.

As for the horror, at the end it is, if anything, more difficult to cope with a frightened body, scared of contingency, the encounter with the real after the fall of the protective moorings of the fantasy.

Following the trace of the emptiness, as well as the fact of knowing that there is a lying truth – which overthrows the richest, the most ingenious stories – brings anguish and fear. That rightly causes horror, this meeting with the truth as Colette Soler says, “that which isn’t sad but horrible, inhuman; and the horror doesn’t depress but rather, awakens”.

The horror was dressed in the image of a bald head. There was a fear in the body (that was implied there), which is associated with cancer but also with the possibility of falling

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ill, triggered by a dream I had: a strange body appeared at two points in my body, and something inconsistent was made present then, because I was going to die at the same time that the things happened. This dream showed the logic of contradiction, a little bizarre, as certain signifiers from my childhood which had made me very afraid were linked with a “hidden” illness, that of my maternal grandparents, which until then I had interpreted as a trick on their part but after, I discovered that it was about something else.

What I could not know was lived in the body as horror without knowledge, a body affected by lalangue, beyond words.

I encounter this in the opera *The Passenger* [in English in the original] based on the novel of a survivor of Auschwitz, Zofia Posmysz, that tells the story of a meeting between two women – a former Nazi guard and a concentration camp survivor, during a voyage in the same boat – when they are surprised by an exchange of looks that leads to a voyage into the past and their memories of the horrors of the Holocaust. This puts them in moral conflict between blame and denial, retribution and absolution.

The opera has two scenes, the second staging their memories, as if they were in the ship’s hold. When I saw the two young women with striped pajamas and shaved heads, I felt a very strong shiver through my body, associated with their bald heads, shaved, and the bald head that named the horror transmitted by my grandmother’s silence.

What was transmitted (through the saying) behind what was said was something in the form of “it is better not knowing.” It was the unspeakable experience that produces horror: my grandmother, a young woman who suffered in the war, seated at the piano, hidden in the house of strangers, receives the visit of a general of the SS. He surrounds her and haunts her, and the sound of his boots approaching paralyzes her. In the fear of being identified she throws away the last pictures of her family. She erases everything except the sound of boots getting closer and closer; I can still hear it, right now.

As Colette Soler says, certain erasures “go beyond the subject”.

It is the instant of seeing that is presented in the experience of horror that awakens the implied subject, the horror of knowing, in this effect of lalangue – strange knowledge existing – unforeseen, an accident of the real that escapes the speaking being.

These affects are what results from the presence of lalangue, of [unconscious] knowledge, which articulates things that go far beyond what the speaking being bears of enunciated knowledge. We learn that in an analysis – one cannot be deceived by lalangue. Without making mistakes, it doesn’t work…

Thus, the saying is something that escapes, the instant, a locatable function in the course of an analysis, the singularity and the difference of the subject. The saying is also an act that transforms the subject and which orients the treatment until the end: “It’s that” – affirmation of a knowledge that signals that one has reached an end that was impossible before. Not without the innumerable tricks that veil the absence of sense in order to deny it, where the word is presented as chatter, coupled with the said, up until the time of the saying.

At the end of the analysis, there was a moment where a scene was presented so that it might be seen. In this case, it was a strange face that appeared, without interpretation and without sense.

One weekend, I had this face in my head, an image that said, “What is that, Adriana?”, a voice that repeated. I tried several times to find out what this face was or to interpret what it said, or even to respond to what I was wondering, but without success. I was writing a text and again took up some notes and memories of analysis when this image of the face appeared and stuck itself to me.

When I came back to the couch and spoke of this embarrassing weekend, I realized that this face was not just any face but that of my analyst – an analyst with a face.

“It’s that!” I said with surprise. A transformation in act, which speaks of a movement already in course. Before that point, the face was only seen as subject supposed to know. The transference was dissolved. A separation from that which sustained a knowledge that fell and left a resounding voice, the voice of solitude.

The end was there in front of me, seen and heard at that moment. It produced a sigh and an exit. Happy chance of a happy encounter! One can tell of it only at the end. “The answer my friend is blowing in the wind…” [English in the original]

An analysis lasts for a while and ends at one instant, the instant of seeing “the non-sense proper to the being”, it lets the significations fall, showing the lack, effect of an important change or subversion as Lacan says: “the subversion, if it existed somewhere and at a given moment, didn’t consist at all in changing the turning point of what turns around, but in replacing the ‘that [ça] turns’ by ‘that [ça] falls’.”

The specific idea that there is a possible adjustment, a look that completes one, falls for the subject; it does not work out and leaves the subject in solitude, in the void of the question: “What is that, Adriana?” How to talk about That [Ça], the impossible of the unconscious without waiting for the answer of the other, which does not exist.

Something then is freed up, and one realizes the question does not come from the other. This emerges as a new discourse, a voice that is freed for the saying of an unprecedented desire, a voice that, when it speaks, separates itself, separates the two implied by the game. There where the analyst acts, where he consents to being this object, where he is allowed to fall, he “no longer has to expect a look, but sees himself become a voice” – a sentence of Lacan’s that is difficult to understand, for this instant of separation “à dens” is not simple.

After the end, the Pass. The end is not the Pass – third instant.

A remainder of anguish that persists in a frightened body takes me back to talk with the analyst, who says to me: “the empty set, your new friend”, a contingent choice of the analyst’s that hits the target, and leads me to several other associations and the production of three dreams that lead me towards the Pass.

This will be the background for the dreamlike production, enigma of separation and femininity but one more step to take and not something to be interpreted.

I called “post dreams” a series of three dreams with the analyst.

In the first, she was behind a store counter, selling something. A strange place for an analyst, if this is only for the indication of sale, like a witticism, like something which is there to be sold – where what is on sale keeps the sales going on, for the analysis introduces the contingency of another encounter, the encounter with the real in which the sale/blindfold\textsuperscript{18} falls.

In the second dream, I took the analyst somewhere hitchhiking,\textsuperscript{19} we were walking somewhere.

In the third, she received me in a strange office yet it was familiar to me as it was a repetition from other dreams. This time, however, my session never started. Suddenly I figured out that the office was already being used, it belonged to another, any old other, it didn’t matter who! This is what precipitated the desire of saying elsewhere, in other place, it didn’t matter where.

Saying unprecedented things, such as the series of dreams that were linked to this series: face of separation, bald head of horror, and now hitchhiking – hitchhiking in order to say it in the solitude of the discovery of the impossible.

A know-how with the solitude of the end: to whom to speak now? To speak to another, to someone other who is not the analyst – the time of the saying (and the instant also). A desire appears to tell of the surprise caused by the contingent, a real unconscious. That is not a little thing: I must say!

After the end, the Pass – another moment of decision.

How to sustain the link “without losing the tenderness” of talking in another place? A new link with the School in transmitting the discovery of this impossible to say. An impasse that the Pass ties up.

From this traversing of the analysis, of the lure of the fantasy and sticking to the eye of the other, a new name is constructed: unstuck \textit{[décollée]}, ex-istent, to my surprise, since it carries the School \textit{[École]} in its name \textit{D-écollée},\textsuperscript{20} without knowledge, or knowledge without subject, “unsticking” for those who take the risk of testifying in the School.

\textsuperscript{18} Translator’s note: in Portuguese, the word “\textit{venda}” can mean both “sale” and “blindfold”.

\textsuperscript{19} Translator’s note: in Portuguese, the word for hitchhiking is “\textit{carona}” which also has the meaning of “a large face”.

\textsuperscript{20} Translator’s note: in the Portuguese original version, the words are “descolada” and “escola.”
The new name, “unstuck” [décollé] takes me to the Pass, which does not make sense without the School, not to be confused with the effect of “glue” [colle], Lacan warns. The time of the saying precipitates the link with the School.

The transmission of the finding is alive. I suggested, in the first testimony, that one could think about the Pass in terms of the children’s game of pass the ring. Sometimes one passes the ring, sometimes one passes nothing and, then, one tries to learn what the ring’s fate is, in the contingency of the one who knows about the holed ring, something of that passes to the others. For beyond what passes of the contingency, of the secret and of the feminine, I still remember, afterwards, being in my grandmother’s house when she was not there anymore, the family gathered together and everyone playing with the ring – all except one. When I wrote suggesting the ring game as a way of speaking about the Pass, I didn’t remember that. What’s that [ca], Adriana?

Surprise that causes That [Ca]!!

Translated by Gabriela Costardi, with Susan Schwartz

What to do with the real?

Julieta de Battista

I would like to begin with a crucial problem enunciated by Lacan in 1967: that the real at stake in the analytic experience provokes its own misrecognition, produces its systematic negation. How, then, can we interrogate this real that one misrecognizes and that one denies? This vital point, so alive, surprised me from the very moment of requesting the Pass, during the work with the passers and after the nomination, at the beginning of transmission to the School. For me, the Pass seemed to be an invitation to run the risk, akin to a traversing of the remains that became fruitful there, and it proved that the word’s corpse is not waste. In the littorals of symbolic articulation, these remains flash, ignite, radiate, throb, ex-sist. The analytic experience touches a real; the fact that one makes with this a behavior a lifestyle could be called a “quehacer” with the real.

I am going to focus on this crucial problem and try to situate it in my experience.

After being admitted to the dispositif and in the thick of imminent transmission to the passers, I recalled the multitude of symptoms, inhibitions and anguish that triggered my first consultation. Just one symptom was missing: the noisy suffering that began with puberty and was attributed to hormones.

The missing symptom was the only infantile one. Curiously, it was precisely this symptom that was not included in my first attempt and was manifested in the body as a unquiet residue: difficulty breathing, with asphyxiation, suffocation, despair and anguish due to this impediment that affects the voice. The voice does not come out, it gets swallowed up and sucked in, it is not heard, in Spanish one says: “to have the voice caught” (tomada), in the

21 Translator’s note: in the Portuguese original version, there is a wordplay between “escola” and ‘cola”. In English, it gets lost as the words are “school” and “glue.”
sense of a voice that is cracked. A known symptom, impossible to forget....still (encore/enquiry). This rejected stone had been the cornerstone of the analysis. I knew this residue was the hinge of the pass.

The analysis had unknotted this symptom to the point of leaving only a small grain of sand that was now insisting in the face of my misrecognition. This symptom had permitted me to traverse the labyrinthine meanders of my lying truth. I spoke for years of the asphyxiation that I felt in front of the men who fell in love with me. Of my need to go on strike with my body using relationships where I was always the second woman for a man, to complain afterwards about being abandoned: a movement of the pendulum between the sensation of asphyxiation, my unconscious efficacy in getting myself abandoned, and the complaints due to my loneliness. But above all, this was a symptom that spoke of my inveterate love-hate for my father, ill and dead on account of his addiction to cigarettes. Sick on account of him, unconsciously destined to the curse on second daughters of my family: alone and sick, taking care of their mother.

This respiratory residue, the aspirated voice, had been the umbilicus of so many dreams, dream-ciphers, leaden dreams, which condensed the knot of a destiny. The cut to breathing marked the moment of anguished awakening. In these dreams, death lay in wait for me: will I become a corpse for this menacing crow? I cannot frighten it, the voice will not come out.

To take care of the sick father and afterwards stay by my widowed mother’s side, without saying a word. Wasted women served this purpose. I had serious doubts about the idea that descendants condemned to a hundred years of solitude would have no chance on earth whatsoever. With my father dead, I seemed called by this inertia: to not form a family, to stay all alone just to accompany my mother. The sickness of my brothers and the premature death of several uncles seemed to confirm the anticipated tragedy.

The pathway of dream analysis under transference dismantled this first prison that had been my reality for a long time. The therapeutic effects of this passage were major: but no end of analysis could result from it, at least in my case. I would even say the effect was the reverse: I was not inclined lose hope that an analysis would save me once again. The supposition of knowing how to speak madness had allowed me to exit the prison of this unconscious destiny. I definitively closed the door on those cursed second girls; I could construct another life, find a partner—both busy enough and available enough—with whom to form a family and be company for each other, as we can do. Having closed the door on the fantasy, I entered the swinging door of the end.

Mourning on account of the fall of the supposition of knowledge produces misrecognition of the analytic act. The analyzand’s path is not that of the act. During the final stretch one enters, exits, and enters again. There is no exit from this alternation, for one continues to be a prisoner of this thirst for meaning. The associative temptation is strong, precisely because of the therapeutic effects drawn from it, which constitute an obstacle to the end. But only one bit of truth is enough. Truth is toxic, it numbs. Love for truth also has an end, if the analyst’s silence accompanies it. In the end, one can misrecognize that dreams and slips no longer carry meaning, the associative machine can restart again, there where there only remains the act of separation, se parere. The remainders remain. Remainder-dreams. The desire of the analyst is waste from the jouissance of meaning.
In my demand for the pass, this known and denied infantile remainder came back again. This remainder ignited other remainders from the analysis, wastes. My mother’s tragic saying upon my birth manifested itself clearly and with horror: the sound of the menacing gunfire in a city besieged by the dictatorship, the disappearance of sons, the kidnappings, the smoke from the theater set on fire the day I was born, death in the air we breathed. Julieta, is a theatrical name without precedent in my family. Tragically theatrical. There also appeared the memory of the story of how I almost drowned when I was very small on account of my parents’ neglect. Anecdotes of the horror that dwelt in my mother’s saying, anecdotes of the dead who watch, suggesting that, perhaps, it was not a good time to come into this world, a world where the sons disappear before their mothers do.

