

The paradoxes of desire ~ IF-EPFCL 2014

Preliminar 1, Cora Aguerre

When one moves into the desire of knowledge far enough, one pushes beyond the horror to knowledge.

The crossing over gives an account of the real at stake in the formation of the analyst.

Passage from analysand to analyst, from the desire of knowledge to the desire of the analyst,

The School engages with this junction

And may devote itself to clear.

The School functions as an incentive, forces us to provide reasons, to expose, to test, and not only through the pass but also in the work with our colleagues.

Translated by Leonardo Rodríguez

Prelude 2, Sidi Askofaré

At the same time that he tried to situate the excentric place—roughly speaking from the Seminar “The Formations of the Unconscious” to “Anxiety”—Lacan never ceased to maintain the paradox of desire. But if he only came to speak of the “paradoxes of desire”^[1] as such, it is by way of a detour through the moralists. Lacan took support from them in order to produce in the Freudian field a conception of desire all together new.

Indeed, until him, in psychoanalysis desire had for a long time been reduced to its Freudian guise of *Wunsch*—wish. What Lacan calls desire doubtlessly proceeds from this but also goes very much further. It is *Wunsch* certainly—and Lacan will deduce from this the thesis that the “dream is demand”,^[2] but it is also *das Begehren* and *die Begierde*, even—and this is the most surprising—*Lust*.^[3] A category as social—“desire

of the Other”—and erotic as it is ethical, that is applied as much to maintain the coherence of a body fundamentally devoted to death as to support subjective division—without which the *parlêtre* would be mad^[4]—or to appear at the level of the impossible relation between the sexes.

But beyond the paradox of desire—a trivial thesis—and the paradoxes referred to by the moralist, psychoanalysis principally brings to light its determination through the signifier that situates the field between truth and the act.

As a result, the paradoxes of the most dialectical category of psychoanalysis burst to be put in tension with some notions as important in experience as the Other, the Law, jouissance, satisfaction, object, demand, inhibition, interpretation, anxiety, defence, knowledge, resistance or reality.

Whence it will appear, perhaps, that the paradoxes of desire—desire which is to jouissance what truth is to the real—are no other than those of the signifier, of truth and of the subject (punctual and fading).

Translated by Susan Schwartz

^[1] J. Lacan, “Subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire”, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 2006, p. 687

^[2] J. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, trans. R. Grigg, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 2007, p. 129

^[3] J. Lacan, “Desire and its interpretation”, session of May 13, 1959, trans. C Gallagher, unpublished manuscript

^[4] J. Lacan, “The Formations of the Unconscious”, session of June 4, 1958, trans. C Gallagher, unpublished manuscript

Prelude 3, Andréa Brunetto

Lacan insists that the problematic of desire is its “ex-centricity in relation to satisfaction”.^[1] According to *The Formations of the Unconscious*, desire is ex-centric because it is always sliding, wanting at all costs an object that is never *That*.

The unconscious is an other place, foreign, which is manifested only through the blunder, the slit, as Lacan puts forward in his *Seminar XI*: a “larval zone”, “limbo”, “centre of the unknown”.^[2] The erratic condition is unique to the human being immersed in language, grounded by signifying traits. This is his radical alterity. Lacan maintains that the subject is only a subject of discourse, wrenched from his immanence, condemned to live in a sort of mirage that does not only make him speak about all that he lives, but makes him live in the game between the two poles.^[3]

The subject is established in one of his poles with signifiers, with his *Wunsch* and, in the other pole, where truth escapes, where it flees from the bottomless pit of a jouissance that continues. It is in this way that I understood “the game between two poles”. From this perspective, wouldn’t the paradox of desire be that of only being a semblant?

In Portuguese, we have a saying that is used in difficult moments: “if we stay there, the beast will take us, if we run, the beast will eat us”.^[4] “To take” (*pegar*) does not signify “to beat” as in Spanish, but “to restrain”. The beast either catches us or eats us. Zeca Baleiro, the renowned Brazilian composer and singer who has a rather Lacanian style in the way in which he plays with words, is going to complete this saying by making a word game with the English tongue: “*o bicho* [oh beast] come. Come, back, again.” It is a version that is a little different from “your money or your life”, for the sexual meaning is more marked.^[5] “To take someone” is an expression used for the sexual encounter, as it also means “to fuck”.