From this insidious saying, I took tragedy and also theatrical reconstruction. For a long time, I was sure that I wanted to be an actress and I worked for that, even as I was working to transmit psychoanalysis and had been practicing it for more than fifteen years. Yet another misrecognition, an unaware encounter. I was surprised that I was asked, in the first testimonies, about being an actress and what of the actress had served the analyst. I think it was only its fall. It was not a “very theatrical” testimony of the pass, they said.

Something else that surprised me was that during one of the presentations, I twice insisted, convinced though without noticing, that “hystorisation” starts with an “H.” It is clear that I wanted to emphasize Lacan’s play with the Greek Y of hysteria. That was heard and also the fact that history always starts with an “H,” at least in all the languages I know. Moreover, this “H” occurred decisively in my saying. Faced with the question, it manifested itself as a distinction in French which always seemed to me lacking: the mute “H” and the aspirated “H.” Neither sounds, yet the aspirated “H” introduces a difference that renders sonorous the void of the cut link. A bizarre effect, it is mute, but it sounds. Perhaps a lapsus with the scope of a letter?

The Pass as a traversing of remainders is an opportunity to gather up these refused wastes and raise them to the dignity of cause, the cause of School. The systematic negation and misrecognition of the real at stake in the analytic experience concern the work of a School open to the reading of new sonorities. Only in this collective polyphony of the disparate odd can one notice the deviations and interrogate this real.

The passand who authorizes himself to the work of hystorisation produces a twist on hystorisation: he becomes the analyst of his own case, he addresses himself to his S1s and produces a know-how with the remainders of an incurable. The playful, almost infinite relaunching of the chain becomes the peaceful aplomb of savoir-faire. The work of hystorization and hystorization produce their own hole. The holes can begin to swirl, become swirls of desire that are transmitted.

The desire of the analyst suggests a difference of voice, in its enunciation. A saying marked by the attempt to pinpoint the cause of its own horror of knowledge, but also by the transformation of what is involved—the case. A saying eager to find the voice of living, absolute difference.

Neither the traversing of the fantasme, nor the mourning for the end, nor the know-how with the symptom allowed me to conclude that the desire of the analyst is an effect of the analysis. It is not without it, but it is not deduced from it. The desire for analysis seems to come après-coup, by way of clinamen, in a field of silent transformations that, at a given
moment, became obvious. It does not emerge *ex nihilo*, it surfaces in the way that an insignificant dripping of water erodes and irretrievably transforms the course of a river.

Translated by Devra Simiu

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II. EFFECTS OF THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING A PASSER AND THE LINK WITH THE SCHOOL

Effects of the transmission of unconscious knowledge
*Nathalie Dollez*

The first impression I have kept from being a passer is that of the joy I felt from the beginning to the end of the experience. That is, from the passand's call to the *après-coup* of the meeting of the Cartel of the Pass. I didn't know if the luck of being drawn by lot would give me the chance to be a passer, but I infer that I was waiting for some time to receive a call to listen to a testimony of the pass. The joy was caused by the experience that was opening up, but not only that. It was also due to the succinct message left on my answering machine by the passand saying that she was a Member of the School and adding, “I have to speak to you about something”. The elements of the procedure were in place: a passand, the School, a passer and in the centre…the testimony of… something.

One has to have this first experience of being a passer in order to grasp that Lacan’s Proposition, which places as the link for the “control of the act” the one who is looking for the exit door at the end of analysis, finding its logic through this knotting, and at its centre, something…of the real! The desire to be the channel for the transmission of a testimony of
the pass had animated me in an enigmatic way for a long time: what is this procedure so out of the ordinary, and this was even before I grasped what was at stake in the procedure. At that time I had not encountered the School and a turning point in the analysis made the experience possible… The passer is not in fact a simple channel of communication, “he is the pass”, Lacan said. His provisional function in the School does not serve the illusion of a didactic analysis, but it testifies that “there is a real at stake in the very training of psychoanalysts.”

How to contribute to the life of the School? The experience of being a passer happened at a moment when I was insistently asking myself this question.

To be a passer is a temporary experience, one that is not demanding, and which has its share of questions. Two of these took form quickly in the time that elapsed between the call and the passand’s testimony:

How not to “leave the thing uncertain”, as Lacan specified in the Italian note, “due to which the case falls under the blow of a polite declining” of the passand’s candidacy. The thing… The elective moment where the psychoanalysand passes to psychoanalyst is proof that he will function as object in the treatments that he orients towards the real, and not as “subject of knowledge”, as Patrick Barillot emphasises. Certainly there is acquired knowledge, “But for whom?” asks Lacan. Not the subject, for, “that there is the unconscious means that there is a knowledge without a subject”. The task on the side of the passand was to say something about it; on the side of the passer, it is to transmit that. In her preliminary text for the Rendezvous, Adriana Grosman formulates the question like this: “what would be the transmission of an end in which it would be possible to hear the advent of a saying?”

So, the essential point in the transmission of a testimony is to realise the moment in which the passand’s real is grasped, in act, through the beyond of the epistemic dimension of her analysis, if that were indeed the case. It did not seem to me to be possible to convey to the Cartel bits of received truth gained by way of the hystorisation of the treatment, with its different turning points. But in terms of what was revealed about the end of the analysis by the real, perhaps I was going to catch something, but not be able to transmit it. How to make happen [passe] the uncatchable of desire, for which no confession would be sufficient to demonstrate the proof? In short, it is necessary to pass through this experience and its unforeseeable effects to make any headway on the question. But at base, from the start, the passand had given me to understand that to hear that this something, of which he had spoken, was not-all nameable.

There was another question before the meeting with the passand, which flows in part from the first question: how does one listen to a testimony of the pass? A testimony is disconnected from an address to a subject supposed to know; it is precisely an attempt to give evidence of what has led him to take on the semblant of the object in the treatments that he directs. A testimony that is articulated with the functioning of the School, and which takes the real into account even beyond the Cartel of the Pass. I take support from

25 Barillot, P, « Particularité de l’acte psychanalytique », in Mensuel
my desire to be a passer, and the link with the School that is involved this experience. The Italian expression, “dare un passaggio”, came back to me, which signifies transporting someone from one point to another. In this experience I had to make the testimony pass from the passand to the Cartel of the Pass.

The very few questions that I was asked only completed what had already been said, and did not bring anything more to the essentials that had passed. In fact, I had no doubt. The small questions arrived right at the end of the testimony of the pass and assured me that I had acquitted the function of passer correctly.

Between the testimony of the passand and the meeting with the Cartel of the Pass, I was seized by a doubt: I thought I had missed an articulation in the passand’s testimony! A strange feeling that was not at all manifested in listening to the passand. Was this a blurring in the testimony, or a blurring in my listening? I was going to call him again to ask for some details, but I decided not to. Without a doubt, being exhaustive had nothing to do with it. I had nothing more “to know” in order to transmit what I had received, including effects.

What I had understood about the passand in the testimony of the pass and what had redoubled my desire to transmit [faire passer] what was essential in this testimony was partly bound with a new position: being confronted with the passand’s jouissance. The modesty [pudeur] that was conveyed [passait] in the testimony was the index of this position. A final turn, after the analysis, had led to the demand for the pass. A final rampart had fallen, dependant on the residue of the fantasy, accompanied by the affect that had remained attached to it.

“The lure that is no longer sustainable”26 about which the passand had testified in the hystorisation of his analysis, this turning point, noted by its effects, pushed me also to go and say something about it, desiring to make it pass. But going to tell the Cartel about the lure that was no longer there rather horrified me and was partially transformed into forgetting!

Discovering the whole procedure of the Pass through the Cartel of the Pass had been stimulating: beyond the different languages and styles, each of us is working to make something from the side of the real circulate in the School.

The central point, the intersection of the passand, the passer, and the Cartel, returns thus to knowledge…in the real. For the passer, the pitfall is not “mis”hearing as I had been worrying about at the beginning, based on the principle that passers do not sleep during the testimony. Colette Soler speaks about the turbulence that characterises the moment of their analysis where they are vigilant about everything that concerns the end of the analysis and the pass to the analyst. Small parenthesis: would a passer who was not motivated by the desire of the analyst be vigilant in the same way in gathering and trying to convey [faire passer] what there is of the psychoanalytic act? Probably, if his analysis were oriented by the real and has taken account of the limits of the lying truth. But what would push him to accept the function of passer? The glimpse of the “incurable truth”27 and of the sexual non-relation pushes towards the social link that invites the community to do the School’s work.

26 Lacan, J., « L’acte psychanalytique », ibidem
27 Lacan, J. « L’acte psychanalytique ». ibidem
In opening up a teaching in continuity with that of Lacan’s, the seminars and the colloquiums make the School function. The instrument of the Pass, a stroke of Lacanian genius, revolutionary in many ways as the history of psychoanalysis shows, places at the very heart of the School a knowledge “insofar as it resides in the shelter of lalangue”.28

Translated by Susan Schwartz

The passer: desire, transmission and knowledge
Juan del Pozo
This triplet of the title emphasizes the elements that marked my experience in my function as a passer.

The desire in my case was articulated in terms of assuming the task. To face it so as not to let it escape, even though I was not sure what I wanted or could discard. I did not want honesty in the exercise of my task to become a functionalist dimension of one who simply transmits the “said” [dit]. I wanted to find in the experience of dialogue with the passand something that would also concern me while sharing with him that same space of the Pass.

I tried to be sensitive to the saying [dire] of the passand without that being reduced to “saids”. With the aim of reporting to the Cartel, I prepared notes based on his “said” and of moments of his hysteria in spite of the difficulty to present my experience in a way that was totally structured and coherent. I could not fine-tune the seriousness expected of the function of passer with a “series” of passes, since I was summoned only by a single passand with the luck that he was named.

I felt very concerned and it makes sense that I wanted to do it well. But what does it mean to do it well when in a School of psychoanalysis it is not a matter of governing or teaching to produce alumni or, as it is said, well educated subjects? The solitude of the passer, without a knowledge that tells him what must be done or how to do it, oriented me to trust a not knowing that knows. I saw in the encounter with the passand the possibility to dialogue with someone who was in the same zone of turbulence but coming out of it.

A desire came into play. To figure out as best I could the experience of the colleague coming to the Pass. This meant that I would meet in interviews with him twice, on two consecutive days with an interval to organize what I had received and also to present my questions and my doubts. I could say I grabbed him by the lapels before letting him go in what concerned me. Even a few days later I solicited via email some clarifications about what I had gathered. I wanted to do it well not just for the School but also for myself. The effects continue to unfold as I write this communication.

The second question that concerned me was that of the transmission. What helped me was a commentary from the Cartel alluding to the brief time. I took it as an invitation to lighten the weight of notes and paperwork in my intervention. The time of my function thus took on a different logic in the encounter with the Cartel in which, I confess, I do

29 Soler, C. Le passeur, Wunsch 12.
not remember very well what I said – except for certain particular points. I remember this as a pleasant moment, neither heavy nor thick, where things were flowing.

Lacan states that “the idea to separate the one who gathers the testimony from the one who produces it dignis est intrare” that is to say, in this dispositif a jury of veterans would be set in place to clarify the passage to analyst. But it is not a question of a solemn jury sanctioning a testimony with the objective of convincing him. Truth cannot convince, knowledge passes in act says Lacan.

I believe, in this regard, that the passer is not the advocate of the passand but somehow in a similar cause. This allows for a distance with the passand rather than an identification.

Not wanting to betray the truth of the passand, but nevertheless, he translates, which summarizes, and so betrays. Andrea dell’Uomo warns us well about the resonance of the word “translate” in Italian “tradurre”, with “tradire” to betray, to defraud. What is important to emphasize is the saying [dire], the desire. And I would add that since “tra” in Italian means “between” we find ourselves in a field between-sayings. In this way the passer adds a touch, a new element bringing to his listening and transmission “the freshness of his own pass” from where he gathers what the passand says. This “from the freshness of his own pass” (the passer is the pass) may perhaps allow the testimony of the passand to be, simultaneously, a cause for the cartel of the pass.

This provides an opportunity for the knowledge [savoir] in play in the experience – one that is not simply knowledge of the “saids”, even though it is not without them – to be able to pass and make resonance in the cartel

Translation by Macario Giraldo

The estimate time of the pass between the contingent and the necessary
Paola Malquori

‘Estimate’ is a term that designates what is closest to us while being external at the same time. Lacan defines it as what is most intimate in me and which I am constrained to recognise as being outside.

Time is the modality in which singular events that are in relation with one another, occur.

The time of the pass is an estimate moment because it knots, between intension and extension, the intimate time of analysis for each subject involved in the dispositif of the pass to the moment of transmission of the School, a time that is outside subjective intimacy.

It is also a knot between the necessary time of repetition of the symptom that unfolds and is being deciphered during the time of analysis and, the contingent moment in the experience that one makes of it while it is happening.

31 Allocution prononcée pour la clôture du congrès de l’École freudienne de Paris le 19 avril 1970.
32 Dell’Uomo, A. L’expérience du non-su qui sait, Wunsch 14.
The encounter with the real of any one of us which can be deciphered only après coup, in the cross roads of what has been written and continues to be written as S1, the necessary, and what comes to be written in the course of an analysis and the possibility that something new might be written.

It has been like that for me in my experience as passer in which the dimension of time presented itself as obvious.

The news that I had been designated as a passer arrived while I was on holiday, in a moment of total relaxation during which I had decided that in September, I would make the request to go through the pass.

That was the moment of the first temporal knot between the necessary and the contingent: the certitude of being at the end of my analysis, confirmed by the contingency of my name having been drawn.

This subjective knowledge also gave me the perception that this was an opportunity for me to make the experience of a different time\textsuperscript{34}, in order to write the end of analysis, the time of the pass on the passer’s side.

The knot between the necessary and the contingent presented itself in the form of a dream on the night I received the news that my name had been drawn. It was a dream, which staged the dimension of time and of writing and which ended with a scene where the passand sent me a message saying that we had to postpone the appointment. He could not come because he did not feel well: the dream placed time and symptom in a causal relation.

The question of time evokes that of the becoming [divenire], of the cause and of the effect and of how to put in relation the changes that happen in the same subject.

How to grasp the becoming of the passage to the analyst about which the passand provides his testimony to the passer and thus, to the cartel of the pass?\textsuperscript{35}

We know that Aristotle resolved the question of the becoming of the pair potency-act. Potency realises itself in the act, hence the becoming is the passage from being able to be to being [passaggio dal poter essere all’essere].

In order to put a stop to the infinite possibility that this may be realised or not, the possible must be united with the necessary as a free necessity,\textsuperscript{36} that is a freedom that does not evoke so much the notions of choice and free will, but something that only acts in conformity with the necessity of one’s proper nature, here we could say in conformity with the S1 of the subject.

This represents a free necessity that we could thus redefine as a “more dignified freedom”.\textsuperscript{36} This is the ethical offer of psychoanalysis, whose task is to respond to madness, the

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\textsuperscript{34} Lacan, J. ‘Il faut le temps’, Radiophonie.

\textsuperscript{35} Spinoza also speaks about this.

\textsuperscript{36} Lacan, J. “The being of man could not be understood without madness, but it would not be the being of man if it did not bear within himself madness as a limit to his freedom” [translator’s own translation]. \textit{Autres Ecrits} p. 358
faithful companion and the shadow of freedom, in a way that does not imply segregation, the latter being on the other hand so much part of our epoch.37

If extimacy has to do with the singular jouissance of each one, the estimate as the time of the pass should correspond to the time of the School, a time and a place in which a link is being created between the singular experience and the possibility of constituting from it an object of teaching that can be transmitted, and therefore a common object, that can be shared/con-divisible [con-divisibile], in which the preposition ‘con’ [with] which expresses the relation and the term ‘divisible’ which evokes the division proper to each one.

I quote Lacan: “The passage of the psychoanalysand to becoming an analyst has a door of which this remainder that brings about their division is the hinge, for this division is nothing but the division of the subject of which the remainder is the cause.”38

The proof of the passage can only come from that experience and, in that experience, in a knot between the necessary and the contingent, which testifies to the fact that the jouissance of the symptom has been put to the test.39

Putting one’s symptom to the test is always asked of the individual or the groups when the impasse of the writing presents itself, of that which cannot be written no matter what. There is no sexual relation, and between the ‘with’ [con] of the relation and the shared/‘divisible’, the hyphen reminds us of the re-union of Euler’s circles whose intersection designates a loss,40 as opposed to a union that would form an all-in-One.

Therefore, the question remains the following: the difficulty to sustain and to elaborate the loss produced by the intersection of the two circles. What is lost, the con-dividable object, is and remains however, it does not belong to the One or to the Other. Nothing is subjective, nothing is personal or collective.

For those who meet in a School of psychoanalysis, from the time Freud re-situated jouissance in its proper place with the pleasure principal, which puts a break on jouissance, an ethical function of humanisation remains that consists of putting a break on jouissance, the jouissance of the object, that our times impose instead on us, in various forms.

The School is a place of transmission and has the function of putting to the test some knowledge on jouissance, a knowledge that cannot be universal but con-divisible. Here the hyphen constitutes the sign of a separation which maintains a symmetrical difference, the sign of a subtraction, the sign of the “vain knowledge of a being that subtracts itself”.43

37 Lacan, J. “How to manage in a way that human groups that are destined to share the same space, not only a geographical one but also sometimes a familiar one, so that they do keep separate? (…) How would we, psychoanalysts, respond?”. Ibid. p.359
To conclude, we are subjected and we have to do with a Real that is sometimes incomprehensible, violent, unexpected, or that comes as a surprise. However, there is some knowledge in the Real.

When in Milan in May 1972, while talking about that strange animal – man – Lacan said that if language did not exist the master would not exist either, he was asking himself if we could hope for a master's discourse that would be a bit less stupid, that would not lead us to think of revolution, that is of having to always start again from scratch.

This is to say that, no matter what, something remains and we always have to do with the remainder.

Translated by Chantal Degril

Following the trace
Adriana Álvarez Restrepo

Two years ago, at the International Rendezvous held in Medellín, I listened to the presentations with great interest. For the first time I witnessed the reflections on the experience of Analysts of the School, passers and members of the cartel of the pass. During an interval I asked an analyst to tell me what the procedure was about. I remember how far away all that seemed to me. I also felt the impact of seeing the Analysts of the School willing to speak to such a large audience about matters of their personal experience in their analysis.

As a result of one of those twists of fate, two years later it is my turn to transmit the experience after participating in the procedure as a passer. I understand this experience as an encounter with the reduced traces of an analysis that the passand leaves behind, and the ulterior crossing over the frontiers to bring them to the addressees – the members of the cartel.

At the beginning of my work of writing on that experience, and finding myself in the middle of a complex task of articulation of a text, it became evident to me that the situation of being a passer itself concerns an encounter with what cannot be said. I can link this with a dream I had the night after I began to think about what to write. In my dream I was sitting in an auditorium, facing the audience, and when I was about to speak my teeth fell out. Under those conditions there is something that cannot be said, or at least that cannot be said completely.

The nature of the testimony that a passand transmits to the passer and that the passer must bring to the cartel consists of intermittent traces, remains that do not have suture, hold or translation. I am reminded of architecture, in which the traces indicate the sides where walls will be erected and which establish the basic forms of a surface. Considered as traces, the testimony refers to a construction, but also to an emptiness and a mobility, a product of the forms of each one in which singularity can be recognized.

Thus, in the middle of an effort to obtain that a text produce an effect of transmission, from my experience as passer I find that it is possible to make an articulated fabric, but one

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in which a hole prevails: there is a ‘not being able to say’, and there is that which remains non-transmissible.

As regards the details of the relevant events, I would like to mention the effect of surprise that the call from the passand produced in me – it left me speechless. I could describe the sensation I experienced at that moment with the Colombian saying: ‘It fell upon me like a bucket of cold water’. It is well known that this has the effect of helping someone to wake up.

The way in which the procedure of the pass has been conceived implies that the passer be taken by surprise at the moment of being designated as such. Lacan’s invention favours a situation which is for the passer hazardous, contingent, of the order of the unprecedented and which, in addition, usually occurs at a time when the relation with the Other has changed definitively. In the simplicity of the procedure, but also in what the analytic institution implies, passand and passer are alone – at least in the first part of the experience. It seems to me that the process itself demands that one takes some steps without support, and it is precisely at that point where the strength of those steps lies.

After three encounters with the [female] passand and the initial effects of the testimony upon me, I found myself in the peculiar situation of having accepted to take something that does not belong to oneself, but with which one feels somehow involved. This compelled me to make an effort towards separation permanently. I felt that the testimony had become ‘glued’ to me, and I constantly produced a parapraxis: when proposing myself, instead of saying ‘passand’ I said ‘passer’. In my experience as passer, the distinction between the two was naturally confused. So, instead of fighting against the inevitable, I was able to work in order to make the distinctions, which enabled me to identify some fundamental elements.

The function of whoever is appointed to take the remains [restos] – I will now use the word restos [remains] because its affinity with the despojos [remains] and somewhat with death – has two dimensions at least: that of the witness and that of the messenger. The position of the messenger evokes mythical figures such as Charon or Hermes. Charon, the ferryman of Hades, is in charge of taking the wandering shades of the deceased to the other side of the river. Hermes was portrayed as also in charge of accompanying souls in transit. Both Charon and Hermes are placed in frontier areas, where movements and changes as a rule occur. The procedure promotes the crossing of frontiers by the passand, the passer and even the members of the cartel. For those who go through the experience, something changes the itinerary, and for that reason the passage through the procedure acquires a value, whether there is nomination or not.

I think there are more complex implications for the dimension of the witness. The first witness is the one that is not there – the passand – and who in turn makes the passer a witness of his/her experience. The passer is the other witness, the one who speaks from the frontier about an experience that he/she approached in an unintentional manner and that he/she cannot pass completely through symbolization. Bearing witness differs from the principle of belief in the other, at the moment when the testimony manifests itself as an event to a witness. A few dreams of a horrifying nature, which combined elements of the testimony and naturally intimate matters of my own, designed the route, the paths that would secure a piece of knowledge. During this process I became involved in the effects of the testimony. For me a relation at a distance was impossible. I faced what cannot be transmitted through the word, and thus I had to re-think the form of the testimony, after it disrupted my everyday life.
Given the finitude of an analysis, the passage to the other institutional devices of the School – the pass, the cartel – open the possibility of elaborating knowledge without the Other. From the devalued remains of the analysis there emerges something valuable in the shape of the effort towards the formalization of the experience in the passage through the procedure: valuable, in what it may contribute to the School. At that point one is not alone any longer – one is with others. The transmission through the procedure of the pass does not stop with the passand, the passer or the cartel. It traverses the School and goes beyond the School. There are later passages through frontiers and something of the transmission reaches whoever listened to it for the first time. Who knows? Maybe whoever is just a beginner in these matters gets a surprise after some years and is able to follow the trace.

Translated by Leonardo S. Rodríguez

A Passer and her invisible Cities

Maria Laura Cury Silvestre

“Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone.
– But what is the stone that supports the bridge? asks Kublai Khan.
– The bridge is not supported by this or that stone, replies Marco, but by the line of the arch they constitute.
– Why do you tell me about the stones? It’s only the arch that matters (says Kublai.)

Polo answers:
– Without stones, there’s no arch.”

It was from this passage in the Invisible Cities, by Calvino, that I took my position before the imminent encounter with the Cartel of the Pass: I’ll speak of the stones, stone by stone, and those who listen to me, have the task of inferring the arch. I had tried to write a text, but I gave up when I realized that, as long as I was writing, something was getting lost.

Radical wager on the unconscious: to refrain from a pre-set format to allow something to be transmitted beyond a text, although not without some text.

But how to transmit?

In this work, Calvino presents a fictitious series of travel reports by Marco Polo, Venetian merchant, to his interlocutor Kublai Khan, Tartar emperor. It indicates something that today I consider to be highly important for a passer:

“The facts or news reported by Kublai’s inarticulate informant were valuable due to the space that surrounded them, an emptiness not filled by words. The descriptions of the cities visited by Marco Polo had this virtue: with his or her thought, one could move around them, get lost, stay for a moment taking some fresh air, or run away.”

If one is tempted to arrange the passand’s text, the emptiness so anguish for the inarticulate passer is fulfilled, but at the price of a loss!

After the meeting with the Cartel, I asked myself: how do they know if the stones that I described are mine or they belong to the passand?
– “Lord, now I have told you about all the cities I know.”
– One is missing, of which you never speak. Venice, said the Khan.
Marco smiled:
– And what else do you think I was speaking about? Every time I describe a city I am telling you something about Venice.
  
     – When I ask about other cities, I want to hear you talking about them. And I want to hear about Venice when I ask about Venice.

     – To distinguish the other cities’ features, I start from a first city that remains implicit. For me this is Venice.”

I am able to think, then, that the clearer Venice is in a passer’s speech, the clearer the differences also become: that is, what is not Venice. And, thus, invisible cities are drawn, although they are not inaudible to the cartel.

We must also consider that Kublai has an atlas, a curious catalog that gather maps of all cities, revealing the form of the cities that have neither form, nor name. The emperor, therefore, is not capable of knowing all the cities through the atlas. It is necessary that Polo travels, letting himself be imprinted by the cities, and come back to talk to him. Polo even teaches us:

    – “Traveling, one realizes that the differences get lost: each city becomes similar to all cities, places change form, order, distances, an amorphous dust invades the continents. The atlas keeps intact all the differences: this variety of qualities that are like the letters of the name.”

In order to know each city, the atlas is not enough – Khan’s incomplete knowledge; the impressions of the trips are not enough – Polo’s incomplete knowledge. It is only in the encounter that one can read something of this variety of qualities, which are like the letters of the name: hallmark of the difference that makes each city unique.

The inarticulate passer, who is himself the place where the cities get mixed, transmits, with his voice, the hallmark that is not his own, and that he might not be able to read. To recognize such hallmark, the Cartel of the Pass counts on its atlas, reference that allows the letters of the name that the passer transmits to be read, without pronouncing it.

But not without saying! That’s to say, the function that the passer actualizes with his or her presence and voice, so that the psychoanalytic act is not forgotten in the amorphous dust that sooner or later will cover the continents.

   Translated by Gabriela Castardi
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE PASS IN THE TREATMENT

Pass and End
Roser Casalprim

In order to orient myself, I will use a few elements of reflection and interrogation that the question of the pass and its link to the end of analysis has raised for me, a reflection that has been revived in my experience at the CIG.

1- The title of the session already implies at least a first consideration: the pass has some effect on the treatment, but whose treatment? The passers'? The passands'? And did it happen in their analytic practice, if they practise? To transit through the dispositif of the pass has some effect on the passers' treatment; they say it themselves in their writings. To go through the pass has some effect on the passand's treatment, we have some knowledge of it thanks to the passands’ testimonies, at least of those who decided to go through the pass without having reached the end of their analysis. They were nominated and they pursued their analysis to the end. There were also cases in which some passands, after having been through the pass, decided to resume their analysis. Other subjects finished their analysis and did not take the step of going through the pass, or they did it a long time after the end. We can therefore say that the pass does not lead to the end and that the end does not necessarily lead to the pass. We could also call this presentation “The effects of the pass after the end of the treatment” or simply “The effects of the pass”. We have recent examples of it, amongst others. I am referring to J. Battista’s reflection in her Pre-text (1) about the effects of the pass as “another know-how” to do with the symptomatic remainder – the incurable – and its possible link to the desire of the analyst. Therefore, can we speak of the pass as a way of defining the “remainder”?