In connection with the verb “to take” (*pegar*), there is a hit by another Brazilian singer, Seu Jorge, whose song is currently played continually on the radio. The words tell the story of a man who is attracted to a friend of his wife. To complicate things, this woman is very beautiful, and feminine beauty touches his heart. Thus he lives a dilemma: “do I sin or don’t I sin?” He tells his story around this dilemma in the face of desire and questions himself on his position confronted with sin.^[6] In singing, he plays with the equivocal between “to sin” (*pecar*) and “to take” (*pegar*). In the words of this song, the word “to sin” (*pecar*) is present from beginning to end but sometimes Seu Jorge sings “*pego ou não pego*”, that is to say “do I take or don’t I take?” (Perhaps it is me hearing

this equivoque that doesn't exist? My Brazilian colleagues will be able to answer my question... or not?)

In the “sin” (*pecado*), *harmatia* in Greek, there is “lack”, as Lacan reminds us^[7]—in the taking [*pegada*] (*trait*)^[8], are we in the semblant of *That*?

Translation from Portuguese into French: Maria Vitoria Bittencourt

Translation from French into English: Susan Schwartz

[1] J. Lacan, *The Séminaire*, Livre V, *Les formations de l'inconscient*, Paris, Seuil, 1998, p. 338. “The Formations of the Unconscious”, unpublished manuscript, trans. C. Gallagher, session of April 23, 1958.

[2] J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. Ed. J-A Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1998, p. 23. Translation modified.

[3] See J. Lacan, *Seminar IX*, “Identification”, unpublished manuscript, trans. C. Gallagher, session of December 13, 1961.

[4] Translator's note (MVB): In Portuguese: “*Se ficar o bicho pega, se corer o bicho come*”. The verb “*pegar*” means “to catch”, “to take hold of”, “to grip”.

[5] Translator's note (MVB): In Portuguese, the verb “*comer*” is also used for the sexual act.

[6] Translator's note (MVB): In Portuguese, “to sin and to take” [“*pécher*” and “*prendre*” in French] have almost the same sound: *pecar* and *pegar*. You could translate the equivoque with *pécher* and *pêcher* [“to sin” and “to fish”] in the sense of being hooked.

[7] J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. Ed. J-A Miller, trans. Dennis Porter, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 258.

[8] Translator's note (SS): The translation of “*pegar*” into English via French is difficult here. In this text the French translation of the Portuguese is “*prise*”, which means taking or catching in the sense of a “*trait*”, that is a line or feature. The literal translation of “*pegada*” in English is “footprint”. I think that the link between the three languages is in the notion of the imprinting, or the taking, of a trait.

Prelude 4, Patrick Barillot

Of desires there are a great variety but desire to know what the unconscious could tell us about jouissance as castrated, absolutely not!

Lacan asserts in *Encore* that there is no such thing as a desire to know, this knowledge proper to the unconscious, and he adds, in his “Italian note”^[1], that all of us, the entire humanity, we are horrified of this knowledge.

Where psychotherapeutic practices only reinforce this horror of knowledge, the analytic offer promotes a desire for unconscious knowledge about sexual reality and castration. This knowledge, already there but encoded, is to be deciphered by the interpretation.

Beyond the deciphering, the analysis also invites a desire for knowledge proper to the psychoanalyst, one that has to be invented since unlike unconscious knowledge “it is not cut and dried”. ^[2]

This is what sets the psychoanalyst apart from the rest of humanity, this would be his mark, he to whom the desire for this knowledge that is proper to him would have come.

Translated by Susan Schwartz (reviewed by Radu Turcanu)

^[1] LACAN J., « Note italienne », in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 308

^[2] *ibid*, p. 310

Prelude 5, Carmine Marrasso

How can psychoanalysts sustain their desire, the desire of the analyst, with its paradoxes? The question is crucial and the “chance that analysis will continue to be at a premium on the market”,^[1] depends on it, as do the conditions for its very survival.