2- If the clinic of the pass and the reasons that push one to go through this experience show a lot of variety, it seems that, in our School, there is a tendency to identify the pass with the end. This is to say that, the majority of subjects are candidates for the pass after having finished their analysis. On the other hand, this question has also an effect on all the actors who participate in the dispositif and, consequently, on nomination. What orients the cartel? What do we nominate? Upon what is the nomination decided? As to the tendency I alluded to before, isn’t it perhaps an effect of the doxa that is circulating, or an effect of the difficulty to grasp what is at stake in the epistemic jump that Lacan took from the time of his new formulation of the real outside the symbolic? Is this perhaps an effect of the difficulty in locating the moment of passage to the analyst? Or, as Luis Izcovich posed as a hypothesis: “to make use of the dispositif of the pass in order to measure the end of an analysis is a drift that results from trying to supplement the difficulty, to circumscribe the desire of the analyst with some criteria about the end”.(2) Recently, C. Soler described the current situation in these terms: “(…) our dispositif, in the way it actually functions, is not focussed on the turn of the pass, neither on the passands, nor on the cartels, nor on the general discourse of the School”.(3) Why? Does one have to reach the end in order to experience the pass?

3- What is in question in the pass? To be at the end, to be in the end, or? …..(4) What does the dispositif interrogate? If I understand it well, Lacan never ceased to ask himself: What is an analyst? What is required in an analysis in order to produce an analyst? (5) This is why he
proposed the *dispositif* of the pass with the idea that this could be evaluated through an experience that was different from the one procured by the treatment. His aim was to try and localise in the *dispositif* certain indices that could allow for the recognition of the mark of the production of an analyst, at the same time knowing well that this question was of the order of the impossible and of the un-transmittable. It seemed to him that the best way was for two passers to receive the passand’s testimony because he considered the passers could bring some light among the shadows, on the condition the passers did not function as a screen.

As has often been discussed in the past, there are a few paths of approach to the pass from the different indications we can find in Lacan’s texts, which seem to have been left open. Today, I will briefly refer to what I extracted about the conception of the pass from the founding texts. I leave on the side for now his later elaborations, which in my view do not invalidate the earlier ones. I will focus on the moment of the pass as ‘passage to the analyst’ – from the function of desire of the analyst, which is distinct from the end of analysis as such. This was the path Lacan first took at the beginning of the foundation of his School, which is linked to the *recruitment* of analysts by the psychoanalytic discourse and not by the master’s discourse, as opposed to the IPA.

Both in the Proposition (1967) and in his discourse to the EFP, it seems there is at least one argument that underlines the convergence between pass and end, as if Lacan had wanted to link those two moments. I quote: The end of a psychoanalysis…is the effective passage from psychoanalysand to psychoanalyst.(6) “(…) The pass is the point in which, after having reached the end of one’s analysis, one makes the step of taking the place the psychoanalyst had occupied in his trajectory”. However, Lacan evoked at the same time the “taking over the analysand’s baton”.(7) There are therefore other indications that allow us to consider that there is no identification or confusion(8) between the two, however these are two different moments in the course of an analysis. The pass is posed therefore as an experience that is underway, in which one has to wait for what could eventually come out of it. Therefore, there is a gap between the pass and the end. From then on, the accent was put on what operates in the treatment at the point of displacement between the analysand’s position and that of the analyst, that is a moment of turning where the analysand is capable of the analytic act and can make himself the representative of object *a*. This is not equivalent to opening up a practice; it has to do with the analytic act, which is supported by the handling of the transference and of interpretation. We can understand the theory of the pass in that moment as a crossing over, which may contribute to a push towards the end. In different terms, the pass as anticipation of the end or, as a *path towards the end*,(9) marked by the entry into the work of mourning, is pursued to the end. Here it would be about being *in* the end and not *at* the end. It is also important to note that this moment of turn or of metamorphosis is linked to the moment of ‘capsizing’ from the assurance one initially took from fantasy, the moment of subjective destitution, of the fall of the subject supposed to know (that is, neither with the ending of the function of the analyst nor the identification with the symptom).

4- Let’s look at some formulations by Lacan that illustrate the point of view that we are trying to present:

In the “Conclusion to the Journées of November 1975”, he said “the one who proposes himself to the pass (…) offers himself to the status of object that the position of analyst destines him to be”. In the “Conferences and conversations at the North American Universities”, he said that the pass “consists in saying, at the point where someone considers himself sufficiently prepared to dare to be an analyst, and could tell someone of
his generation, a peer (…), what gave him the strength to receive people in the name of analysis". (10)

He thus interrogated “the moment of compromise in the practice” and how “to authorise oneself with dignity”. (11) In Television (1973), he had already defined the pass as “the examination of what makes an analysand decide to pose himself as analyst” (12).

5- On this question and about the passes that were listened to in the cartels I was part of, I want to simply remark that we have been able to verify – in particular in one case where the passand was nominated – a particular logic which, as an effect of the treatment, made it possible for the passand to take the step of authorising himself/to establish himself as an analyst, an act not designed to be either a passage to the act or an acting out.

6- I finish by taking a jump to one of M. Bousseyroux’ developments which appears to me very interesting in order to continue thinking about the pass and psychoanalysis. In 1977, Lacan said: “About the real of the Borromean knot, in the pass, we have to make do with it, but in the dark.” He added that, as he characterised it at the time, “It is the place where the real of it can be attested to only by the cut” and that “in order to attest to it, the cartel has only at its disposal the snip of the scissors of a nomination”. “However, if the pass is about having to do with that (…) it is also necessary that at the end of an analysis one knows how to write this knot clearly – therefore how to redo it”. (13)

This led me to pose the new paradigm introduced by Lacan of the Borromean knot as a useful instrument to continue thinking about the experience, both of the pass and of the treatment. On the side of the pass, this is in order to continue approaching the impossible and the un-transmittable, which go beyond the dispositif itself, that is, in order to try and bring some light among the shadows. And, if this is so, what new lights can be brought in order to approach Lacan’s theory on the pass? In any case, it seems the shadows are still persisting.

5. See A. Nguyen’s reflections on this question in ‘Pass and Doxa: The Problem’.
10. I borrowed the reference from the two Conferences in C. Demoulin’s text, op.cit.

Translated by Chantal Degril
What knowledge is in the pass?

Patrick Barillot

There is a debate in our community about relations between the pass, the turning point involved in it, and the end of the analysis. It is not new, we are traversed by our different opinions on this pair - pass and end - without them really being raised to an epistemological problem.

What’s involved here?

The question can be formulated as follows: do Lacan's last conceptualisations regarding the end of the analysis have implications for the moment of the pass in the analysis?

Since these last formulations give us new definitions of the unconscious, of the symptom, of jouissances and the relation of each one to the language that the Borromean knot allows to be organised in a new topology, we can ask ourselves about possible consequence for the pass.

In other words, with a real unconscious, the place of the Other made of Ones that are enjoyed, the symptom as event of the body and jouissance of a letter of the unconscious, a question can be asked: has the moment of the pass – as Lacan defines it in his “Proposition on the psychoanalyst of the School of ’67” – moved in the course of the analysis to the point of finally joining up with the end, whether that's defined as identification to the signifier of the symptom, outside sense, or the appearance of a satisfaction of the end?

The experience of the Cartels of the Pass give us an indication of the doxa of our School on this point in that it objectifies the idea that the pass and the end are of the same order.

Indeed the overwhelming majority of passands engage in the dispositif by having terminated their analysis and many are the passers who wait to have finished their analysis before thinking about doing the Pass.

Colette Soler recently formalised this problematic of the pass and the end, in an intervention entitled "The passer, a clinical approach", delivered in September 2017, and published in the last Wunsch No. 18. She asked if there were one or more conceptions of the passer in Lacan's constructions, especially in the "Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI" of 1976, which deals with the end of the analysis. Her conclusion is incisive: "the fall of the analyst as subject supposed to know is not the end of his function" – so not the end of the analysis – and that this text of ’76 which does not speak explicitly of the pass, presupposes it without changing it.

My question is different but not unrelated to the preceding one: the turning point of the pass defined in the “Proposition of ’67” and in “l’Étourdit” in ’72, as the fall of the subject supposed to know remains the same in the texts which follow, such as "Introduction to the German edition of Écrits" of October ’73 and subsequent ones. Not unrelated, because to ask if there are several conceptions of the passer in Lacan, is also to ask if there are several conceptions of the turning point of the pass, the passer being the pass,\textsuperscript{45} that is to say, in the pass.

\textsuperscript{45} Lacan, J. Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School. Trans. Russell Grigg. Analysis 6, 1995: “From where then could an accurate testimony on whoever crosses this pass be expected, if not from
The turning of the pass as defined in the “Proposition” and “l'Étourdit” rests on a clinical tripod: subjective destitution, traversing of the fantasy, and glimpsing the object that in the fantasy was imagined to be for the traumatic Other. In this turning, the assurance taken from the fantasy becomes shaky through the mourning of this object that one was for the Other. In this metamorphosis of the subject the analyst also bears a cost. As partner supposed to know, he “vanishes through being no more than the vain knowledge of a being that subtracts itself”. In this movement, which thus leads to the disbeing of the analyst supposed to know, waste product of the operation, there emerges for the analysand the impossible to say of the object a as cause of desire. One is then at the end of the transference relation marked by the fall of the subject supposed to know, without, for all that, the analysand having finished with his analyst.

This relation of transference is that of a love which is addressed to knowledge but it is a knowledge about the truth of the subject, about the significations of the subject which would come to give an account of his symptoms.

In the pass, the analysand experiences the impasses of this truth, which cannot say everything about jouissance and which lies when it comes to the real that is in play.

My question is the following: is the fall of the subject supposed to know the truth also the fall of the subject supposed to unconscious knowledge? Is it the end of what Lacan calls, in "The Introduction to the German edition of the Écrits", "the supposition of a subject to unconscious knowledge, that is, to ciphering"? Is it the end of the belief in a subject of unconscious knowledge?

It seems to me that it is not the same thing and that the pass opens the way to another knowledge about the structure, to the glimpse of a knowledge, that of the unconscious without a subject, made of the enjoyed ones of lalangue, outside sense, thus real. To pass from the subject of the unconscious to the unconscious without subject requires some modifications.

We can distinguish two phases in the analysis, two steps that Lacan makes. The first phase is a lucubration of knowledge about the impossible to say of the object a. This is, I believe, what accounts for Lacan asking himself in “l'Insu qui sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre.” He responds that it is not, because what is common to both, to analyst and analysand, is lalangue. It is through lalangue that two can make themselves heard. This is a thesis that I find original and for which I will try to give an account.

The analysand speaks his truth as subject and as we have seen not everything can be said about jouissance, a truth that touches the real that he cannot say.

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an other who, like him, is still this pass, namely in whom at this moment is present the désêtre where his psychoanalyst harbours the essence of what has been passed on to him like a bereavement, knowing thereby, like any other in the function of training analyst, it will pass on to the too.” p. 10.


The speaking Other, according to Lacan, is the body, "mysteries of the speaking body," he says in Encore. If the body speaks it is by the event of the body that is the symptom, which speaks otherwise than the subject, which speaks the lalangue of the unconscious. In “l’Insu” he will say, “in his free associations, what does not cease being written and which is an obstacle for the truth is the symptom”. In other words, despite all that the subject has been able to articulate, there remains the knowledge without subject, a stranger to the truth of the subject, but not to the body of jouissance.

The second stage also mobilizes transference love. If transference love, always love that is addressed to knowledge, “is a feeling that takes a new form”, as it is expressed in the "Introduction to the German Edition of Écrits", it is because the analysand is given a partner who has a chance to respond. This is not the case in other forms of love. This is well known. And that response is for the analyst to furnish.

How does he respond? By the interpretation, we reply. Certainly, but in order that it not be an autism à deux, we must also take into account that “communication in analysis happens only in a way that transcends sense”. The way that transcends sense is communication by lalangue. It is because the analyst makes use of lalangue and its equivokes, which is not only the effect of sense and of jouissance, that the analyst responds to the lalangue spoken by the body. He responds by an effect of sense that touches on the real of the symptom, a coalescence of an event of the body and a One of lalangue; he responds, not by the sense but by the sound of the signifier. That’s what assures us that this communication has taken place since interpretation at this level is always risky.

What objectifies this communication is the effectiveness of the interpretation, or therapeutic effect. The therapeutic effect on the symptom ultimately demonstrates that each is not in his own bubble.

The analysand will grasp the idea of this knowledge about the structure of the place of the Other, the unconscious which is without a subject – he’ll catch a glimpse in “l’esp d’un laps”, the space of a lapsus, that there is no longer any gateway to sense because, according to what he tells us in the “Preface”, at that moment “one is sure of being in the unconscious”.

In answer to my question, I would say that Lacan’s last formulations do not call into question what he said about the pass in his “Proposition of ’67”, but rather complement it.

There are two phases in the analysis and there is a balancing from one to the other. The Pass is also a way of sorting out this muddle, still in the Preface, between the truth of the subject and the real, outside sense, of the symptom.

As for the termination of the analysis, it will require a certain balancing between the two poles in order to reach this satisfaction, which marks the end.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

48 ibid.
50 ibid.
It takes time

Clara Cecilia Mesa

I take as my reference the theme proposed for this table, namely “Effects of the Pass in the treatment”. This is a title that inverts the classical logic that would be “effects of the treatment on the Pass” and which implies its own logic, that is, how the hazards of a treatment, the subjective movements, the hazards of the transference, can be put to the test in the Pass. The proposed inversion goes beyond the particularity of the treatments, the one by one. It leads us to envisage the Pass as putting the emergence of the analyst produced by a completed analysis to the test, and how this emergence implies the advent of the desire of the analyst on which the function of the analyst depends in the direction of the treatment.

I propose to begin with a specific experience that I drew from my participation un the Cartels of the Pass, and which allowed me to see a phenomenon that particularly drew my attention, for it appeared several times. It is in relation to the testimonies presented by some passers who took their support from writing and sub-titles according to the axes pre-established by a sort of doxa concerning the end of the analysis – traversal of the fantasy, fall of the subject supposed to know, identification with the symptom, emergence of the desire of the analyst, the appearance of enthusiasm, setting up a practice – and is generally preceded by the infantile neurosis and the therapeutic variations produced by the analysis. The surprise comes from the fact that we know very well that the passer, “a sensitive plate”, has no need of textually transcribing the message he has received from the passand. He is not the emitter who transmits a message to a receiver, nor is his function to produce a theoretical exercise for this is the function that Lacan gives to the Cartel of the Pass, which, as he says in the Proposition of 67, “Any functioning jury therefore cannot abstain from working on the doctrine, over and above its function of selection”.

I wonder then whether there has not been established, in an implicit way, a sort of doxa that shapes the experiences of the Pass, which does not go without the known risk of producing a standardisation of the Pass, not on the side of the Cartels of the Pass, that is, on the side on which the suspicion usually falls because at times one has wondered whether the Cartel is oriented by a theory, a doxa or a kind of checklist when deciding on nomination or non-nomination. However what I am presenting here situates us on the other side, the side from which the Pass is elaborated, the testimony, whether this is the passand or the passers, and in terms of which one could perhaps reformulate the question. Is this knowledge organising the testimony, which may imply the will to adjust the lived experience to the ideals of the School (and perhaps that is the reason) is it not a knowledge, in these cases as in all those where the dimension of the ideal is played out, which closes the encounter instead of helping to demonstrate the analytical conditions that allowed the passage? Without doubt, Lacan had perceived the possibility that this could happen when he said at Grand Motte: “If he has only learned to learn how to make others aware of him, this is little in comparison to what was revealed to him in the analytic experience”.


Without doubt that puts in question the relation between the end of the analysis and the Pass, more exactly, between the conception of the end of analysis and the conception of the Pass, which is a very important point to review for the experience of the School rests on the juncture where the Pass operates as proof of the School. Does the knowledge precede the Pass? Or is the knowledge constructed as an effect of the Pass as an experience. There is a whole problem around this point, a point from which one can extract two questions. The first, what is the place of theory in the procedure? And second, is there an opportune time to take part in it?

For the first point, the problem lies in the gap between doctrine and doxa. In relation to the doctrine, I mean the place that the whole development that Lacan made to move the limit posed by Freud with his question about whether analyses have an end or not, is held in Lacanian psychoanalysis. From the beginning, up until the formulations of the later years, Lacan constructs a doctrine to try to account for the coordinates that determine the end of an analysis, by passing through the proposition of the Pass and its articulation with the guarantees of the School in 1967, and continuing with the elaborations of the 70s on the formulation of the real unconscious. A work that is not diachronic would show that a theory is constructed according to logical times rather than the fact that each new formulation renders the previous ones null and void. Luis Izcovich warned us of the risk of assuming earlier formulations in his text "The doxa and the community" in Wunsch 11 in which he says: "to isolate formulations of the last Lacan, and to consider them as the only point of orientation in the theory consolidates a doxa which is not without consequences on the testimony of the passands, the elaboration of the passers and which even conditions the listening of the Cartels". This poses the question about whether this pre-established, fixed knowledge does not result in conditioning the nominations, which, in turn, leads to a sort "of insidious infiltration of the idea that a community is made from an AS".

We know that with the Pass, Lacan proposes a recruitment of analysts by means different from those of the group, to recruit "another type of individuals susceptible to change, not with regard to certain fundamental structures but to the nature of the discourse", to pass from the discourse of the master in which knowledge is reduced to a commodity, to the analytic discourse in which knowledge is the product of experience. Lacan thus states eight years after the Proposition: "this would be a real recruitment, if this mode of investigation that is the Pass was introduced. The Pass in effect allows someone who thinks he can be an analyst, someone who is close to authorising himself, and even if he has not already authorized himself, to communicate what made him decide, what made him authorise himself thus". Of in other words, why someone assumed the crazy risk of becoming what the object "a" is. If I have emphasised the idea that Lacan employs for his question, it is because in principle, for Lacan, there would be no continuity between the end of the analysis and the emergence of the analyst's desire. This is what must be proven: not whether one has finished one's analysis but rather why, in addition and despite this, one decides to occupy the place. Lacan put it this way in the "Note to the Italians": "there may well have been an analysis, but an analyst, no chance".

53 Izcovich, L. La doxa et la communauté. Wunsch 11, p. 47
54 Idem
56 Idem
57 Idem
58 Idem
transformation of the discourse is what puts into operation the passage from the analysand to the analyst, so it is obvious that it is not done by the hystorisation of the analysis, a condition *sine qua non* of course, but by the hystorization of the moment of juncture in becoming an analyst. Lacan expected from the procedure that it would allow us to dissipate, "This dark cloud that covers the juncture I am concerned with here, the one at which the psychoanalysand passes to becoming a psychoanalyst – that is what our School can work at dissipating."  

A second consideration on the question I asked at the beginning: if the Pass as experience actually brings a gain in knowledge about the unspeakable, I come back to Lacan’s question in “On the Pass” where he asks himself "if indeed this Pass can be something that, all of a sudden, puts in relief for the one who offers it ... as can a lightning flash, i.e. in a way that brings a different light, a certain lifting of the shadow on his analysis ... This is something that concerns the passand".  

What does that mean? Doesn’t it mean that the Pass is not carried out thanks to the knowledge accumulated by the elaboration throughout the analysis but that the Pass itself can shed new light on the shadows of the unspeakable that left the analysis itself?  

A pre-elaboration of the testimony is perhaps an attempt to make the unspeakable real pass through the imaginary thus becoming a remote testimony of the dimension of the encounter, put distant from novelty, freshness and even from the dimension of the experience to take up again Lacan’s variations on the motion of time corresponding to the Pass: “When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning ... then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. *One knows*. But one has only to be aware of the fact to find oneself outside it. There is no friendship there, in the space that supports this unconscious”.  

What of the Tuchè was used is reproduced as automaton. In the end, the Pass could only be judged by the effort of apprehension of those who were exposed to it, experienced it, and experience means that the dimension of the real is involved.  

I wonder then if there cannot be a sort of precipitation in the Pass, like a sort of precipitation of the moment to conclude before the time to understand, and in this case the passage to the Pass can wait ... The destitution of the subject supposed to know, the fall of meaning is not the moment to conclude nor the moment of authorisation, for it can facilitate the passage to the official or to self-ritualization. Why isn’t it? It can be the end of the satisfaction related to the lucubration of the unconscious but not the passage to authorisation in the sense of "to authorise oneself only from oneself".  

It is the turning that opens the question of being, it is the stopping of the insistence of what has been attributed to the Other, to the biographical history, but it takes another time for the analysand to be able to find his way when faced with marks of enjoyment that owe nothing to the truth. The affect of this shift is not enthusiasm but the "horror of knowing" and additional time is needed for it to be possible, beyond the therapeutic effects of the analysis and beyond the horror of knowing, to prove that despite this, one wants to occupy the place of the object "a", waste, loss, to be cause for an analysis for

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61 Lacan, J. *Sur la passe*  
others. Lacan clearly distinguishes "the analyst's desire from the desire to be a
psychoanalyst".64

If there is no Pass type or end type, with regard to the relation to time, we cannot say
either that there is a time that measures the passage of the fall of the function of the lying
truth to the Pass. There are all sorts of variations, from those in which there is a cessation
of the time of the end or its prolongation, its slowdown or "endless mourning that can
lead to endless passes"65 or a long time between the end of the analysis and the Pass, time
necessary to complete the loop, but there is also the anticipated precipitation.

There is therefore no continuity between the end of the analysis and the Pass. There is no
continuity between analysis and the advent of the analyst as an advent of the real. Thus I
understand the formation of the analyst proposed by Lacan that goes from the long
duration of an analysis to the act of advent of the analyst. The analyst comes to work with
the real unconscious.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

IV. FROM ONE DISCOURSE TO THE OTHER,
GUARANTEES AND IMPASSE

"From the impasse of a discourse to the Saying Other: a jump".
There is Something of Joy,66
Dominique Touchon Fingermann

"If the analytic discourse and its determinative void are necessary for looking our joy in the face...it is not
for the purpose of then yielding to spherophilia, hoping that the round of discourses would create a universe
that does not exist, but only to permit the analyst to jump more freely from one discourse to another."667

1- In his prelude, Note à la joie, Frédéric Pellion, passed along to me the tone of a possible
response to the question posed by my title. There is an impasse proper to each discourse; it
has to do with the fact that the truth which inaugurates it is never found entirely in what
produces it; this impasse can restart the recourse to another discourse to better approach
what is left stranded there. There is no continuity between one discourse and another; one
needs to jump. The discourse of the analyst writes this jump, for it is the objet a, insofar as it
is fundamentally lacking, that causes this sleight of hand that in the end produces a One
which can stand alone and thus renew its link to the Other. It is this jump of the One
alone, not-without-the Other, which can next “allow the analyst to jump more freely from one
discourse to the other”. There is Something of Joy [Y A D’LA JOIE], as one would say There
is Something of One [Y A D’L’UN].

There is joy, when the analyst passes after a jump that is more or less perilous. This grace in
the functioning “of the analyst” can yield, why not, an acrobatic air, but above all, it graces

66 Trenet, C. Ya d’la joie – chanson de 1936
67 Pellion, F. Prélude VI Rencontre Internationale d’École
us with some of the satisfactions of our dispositifs, our communications, our links in the analytic group, our discoveries that spawn the wandering of the real. It happens!

Or worse...that is to say, brooding and being afraid of never being done with the impasses of the group (“the deceits among analysts” [le nicmac entre “analystes”]), or more generally, with those of the subject supposed of knowledge and its fundamental misunderstanding, or even yet again remaining stupefied in front of the horror of the act about which Lacan nevertheless warned us.

“What joy do we find in what constitutes our work?” The statement of the question contains an affirmation. What constitutes our work is the act, and “There is something of joy”: there is no analyst without enthusiasm, no analyst who does not know how to provide satisfaction to an urgent case: joy, enthusiasm, satisfaction, it is not only a question of feeling, it is question of ethics, on which depends the logical results of the treatment.

This feeling of pass has an effect on us, the ricochet of the “YAPAS” to the Y of the One, in the analyses that we conduct, in the dispositif of the pass, an echo in the body resonates as if it said There is Something of Joy!

2- The discourses are, themselves, “apparatuses of jouissance” determined by the structure of the signifier: it is a jouissance always in remainder. The structure of the signifier that determines the discourses makes a link between them but does not produce a sexual relation; but equally, the signifier does not produce a relation, that is, produce social link. It is this real that makes the world go round from one discourse to another. It is still necessary to take things literally!

Each discourse butts up against a non-meaning, an impasse; the product of each apparatus misses the truth of the jouissance, its existence, which supports its initial saying and it is another discourse which will reveal its missed meaning. In each one something always returns to the same place, making it that things really don’t go around all that much; to escape the impasse or the hum, it is thus necessary to jump, make “that step of the real”, so that an other Saying produces a step in a different direction, establishes another discourse.

There are four “right” ways to do this, that is, from one semblant to the other to precipitate and order a new link which would give meaning to the jouissance: to command, to demand desire, to hoax the students [canailler l’astude], finally to cause, “to interpellate
If each of the discourses implies its own ethics, this means that each proposes a treatment of jouissance, thus of the real, thus of “there is no” which regulates its behavior. That of the psychoanalyst puts knowledge in the place of truth, its positioning of the unconscious as real validates its act and constitutes its guarantee.

The analytic discourse, and the act which signals it disposes to joy...how is it possible to celebrate making this waste?

The logic of its structure shows that finding the signifier as One with none like unto it allows passing to the act and afterwards proposing the object a as a semblant which causes: “In the structure of the misunderstanding of the subject supposed of knowledge, the psychoanalyst nevertheless must find the certainty of his act and the gap that produces its law”.

It is in this sleight of hand that occurs a crossing of the horror of butting up against knowledge without a subject, and a passing to the enthusiasm that makes act. In the sixteenth century, the “divine transport”, suggested by the etymology of enthusiasm, denotes the “transport and exaltation of the poet under the effect of inspiration”, then in the seventeenth century, “the impulse to act with joy”.

This transport inspires our act which gives impetus and breath to those who choose to no longer just sigh and who are engaged with us in this discourse where it is this incommodious object, the waste of « humanity », that commands.

On this impasse of the subject supposed of knowledge and the jump it implies is founded the guarantee we find in the Discourse of the Psychoanalyst, that is, in “what is implicated in the analytic discourse, namely a bit better use of the signifier as a One.”

3- In the world, in treatments, like in the analytic group, the Discourses circle around, one step forward, one step back, all is well even though they stumble and trip on their impotence, for the worst would be to become stuck in the capitalist plague which contaminates all links to the point of derailing their circulation and halts « the apparatus of jouissance » which regulates desires.