Freud was the first to have approached the question, as his writing and correspondence attest. And at the moment when he comforts us with a singular optimism in relation to the

fate of his invention, he credits the psychoanalyst with a “certain degree of readiness to accept a situation of solitary opposition”.^[2] Now, how to understand this “certain degree of readiness” if there is “nothing in man’s structure that predisposes him to psychoanalysis?”^[3] With Lacan, we advance. He aimed to awaken the analytic movement to the breakdown and deviations of a training that assured the analyst of “a routine with no problems [which] makes [him] comfortable”^[4] and his persistent critique has brought the resistances to psychoanalysis to the resistance to the psychoanalyst himself.

For a long time I believed that his completely new institutional event was a response to the Freudian fate. But if it is a matter of a “solitary opposition”, this is not only an opposition, another way of making the Other exist, but of putting into action the “desire of the analyst”, precious gain at the end of analysis. It implies, rather, a self-authorisation without the “assurance of the Other”,^[5] and not in the field guaranteed by the knowledge of the Other either, but in the field of the act. Thus a “certain degree of readiness” for the analytic act.

So “one act-oriens” oneself? “[...] all [the psychoanalyst] does is to be in the place of the actor, in so far as one actor is enough just by himself to hold the stage”.^[6] From this perspective, the paradoxes of the desire of the analyst would be nothing other than the “paradoxes of the analytic act”. This act “that we assume from the elective moment when the analysand passes to the analyst”,^[7] “to which the psychoanalyst seems to oppose the most frenzied miscognition”^[8] and of which “he has a horror”,^[9] “act-horr” [*acte-horr*], that fixes him in the place of “the reject of the aforesaid (humanity)”.^[10]

But if such a place is not desirable, how can the analyst desire it, continue to desire it? The decision to reinvent is necessary. It is in this way that I understand this “constraint”: “that each analyst is obliged—for he must be obliged—to reinvent psychoanalysis, from what he has succeeded in extracting from having been a psychoanalysand himself.”^[11]

Would it be possible that the School of the pass might sustain the wager of a decision, always contingent, with its scope of enthusiasm?

Translation from Italian into French: Irene Pagliarulo

Translation from French into English: Susan Schwartz

^[1]J.Lacan, “Note italienne”, *Autres écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 310. English translation: “Italian note”, trans. Cormac Gallagher, www.lacaninireland.com

^[2] S.Freud, “The Resistances to Psychoanalysis” (1925 [1924]), SE XIX, p. 222

^[3] *Correspondence S.Freud – L. Binswanger (1908-1938)*, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1992, p. 134.

[4] J.Lacan, *Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur Le psychanalyste de l'École*, Textes de référence EPFCL, www.champlacanian.net English translation: "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, p. 13.

[5] J.Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject in the Dialectic of Desire" (1960), *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.

[6] J.Lacan, *Le Séminaire Livre XVI, D'un Autre à l'autre*, Seuil, Paris, 2006, leçon du 4 juin, 1969, p. 350. English translation : *The Seminar Book XVI, From the Other to the other*, lesson of June 4, 1969, trans. Cormac Gallagher, www.lacaninireland.com

[7] J .Lacan, "*l'acte psychoanalytique. Compte rendu du Séminaire 1967-1968, Autres écrits*", Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 375.

[8] J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire Livre XV, L'acte psychanalytique*, inédit, leçon du 29 novembre, 1967. English translation : *The Psychoanalytic Act*, unpublished, lesson of November 29, 1967, trans. Cormac Gallagher, www.lacaninireland.com

[9] J.Lacan, Letter to the newspaper *Le Monde*, January 24, 1980.

[10] J. Lacan, «Note italienne», cit., p. 308. "Italian note" op cit.

[11] J. Lacan, «Sur la transmission de la psychanalyse» (1978), *La Psicoanalisi*, n° 38, Astrolabio, Roma, 2005, pp. 13-16.

Prelude 6, Martine Menès

Neither fear nor pity

But was it necessary to be a hero? Above all, if one is/was born a girl.

"Have I cried enough for being a girl!"

To which Ismene, in "true" girl fashion, replies: "You desire impracticable things".

Daughter of her father, Antigone shows him after death what the Law is, the true Law.

Under the pretext of the gods, she buries Polynices, "her good", her incestuous double, because "he is her brother". That's all.