Tripping on the real can provide an opportunity to jump, there is a chance, take it or leave it, to change one’s thinking, thus an opportunity to raise impotence to the impossible, that is to say, to make “the step of the real”. For everything bad, something good: “It is only by pushing the impossible into its last defenses that impotence takes on the power of turning the patient into an agent.”

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Le Robert, Dictionnaire Historique de la Langue Française, Alain Rey, Paris, 1995


Idem.
This “step (pas) of the real” which makes things happen (faire passer), falls within the responsibility of the Discourse of the Analyst, this is the way it enters the circle and this is how it will remain there. The discourse of the psychoanalyst has revealed the meaning of the discourse of the hysterical and of the others in turn; the non-sense, the impasse of its foolish hope, comes from the real of the structure, whence comes the analyst’s act: “Note that this step, he establishes it with the very act by which he advances it; and it is to the real, which this step makes operative, that he submits the discourses which he puts in synchrony with the said.”

This passage from one discourse to another is a breakthrough, for it is produced from the moment an impossibility is revealed by the impotence of its production. Lacan said, from the worst to the saying; it is this real which makes a new Saying embark on a new love, that is, a new link, and founds the change of Discourse: “there is some emergence of psychoanalytic discourse whenever there is a movement from one discourse to another.”

When Saying occurs, it is an event, a risk, because of the necessity to jump, without guarantee, but on this is founded the discourse which follows it.

In order to jump, one needs to bear for a moment being suspended in the void. Human nature has a horror of the void, but the acrobat analyst knows how to find reason in it, knows that like Ponge, one can write réson to capture the echo in it. Beyond the banks where ancient Greeks practiced usury and traded in money—and in spite of Capital’s banks—the analyst acrobat pirouettes on these banks interpreting “that which perdures through pure loss betting only from father to worse,” sighing better and better, giving a full account of the wanderings of the real, finding some good air.

There is something of joy since the Discourse of the Analyst, for from it one takes into account the empty whole that can be named as One.

The “deceit among analysts”, “the obscenity of the group”, the impasses of discourse, which cause us so much grief, have to do with “there is a real at stake in the very training of psychoanalysts”. However, this knowledge could not very well be forgotten; the School, that is the pass always begun again, will guarantee it. The lesson of the pass is that there is something of the One that makes a link: our curiosity is awakened when we listen to the teachings of the AS.

That could « inter-est » us more and makes an inter-sinhome link, as Soler indicates, for according to the principle taken up again by Lacan: the more we are sainthommes the more we laugh.

83 Idem
88 C. Soler Qu’est-ce qui fait lien ? CCP 2011-2012
“Well, let us have that chance to lady luck—encore.”

Translated by Devra Simiu

What is not guaranteed

Colette Soler

We are still then speaking about the guarantee. I have always felt somewhat resistant to the interpellations on the analytic guarantee. These are not just recent, they began with the SPF, the School of Lacan and in a rather passionate tone with which I have never been on the same page. That makes me wonder, but I believe it stems from my conviction, a longstanding one, that there is no guarantee anywhere, I mean in any discourse.

There are admittedly discourses where, unlike the analytic one, we can define a competence of knowledge and/or of experience on the basis of validation tests. It’s what happens in the sciences and in technology, and thus in universities, in schools and various places of learning. Hence the very current question about evaluations in France. Evaluation has various aspects, but what it guarantees is always a competence. Not necessarily grandiose, to be able to write faultless French for example is a competence. In short, we can ensure a competence in certain discourses but this does not constitute a guarantee for it never ensures … the performance *hic et nunc*. Between the two, between competence and performance there is a gap that manifests in experience, for example in stage fright at the moment when the competence has to pass to the act, and this gap is often now referred to with the expression “human error,” even fault, in the one whose competence has been validated, and if you are a construction engineer, or a train driver, you will be charged with performance failure.

Well, it’s ruled out that one ever presses charges against an analyst for failure of the analytic act. It certainly happens that an analyst is charged, for example for unlawful exercise if he is neither a psychologist nor a doctor, but this is a charge with regard to the social law and not with regard to psychoanalysis. That’s the whole problem that Freud and Lacan defended as “lay analysis.” This is because there is no possible proof of validation of any analytic competency. I say this in non-analytic terms deliberately; Lacan said it in so many other more obscure ways: Who is, where is the analyst … and again the desire of the psychoanalyst, to find oneself there is to get out of it for good, and then finally, the analyst falls under the notall *paston*.

This indeterminacy sheds light on the phenomena of the analytic world, if only the valorisation of the duration of the experience, in other words of its functioning, and then also the frenzied aspiration to be recognised. This aspiration is certainly everywhere, but here more acute that elsewhere, except perhaps in the arts for there it is called upon as compensation, even as covering for the deficiency in question. In fact this doggedness is overdetermined, I can’t develop it here but its scope is not only that of subjective reassurance, it is also marketable in its effects on what is symptomatically called the “clientele.”

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But there is more, an aporia: it is this indeterminacy that makes it necessary that the School—at least the one which wishes to follow Lacan’s orientations—guarantees its analysts. A parenthesis: today more than ever because we always confuse the analyst “who authorizes himself” with the one who “installs himself” according to the established expression. Hence this contrasting feature in our time, between the rapid multiplication of the number of analysts and the observation of the decrease in the number of subjects disposed to analysis, and even the decline of psychoanalysis. That’s what led Lacan to say that it would be necessary—the ‘it would be necessary’ conditional on wishful thinking—that only analysts would authorise themselves.

Thus the necessity of guaranteeing analysts impossible to guarantee.

The business faces two pitfalls. First the grievance, justified precisely because of the lack of competency criteria. We know its cry: “why the other and not me?” and “what are your criteria?” This is the pitfall of non-consent. The spirit of the times, the extremity of parity, strongly accentuates this pitfall, to the extent that some wish to suppress any guarantee of the School; we knew this when we began.

The second pitfall is more masked, more insidious but more critical. I introduce it through Lacan’s words, when in 76 he replied mockingly to the interpellation on the criteria: “they won’t have a bad effect, (not right away).” But in whose eyes? This is an unmistakeable reference to group opinion, the bad effect of the doxa of the period or of the analytic doxa he didn’t say, but his remarks clearly imply that the committee that names, Lacan was part of it for 20 years, has no other compass.

Comment.

Can we think that this restoration, in relation to the statement of 67 on the AMS “who has proved himself,” is due to the aging man, as was said of Freud about the death drive? We can surely think so since it was expressed as such, but let us seek another thought.

For that I look to the theoretical context of the date of these remarks. We are no longer in the days when Lacan thought he had found in the Name of the Father a structural, linguistic guarantee, actually capable of guaranteeing the consistency of a discourse, that is a pseudo universality. He had to arrive at an existential Name of the Father which is of the order of the saying, the saying which is the father, the father of possible Borromeans, in the plural. To characterize this saying as existential implies several things. First that it is itself an unpredictable performance, an advent of some kind, that announces no verifiable, that is, validatable competence. I could say: it is causal but not caused. It does not signify that it’s ex-nihilo, it may have conditions, contexts, but it does not come from the big Other: it does not inherit from it, it does not preside over any universal, but it does fall under the ‘There is something of One’ [Y a d’l’Un], under the One-saying [l’Un-dire] as Lacan wrote it. That’s why the true fiction opinion of the Menon of Plato no longer has for us any kind of signification, and it’s not the fixion with an x of the point off-line which will return it to him. I come back to the two pages of L’étourdit that Lacan from 1972 devoted to opinion.

This takes me back to the possible “to have a bad effect” of those who will not be selected based on the opinion of those who decide. It is useless to ask their reasons, no more than for the analytic act. The opinion that names has no deeper reasons than affinities, within our terms always symptomatic, or, founded on “judgments of taste” in Emmanuel Kant’s
terms. In which, moreover, it was well founded to put this Encounter of the School under the sign of an affect, joy. So the guarantee, a guarantee if I may say always has the same colour—for I cannot say the same value and I cannot say the same smell—hence the same colour as those who guarantee. It’s the same in art: art, we know, is always dated and is said to reflect its time. In this sense to destroy Palmyra or to let the Rio Museum go up in flames is akin to murder.

Another more down to earth way of saying “to have a bad effect”: a community has the AMSs that it deserves—without it being possible to measure this worth. It’s why when it’s a matter of nominating AMSs I campaigned for loosening up a little the consistency of the existing group of AMSs.

Even if there is no Other as Lacan said at the end, even if we cannot escape the regime of there is something of One [y a d’Un], it is better to avoid the coagulation of ones and come together one by one.

The device of the Pass corrects nothing of what I said there. In the Pass, according to Lacan from whose words I try not to stray too far, we do not sanction any competency, just a performance. And not just any one, but a performance of transmission. We can discuss what it is to transmit: the turning point of the pass, the end of the analysis, the ONE saying of the passand, etc. The doxa is evolving at this level, but what is certain is that it concerns a performance of transmission which, like the witticism, according to Lacan, is supposed to pass precisely through an effect produced in the other, in the first place on the sensitive plate of the passers who make the received effect pass. So, again, it’s useless to ask the cartels for their rational reasons.

Ultimately, in this device, we are going to wager on those who think they have captured something of their own analysis, a first performance, and who succeed in passing it, a second performance. It’s a wager, for a performance never guarantees anything other than what comes after. What follows is only possible, which means exactly that it may not happen.

I will conclude: this dominance throughout of the performative One-saying, identified but developed from the end of L’étourdit, obviously has consequences on what we consider to be an analytic clinic and it particularly changes the aim of interpretation. It certainly does not cancel the earlier structural and logical elaborations that are more familiar, the structure of language and of discourse, but this dominance displaces a lot without cancelling it. So what? The causal value of solely saying the truth which is the stuff of what we call since Freud, the clinic. This displacement of the emphasis on truth towards the performative One-saying—which is a real—is a major epistemic transference in Lacan’s teaching, the man of the matheme, the measure of which I believe we have not yet taken but whose consequences are practical, truly concrete if we are to believe it. The proof through the AMS who does “not have a bad effect” and through the passand, he who caused the effect.

Translated by Esther Faye
The analytic discourse, guarantee of the hysterisation of the analysand

Gabriel Lombardi

The effort to erase the particularity of the subject

In recent decades, the psychiatrist has become a technician who supplies psychotropic drugs; he now aspires, for economic reasons, to control the expensive operations of degenerative neuropsychiatry. With the increasing age of the population, investments in health shift from "psi" to "neuro", neuro-immuno-endocrinology and so on. The psychiatrist pays the price of having eliminated from the DSM terms like hysteria, paranoia and passion, the latter being broken down in the American Psychiatric Association into mood, emotion and affect.

What do these categories have in common? These are types of symptoms or dispositions in which the subject wants specifically to be listened to. Those with different clinical presentations such as panic attacks, are looking for sedative medications as a matter of urgency. The paranoid, on the other hand, wants to be listened to, his delirium to be registered by an attentive ear, to be written somewhere. The one who is passionate looks for impact on the Other. The hysterical subject tries – and often manages – to make a social bond with her symptom. Colette Soler’s expression "the desire for psychoanalysis", the desire to be listened to analytically, seems appropriate in these cases.

The fact that psychoanalysis is interested in singularity is so obvious that it doesn’t need saying, since – this author affirms it with irony – we are all singular. So there is for me a distinction to make between the semblance of singularity, and another singularity that requires going through some troubling particulars which put in question the way a community like ours makes use of diagnosis.

The place of hysteria in psychoanalysis

I propose to return to the singular place occupied by hysteria among the clinical types in psychoanalysis. Freud and Lacan situated it in different ways that are consistent with each other. The first detected in it a mode of communication with partners by means of a symptom inscribed in the body. Starting from Freud and his cases, Lacan proposed hysteria directly as a discourse, a social bond whose structure he summed up in this way: the hysterical subject tries – and often manages – to make a social bond with her symptom. Colette Soler’s expression "the desire for psychoanalysis", the desire to be listened to analytically, seems appropriate in these cases.
clinical type makes it possible to connect symptom and structure with certainty, showing "a real close to scientific discourse", according to what Lacan suggests in *Autres écrits*.

It’s well known that psychoanalysis also applies to those subjects whose type of clinical symptom is not social, and to symptoms that are not articulated so clearly in the structure, as in the case of the beautiful butcher’s wife or that of Dora. Starting from Freud’s elaborations, which point to a converse core in obsessional neurosis, and those of Lacan, which show the transferential structure of paranoia, and the turning-plates or back-and-forth [object/subject] typical of perversion, we can understand that analysis is not offered only to the hysterical subject, that psychoanalysis is "inclusive," as they say.

On condition of being destituted as a subject to the point of obtaining a "complete submission to all the subjective positions" of the paranoid, the analyst can receive him, gain his confidence, even his complicity, so that he can open his unconscious and become divided, weep in the session, and pass eventually from dreams of persecution to dreams of dissatisfaction. And so that he can take back his life, his work and some bonds of friendship and love, in his own way.

As for the subject of perversion, on condition of allowing the initial seductions of the turning-plate that he proposes, the analyst can receive him as an analysand too. Particularly when he's "out of the closet", when he is self-authorised and self-depathologized, this analysand likes to share his secrets, even if he's a little ashamed of them, and his account stops turning towards the 'passage to the act' that it did at the beginning, a typical turn and very precisely indicated by Serge André in *L'imposture perverse*. Its particular relation with repression and guilt is radically different from psychosis without repression, and also from neurosis, where repression acts in a different way, accentuating the fading of the subject in the fantasy. The pervert, on the other hand, affirms himself with the staging of the object – two very different modes of self-treatment of subjective division by means of fantasy.

**From wild singularity to analytic singularisation**

We are all singular, most of us adapted to the norm, but there is also this "*chique gorda*" with fuchsia hair and carefully neglected look, who self-defines as queer, a generic and paradoxical nomination that *les bizarres* choose. But beware! The obsessional also considers himself very singular, because he does not communicate his symptom with others; and also the paranoid whose case is, of course, exceptional; and the schizophrenic who incarnates several incompatible cases at the same time; and also the melancholic, so singular that he does not make any case. None of them constitutes an analytically verified singularity; for the moment, they are only individuals who have not yet gone through the hysterisation recommended by Lacan in order to enter analysis; he says in *L’envers de la psychanalyse*:

> There is the discourse of the analyst, and this is not to be confused with the psychoanalytic discourse, with the discourse sustained effectively in the analytic experience. What the analyst institutes as an analytic experience can be said simply – it is the hysterisation of discourse. In other words, it is the structural introduction, through artificial conditions, of the discourse of the hysteric.

From which we can deduce that:

1° The analytical method does not consist merely of a single social bond, it is rather a practice of a change of discourse. The analyst, starting from his discourse, intervenes by

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91 This is the "politically inclusive" language currently used in Argentina that erases gender difference.
interpellating the divided subject, caught in his symptom as patient and agent simultaneously \((a \rightarrow \$)\), thus prompting him to rebel/reveal himself and to respond from the discourse of the hysteric.

2° Lacan does not say that the analysand, in order to become one, must be an hysteric beforehand. Whatever his prior clinical type, the analysand tends to respond from his hysterical symptom, vectorised towards the Other by the transference: a symptom that is constantly asking questions, seeking to exhaust the responses of the Other, and finally ironic, that attacks the analytic social bond. The analyst must not only channel, but actually obtain from the analysand a response from the "scientific" discourse of hysteria, a response made from a position of divided subject, favouring a heuristic context or one of discovery, in the words of Reichenbach. The change of hysterical-analytic discourse is essential to the analytic game, to analytic “body storming” [in English in the text]. The trajectory of the entry into analysis therefore generally goes from wild transference (hysteric, acting out, passage to the act, delirium, wild destitution of anxiety) to the hysterical answer/question that is analytically induced. This sequence, this coming and going between at least two discourses, pushes towards the resolution of the treatment. In a way that is consistent, at the end of the experience of analysis, with the subject supposed to know already exhausted, Lacan proposes in his "Preface to the English edition of the Seminar XI":

*Now, a little late in the day, I add my pinch of salt: a fact of history, or hysteria: that of my colleagues as it happens, a case of no importance, but one in which I happened to find myself implicated for concerning myself with someone who introduced me to them as having imposed on myself Freud, the Beloved (l’Aimée) of Matheus* [my thesis – translation modified].

The sequence is thus: Aimée sent Lacan, a psychiatrist, to be analysed; the latter met the hysterics of the IPA, particularly Lowenstein, and from that meeting he became this analyst with so many possibilities of speaking and teaching, starting from the discourse of the hysteric, among others.

**Hystorisation and prehistory of the symptom**

In summary, the analytic discourse guarantees the hysterisation of the analysand's discourse, whatever its initial clinical type. It guarantees for the one who looks for his broken saying to be listened to, the meeting with a partner able to do so, who can even make it possible for him to institute a saying.

The passage through the discourse of the hysteric seems to homogenise the clinic, an effect that is evident in the *dispositif* of the Pass. Lacan himself postulated that the Pass implies an "hystorising of one-self", tending all clinical sensitivity in the direction of hysteria, and camouflaging in many cases the position prior to this hystorisation, the *pre-hystory* which, however, does not remain completely forgotten in a *pre-history*. *Pre-hysteria* is not prehistory.

Although it produces a disconnect between the Pass and the clinic, the *hysterisation-hystorisation* hypothesis is consistent with other of Lacan’s affirmations:

- There are types of symptoms, there is a clinic, but it precedes the analytic discourse.
- The fact that clinical types respond to the structure is something that can be quickly written, but not without vacillation. It is neither true nor transmissible except by hysterical discourse.
- The scientific discourse is close to the hysterical discourse.
I conclude with a personal note. While hysterisation is good for the treatment, it is really a pity, in my opinion, that "psycho"-analysis is reduced to an hysterisation of everyone, as if aspiring to make what is pre-hysteric no longer exist. It's like diluting everything. Because the drives and desires that subsist in other clinical types, even if less social and inoffensive, are those that change the world: in science, in technology, in art. Psychoanalysis would have a lot to say about it. Perhaps in Pereira, 2019 ...

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

TEXTS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM

September 12, 2018

The Symposium brought together a significant number of members.

We were able to rework certain points of difficulty.

The whole debate was developed in *Echos* number 13.

Seven members of the ICG proposed brief presentations on some precise points that the experience of the Passes in the ICG had taught them.

**Suspension points**

*Sandra Berta*

*So then, to mark something, a point, a point of suspension* (Lacan, 21/6/1972)

This is my first experience with the CIG, an experience without precedents. The encounters with the passers, the debates in cartels, the work in *intension* have a teaching effect with or without nomination. Something affects the various instances of the pass; it is an effect that spreads.

The three suspension points “...” or the suspension – punctuation in progress – recall logical time as well as interruption of the session; for the first, the assertion of anticipated certainty; for the second, scansion of meaning.

Today, I wanted to talk about a suspension that no longer leads to false tracks or down wrong pathways, these latter being the strategy of the *parler* faced with the horror of knowledge.

In 1975, Lacan, following Freud’s footsteps, emphasized that “the analyst must rely on his own analysis, strengthen himself from his own analysis: that is, to know, not so much of what for, but what did it make use of.”

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Not so much for what..., but of what ...

Of what use is the analyst in an analysis, his own, if not for the experience of the real unconscious that is vectorized in Borromean fashion? Each time there is a turn, it is the presence of the real unconscious, outside meaning, that is brought up to date. The subject supposed to know is put in an awkward position on account of this real.

“Of what did it make use” requires the transmission of what an analysis produced, that is, what an analysis produced in the one who decides to give testimony about it. It is not only in the Pass that this is at stake. The Cartel also produces a work that has this question as its backdrop.

Because of the experience, I refer back to the points of suspension and to the suspension of points at stake, whether by the capsizing of the phantasy, or through the stopping point it offers après-comp., a reading of the one passing about what his analysis produced. These three points, Lacan emphasized them in “…ou pire”. Points that are neither resistances to the turning point of the pass nor to the end. Punctuated suspension, antechamber to the time of the end. Suspension which makes a hole in the moment of concluding and which passes (sometimes) to the passers, this time of suspension and of scansion that makes itself saying (se fait dire). Three points – “…” – in which Lacan designated that function of the objet a – decompletion and cause –, and added that they operate in the refinement of the fields of jouissance.

This suspension, an index of a “loosening” [dé-tension] in the course of an analysis, a moment where the lack of precision illustrates the possibility of a cipher or something else that cannot be said, which seems to detach itself from everything that has been said, but which evokes, by producing this effect of surprise, through going back to the question of the intension: of what did it make use. This reached us through the passers, and there was an opportunity to center ourselves on these points of suspension, to fish for the opacity of this moment and to follow its effects.

Suspension, then, in the opacity that permits no strategy, but which provokes the dizziness that comes after a turn: « between knowledge and jouissance there is a littoral, which does not turn into the literal except insofar as you could take the same turn at any moment. It is only because of this that you can take yourself as an agent who supports it”.94 Suspension that, instead of knotting the contingent to the necessary, unknots it. After that, cascades of dreams, the time of the end, details of the changes in the level of jouissance and the decision to conclude.

This suspension, index of the turning point of the pass, had been transmitted to us provoking a surprise, discretely shared in each Cartel – discretely in the moment of the encounter with the passers. Afterwards, the nomination had the effect of joy. The Cartel works through the chance of nomination.

This ... After all, what is involved in the dispositif of the pass is the intransmissibility of a knowledge. Thus, something that returned to the passands, now AS,’ who, we wager, will

offer their contributions, make their punctuations, for a School. Punctuations which are not foreign to this moment of suspension.

*Transcribed by Devra Simiu*

**Pass and point de capiton in psychosis**

*Jean-Pierre Drapier*

This is my second experience as a member of the ICG and so of the cartels of the Pass. After an interval of six years, there is always the same affect of enthusiasm, the same admiration for the effects of the analysis and the same conviction about the interest of this dispositif, certainly for our School, but beyond that for the analytic community. And this is apart from the satisfaction of nominating ASs or not: the path is just as interesting as the aim of the journey.

First of all, let’s say that to see things in this way already makes it possible not to confuse the dispositif, its instances, its mysteries, its course - from the request to the local epistemic dispositif to the response (from the ICG), the passing on by transmission (to the passers) - not to confuse these with the moment of the pass, the turn to the analyst, the one who makes himself the object. In the same way, it’s interesting to classify more precisely the moment of the pass and the end of analysis, the end of analysis and the fall of the subject supposed to know: the analysis continues beyond this fall and if the end can be assimilated to a know-how to do with one’s symptom, to know how one is ‘folded’ and to manage with those folds in order to be less encumbered, the pass to the analyst is the moment when the subject gives up the disguises clothing the object and perceives its function of division. It’s an encounter with a real.

During my four years with the ICG, I heard 14 Passes of which, inevitably, a certain number concerned subjects with a psychotic structure. What struck me was that in these cases (but not only these), whether the analysis was finished or not, it was not a question of giving up but of giving, making a gift to the School, in sticking to the doxa, constructing the Pass via the theory, the gift of an exemplary program, the enthusiasm of the end included. And this has a logic: for these subjects, the analytic treatment has remarkable effects, it allows them to build a replacement [suppléance], rather it is a replacement, a fourth ring that holds the other three, an ordering of the reality, a sense permanently put on an unsteady reality. The status of analyst, sometimes taken very early, is then an anchoring-point, a signifier that comes to fix this supplement in place, allows the subject to function, not outside the analysis, but outside of his treatment. Perhaps analysts very attached to sense, to the giving of sense with which some analyses can go a long way. After all, if, as Lacan says in "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", analytic maieutics consists of inducing a controlled paranoia in the subject, these analysts must also be up to treating neurotics.

Asking to do the Pass is another way of anchoring this construction by asking the Other of the School, incarnated in the ICG, to authenticate this "being an analyst". Admittedly, this imaginary positioning of the dispositif indicates an Other which continues to consist of rendering the request for the Pass null and void de facto, but has the merit nevertheless of indicating a quandary for the subject or at any rate a desire of the subject to avoid being "nominated to" psychoanalysis which could make him decompensate. It also has the merit as does any Pass-procedure of reconstructing the treatment afterwards, of consolidating the lineaments, of showing the therapeutic and didactic effects of this treatment, the
knowledge accumulated (but then confused with Truth). Whatever the structure of the analysand, what is made evident is hysterisation as the modality of interrogation of the Other, starting from the social bond promoted by the analytic discourse. What is very instructive in the position of member of the Cartel of the Pass is to pick up this hysterisation in a short period of time, to hear in an accelerated way what we know in our work as analyst is spread over years and years and hundreds of sessions. And to hear from a different place, not that of the analyst in the process of the treatment but that of participant, with colleagues from the ICG, the passand and the passers, listening to an experience testifying outside the treatment about what happens in a treatment. Outside the treatment but closer to the clinic.

Of course, the confusion of knowledge/truth, the cementing via theory and doxa, if they have the merit of fitting out the subject, do not allow the conclusion that there was a moment of the pass to the analyst: if they provide a foundation for the subject, and this is a remarkable result, they are far from letting the expected nomination drop. But let us not forget that with the Pass (procedure), if it is a matter of gathering by testimony what happens (action) in the pass (moment) to the analyst, it is not a matter of making a judgment on the subject or on his capacity to be an analyst. So I agree with the question raised by Gabriel Lombardi in Wunsch No. 18 and which will serve as a conclusion: "A critique of analytic judgment seems to me obligatory in order to avoid thinking that we owe everything to neurosis, thus giving the impression that it is the best if not the only acceptable structure for the analyst".

*Translated by Deborah McIntyre*

**When life takes charge**

*Carme Dueñas*

Being in the CIG and being able to listen to what the passers pass on of what has been the trajectory of an analysis is a new experience in each pass. Every analysis is unique and what is transmitted is always articulated through the logic of each treatment.

However in those passes in which we have been able to discern the transmission of an unprecedented desire I have also been able to hear what we might call an “enlivening” effect of the analysis. An effect of a feeling of life in those subjects who have achieved a different treatment of each one’s own real.

It is the real that permits: “the effective unknotting of what makes the symptom hold together, namely a knot of signifiers”,95 says Lacan in Television. The unknotting of chains made up of signifying material, not of sense, but rather of jouissance-sense. Unknotting in order to put an end to the deciphering, to the search for the “lying truth” and assume that there is a limit, an impossible to speak and to know. The impossibility of going beyond the deciphering produces a satisfaction which allows the subject to let go of a belief in truth, and the turning point away from a deadly jouissance tied up with the identification with the object of the drive and towards a jouissance which articulates the joy of life and the possibility of occupying the place of object cause for his analysands.

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In the Pass it is verified that it is from being able to experience something of the real that this turning point becomes possible. Moving away from the imaginary; purifying the sense of the symptom; situating the early emergence of a symptom in the body; when an unloosening of a knot, until then tight, happens. Being enabled to catch something of that which marked the self. In some cases it is a slip of the tongue, in others a dream or a series of dreams, or an interpretation which has a revelatory effect, that which has brought about the unknotting. But in all cases there is for the passand an effect of “certainty”. Something which has an essential signification which concerns each individual and which puts a final full stop to the jouissance of deciphering.

From this point onwards there is no longer jouissance of the symptom but rather the opening of a new know-how with respect to the symptom, a different treatment of the real which allows the subject to leave suffering behind and put this real at the service of life. This also opens up a new position in the clinical listening, a being able to occupy the position of the analyst.

Something of the real remains at the end of analysis but it is not articulated in any identification but rather in something of the individual body, a mark of original jouissance that cannot be reduced.

The points of detention, the impossibility of going beyond deciphering, the meeting with the real, mark the limit of that which is impossible to elucidate and allow the putting of an end to the infinite drift of sense, the “mirage of truth”. An encounter with the real that allows the subject to modify his relationship with jouissance and opt for life.

Translated by Richard Barrett
Precisions and the impossible to define

Marie-Noëlle Jacob-Duvernet

During this ICG, I listened to passes in the immediate prolongation of my own pass and of my nomination in 2016.

The pass is a testimony of what is able and of what one wants. One can only say a few things, the real doesn’t allow for more, but one also chooses to say or not to say. I interrogate this choice which extends from the allusive to the precise, as the passes are clearly very different on this point. Clearly, for each passand it is a matter of style since nothing can be predicated with the real.

When one evokes precision, one thinks about the difference that Lacan makes in The Sinthome between showing and demonstrating. What is shown is always only an appearance, and the point is to get rid of it in a demonstration. But it is not a demonstration that would perpetuate infinite chatter, but a precision, which allows a hollowing-out. A precision, in order to get away from evidence what is shown all too easily in the imaginary.

I find that this matter is not at all easy to understand or, rather, that understanding requires that this matter enter into experience. It is clearly what has remained most vivid from my own pass. Today, I would say that what had made the pass was a moment of turnaround – from precision to what is impossible to define.

In order to illustrate it, I take up the testimony of a passand who was nominated AS, which is very clarifying on this point. It is a dream; she dreams that the analyst will not arrive on time because he has a meeting. She wakes in order to say that there is no anguish.

“What falls”, says Julieta de Battista, “is the supposition of precision.” This phrase testifies to a change of relation to time, which ceases to provoke anguish; there is no such thing as the right time, there is no right time attributed to the analyst.

There is also this: that precision is no longer supposed. That precision is this effort all the way up to its own hollowing-out, all the way up to this point where one doesn't know, in the end, neither what one says nor what will be understood, this is something that escapes. A precision which encounters the point of its own turning around, its point of the impossible, of the impossible to define.

Translated by Sara Rodowicz Ślusarczyk

Pass and Witz,

Agnès Metton

If the pass can be an ‘absolutely deeply moving’ experience for the one who offers himself to it; if equally, the impact on the passers takes all its weight, for me the surprise came from the effect of the pass on the cartel itself.

The cartel has only an indirect relation to the passand’s saying since the testimony is mediated by the passers. However, the cartel is not without being vividly touched by the testimony, especially when some indices of the end of analysis and of the pass emerge. These two moments deserve to be distinguished from one another.

In every pass, we already find manifested an interest on the part of the cartel members in listening to the testimonies and their pleasure in working collectively on the very core of what makes them gather in the School. What is gathered from the treatment work and what is deduced from it comes to be realized, arouses everyone’s mobilization in the experience of psychoanalysis, which is, each time, so unique. Even the therapeutic effect, which is not the aim of the analytic act, is not disregarded.

But moreover, in the cases where there is a nomination, at least in the two cartels that have nominated some analysts and in which I have participated, an additional animation occurred. Each time, the cartel was stimulated and pushed to pursue an elaboration beyond the elements that were transmitted, to reconsider for example what the situation was regarding the knowledge that circumscribed jouissance, when the passand had not yet necessarily put it into a form – besides, if the question of the crossing of the horror to know had been treated by the passand in an intellectual way, in a way too ‘dogmatically normalized’, it is not sure whether it would have gained the cartel’s conviction. Whereas, precisely, it is from a glimpse that comes to shove, to astonish, that in a mix of intimate conviction and of collective elaboration, the idea is formed that there is a pass and there is something of a psychoanalyst, and this is deduced from experience. The decision to nominate that ensues brings some satisfaction to the cartel in a mode that is rather joyful, something that resonates with the subtitle of our Journées de l’École [Paris 24-25 November 2018].

But are we able to say exactly what was glimpsed? Of course, something from the articulations of the mystery of the treatment, something that was isolated from it and the way this was discernable and circumscribable; from some elements of the end of analysis that could be located or, some elements of the choice towards the desire of the psychoanalyst, that are often more difficult to discern. Beyond the content, let’s note the effect of what was glimpsed: it resonated with an effect of surprise. A surprise, for example, to see the signifier that fixes jouissance be extracted; it always comes as a surprise to see the reduction of analysis to something finally so small, a surprise again to see the incredible efficiency of that little thing in transforming a life, and when the subject reduces himself to it. And this surprise is invigorating.

Lacan told us in November 1975 that “this pass… all of a sudden [for the passand] puts in evidence, like a flash of lightning would do, a certain part of shadow in his analysis”, after having situated, from Heraclites, that the lightning demonstrates the principle of heterogeneity between things. These are the ricochets, the echoes, or the aftershocks of that lightning that strikes the cartel when it nominates a passand.

The lightning brings us back to the Proposition of 1967. “Who will thus see that my proposition is formed upon the model of the Witz of the role of the dritte Person?” As the dritte Person is the condition of validation, of authentication of the Witz, the cartel – because it is in the place of a third party – is the necessary element that allows for the sanction, for

97 Ibid.
the act of the pass. The testimony is addressed to the cartel beyond the exchange between passand and passers.

I spoke earlier about the pleasure the members of the cartel take in its functioning and also, elsewhere, of the vivacity that takes hold of the cartel when the conditions for a nomination are gathered. This can also be articulated using an analogy with the Witz because the Witz provokes pleasure. There is a satisfaction in having seen during a few flashes of lightning something that verifies a belief in the unconscious, something that confirms the inevitable and incurable aspects of the real; to have got a glimpse in the pass of the place of what is not in there, as well as: the “point of the Witz designates, and always sideways, what is seen only when we look elsewhere”. It is a satisfaction again based on the fact of almost touching via some fragments, of the way the passand accommodates both the unbearable and the fact of having to define a new desire from it. There is a pleasure also in feeling the desire of the cartel – that of the group and that of each member – a desire that consists in seeing that the knowledge about psychoanalysis continues on being woven. This makes it more intense, spurred on. This is because, if the testimony of the pass has transmitted something to the cartel, it is also clear that it still leaves something to be desired in the best sense of the term, which is that through it, it offers a supplement of desire. And this is the sense of nomination: a waiting, a hope for the expansion of the analyst’s desire, the wish that what the cartel heard emerge from the pass is pursued further as part of an elaborative progress and, this time, for the benefit of the whole School.

Translated by Chantal Degril

The pass and time

Frédéric Pellion

Among other benefits, the pass makes us feel that the idea that we could in any way measure a time of analysis – that is, according to one or other linear benchmark—is a false one.

This false idea goes hand in hand, it seems to me, with the illusion of a natural termination of analysis that would move by itself towards its end, towards its destination – other than to encounter the obstacles caused by the analysand, or the analyst, or by them both.

However, the accidents of individuals and the constraints of structure are two separate things.

I moreover note that the famous sequence described by Lacan in his text “Logical Time” (É, 161-175), if taken literally chronologically, can give credence to this false idea.

Yet we can be alerted by the term “sophism” which Lacan attaches to his title.

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99 Metton, A. Sur le vif du cartel de la passe, Echos n.11, Dec 2017
101 The references to Écrits (Lacan, J. Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 1966) are noted by É followed with the page number.
An implicit rule in our community is that everyone, and especially the AS, is given the responsibility of commenting on their own treatment, if they so wish.

Nevertheless, to support my remarks, I will attempt to present, then connect, two examples of the non-linearity of the time of analysis, which in two of the testimonies of the pass listened to by our ICG 2016-2018 seemed to me to be particularly convincing.

First testimony.

An especially salient feature, latency: at the time when the first analysis is reaching its end, a remark by the analyst indicates the possibility of the pass; then, for a long interim period—a time outside the treatment but not outside the transference—the signifier ‘pass’ goes through the nuances of interrogation; a second analytic sequence, with another analyst, these nuances subsequently reduced to their “colour-of-emptiness” (Écrits, 722), before finally, still some years later, after getting closer to the dispositif the analysand produces a thought splicing the signifiers of the symptom of entry to the signification of the act, and crosses the ford of the demand for the pass.

Retroactively, the signifier ‘pass’ will have thus oriented the future, both analysing and analytical, of the passand.

Second testimony.

It emphasizes something else, a kind of winding on one another of the moments of stasis, even of stopping, of the personal analysis and the stages of development102 of the desire of the analyst.

The time here lost is there gained, and actually, the sequence of separation with the last analyst puts into play the impossibility of agreeing on an equal measure of time.

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These two testimonies gave rise to a nomination.

This may not be perhaps entirely unrelated, in the order of will, to this assumed retroaction of the time of the analysis onto “lived time.”103

Now, the pass, as a form of time different from the non-time of the unconscious as well as from chronological time, induces, even precipitates, this retroaction.

It therefore sometimes participates in the first changing the value of the second.

Translated by Esther Faye

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102 In the strictly progressive sense that this word has in English, for example in the Preamble to the American Constitution: “in order to form a more perfect union.”

When the Cartel does not nominate

*Marina Severini*

There were no nominations of AS in the four Cartels of the Pass in which I participated. I know that I am in good company because this is what happens in the majority of Cartels, but it is not what I expected at the start of my experience in the ICG. I noticed the atmosphere of joy and a certain euphoria in my colleagues in the “happy Cartels” (that is the way I think of them) when they said that there had been a transmission and that they could reconstruct its passage: a contagious climate fortunately, but this is not the same thing as having experienced it directly.

The cartels that say “no” are the majority; we have known this for a long time. How to question this point, how to avoid it becoming a sort of routine to which we are now accustomed? And if one expects more from a Pass with a nomination – on the part of the AS, and the elaboration of the Cartel – what can be transmitted to the School about the experiences of the passes without nomination? What teaching? I am going to try to say what they have taught me.

1) Pass and end of analysis

The most frequent case seems to be that of undertaking the Pass after the end of analysis, and it was also thus in the Cartels in which I participated. Why does one think of doing the Pass after the end of analysis? When there is no nomination this fact is put more into relief, in some cases one could say that the Pass had been like a demand to the School, a sort of authentication, an implicit demand: have I really finished my analysis? And can I legitimately be an analyst? One case was an exception to this because the demand for the Pass was made before the end. What is interesting here is that in this case the experience in the procedure allowed the subject in question to perceive that the demand for the Pass had provoked the precipitation of the end (that is to say: since I am doing the Pass then I must finish the analysis), an end that the passage through the procedure had called into question. I think that one of the motifs of the confusion regarding what the pass and the end is all about comes from the difficulty of separating from the idea that the psychoanalyst is the product of a completed analysis. There are many citations in Lacan that contradict this idea and also many texts and well-articulated commentaries (a recent reference is the Pretext by J. De Battista, recently named AS), and besides, if the psychoanalyst were the product of an analysis, the procedure of the Pass would be absolutely useless! But if this idea is so persistent there must be a good reason for it.

2) Effects of the analysis and pass to the analyst

Almost all the testimonies have put into relief the positive changes due to the analysis: relief from anxiety, modifications with regard to symptoms, and new choices in life. One sees better after an analysis, and this is a good thing, but the Pass is not intended for that. I have heard testimonies that were focussed on the therapeutic success of the analysis. The interest (of the passand? of the passer? both?) in the positive effects of the analysis is marked by the presence of many words (a great number of meetings and a great desire to report to the Cartel the many details of the “historiole”). There are many words when the point cannot be circumscribed. But in fact what interests us is this point: the moment of the passage to the analyst. What can be said about this transformation, when and how does it happen, what horror of knowledge has to be moved beyond in order that psychoanalysis and the psychoanalyst are no longer ideals?
But I do want to add that I met passers who were equal to the task, really interested in the question of the being of the psychoanalyst.

What I have wished to make evident to you in this presentation are the problematic points that I extracted from my experience.

I conclude: what can be transmitted to the School about this experience of the Cartels that have not made a nomination? I think that their contribution consists in opening questions that the work of the School can try to clarify. The aspects that I have emphasised are not new, I repeat, these are facts that have been well known for a long time. Is there a risk, then, of considering them to be of little interest, something we have become accustomed to? Or are we able to let ourselves be surprised as if they were new? And to keep putting ourselves back to work – “Hard labour” (Lavorare stancamente) – said Pavese (the Italian writer and poet). But the alternative would be for us to sleep in comfort. So welcome to the Pass that helps us not to rest comfortably and to continue to ask ourselves “what is a psychoanalyst”?

Translated by Susan Schwartz

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FORTHCOMING EVENTS

First European Convention of the IF-SPFLF
July 12-14, 2019
Maison de la Chimie
28, rue Saint-Dominique, 75007 Paris

Theme
For the IF-SPFLF: “The saying of exiles”
For the School: “The School of cartels”

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Theme:
The Psychoanalytic clinic: the Borromean structure of sexuation

TARIF

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XI° Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF et VII° International Encounter of the School
July 10 – 14, 2020
Buenos Aires, Argentine

Theme:
For the Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF will be: “Treatment of the body in our times and in psychoanalysis”