No. He is also her nephew, the trace of the fault: affected blindness of her father before the predictions, a mother's blind love for her sons, all her sons.

"This victim, so terribly wilful" is never mute before the astounded Creon: "... of we two, it is she who would be the man if I allowed her to win with impunity". As inflexible as her father, roars the Chorus.

Difficult to conceive as woman, and yet she is (one), recognizing it only on her way to death,

lamenting being neither lover nor mother.

Besides.

Haemon can only join her in that outside place of the sexuation that imprisons her.

False Narcissus she looks at him in her lakes.

Wouldn't there be a desire that must be ceded in order not to cede one's desire?

Extracts cited from Sophocles' Antigone and Seminar VII of Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, lessons XIX and XXI.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

Prelude 7, Sonia Alberti

Paradox, from the Greek « para », is commonly translated as "against", and "doxa" as the true opinion. In his seminar of May 10, 1977, Lacan wonders if it would be possible to represent the paradox.[\[1\]](#)

In order to go a little further on this point, let's recall the paradox of the liar, which, in the sixth century BCE, raises the question in Epiminedes the Cretan's phrase: "All Cretans are liars". How could Epiminedes, in so far as he was Cretan, say that about Cretans?

Was he lying then, being Cretan himself? And if he lies, does he not then tell the truth? It is undecidable in terms of logic.

The paradox deals with what is undecidable. Lacan confirms this in his seminar “The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst” when, on the side of woman, he introduces non-existence on one slope, and the not-all on the other.^[2] Between the undecidable on the side of woman, and the contradiction that castration imprints on existence on the side of man, Lacan puts into circulation lack, fault, desire and the object *a*. As a consequence, he defines castration as “leaving something to be desired” and then affirms that it is because of the fact that it circulates and leaves something to be desired that we are in relation with the object *a*.

Now, the paradoxes of desire appear from this point: “The One dialogues all alone since it receives its own message in an inverted form”.^[3] Because the One dialogues all alone, the object *a*—which appears because of the circulation between the undecidable and the contradiction—is not only the object which causes desire, but is also the object of *jouissance*—a *jouissance* that is desexualized in the Freudian sense of the term in that it does not refer to the phallus.

Lacan noted this already when he constructed the fantasy in obsessional neurosis differently from that in hysteria: if in the former, the object is always metaphorized in reference to the phallus that veils it, in the latter, it is metonymized In the first case, the subject knows of the lack inscribed in the Other and does not want to see it in order not to be confronted with the undecidable; whereas in the second, “to try to abolish the difficulty that I designate under the name of the parasitism of the signifier in the subject”, the obsessional, if he aims at the degradation of the Other, does so in order “to restore primacy to desire”.^[4] In both cases, it is the possibility by way of what Freud called transference neurosis that can support the wager of being able to do without the Other, in opening ways for the appearance of the paradoxes of desire. But in both cases it is also clear that these paradoxes can only be unveiled at the moment when we recognize that what is parasitized [*paratisé*] by the signifier is, in reality, a Borromean knot^[5] which articulates RSI and involves the undecidable in which desire and *jouissance* are linked.

Translation from Portuguese into French: Elisabete Thamer

Translation from French into English: Susan Schwartz

^[1] « Les paradoxes sont-ils représentables ? [...] Δόξα [dóxa], c’est l’opinion vraie. Il n’y a pas la moindre opinion vraie, puisqu’il y a des paradoxes ». “Are paradoxes representable? Δόξα [dóxa], is the true opinion. There is not the slightest true opinion, since there are paradoxes”.

^[2] Lesson of June 1, 1972.

^[3] Lesson of May 10, 1977.

[4] J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, livre VIII, *Le transfert* [The Transference], Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 295

[5] « Ce *corps-de*, est parasité par le signifiant ; car le signifiant, s'il fait partie du Réel, si c'est bien là que j'ai raison de situer le Symbolique, il faut penser à ceci, c'est que cette *corps-de*, nous pourrions bien n'y avoir affaire que dans le noir. Comment reconnâtrions-nous, dans le noir, que c'est un noeud borroméen ? C'est de cela qu'il s'agit dans la Passe ». J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, livre XXIV, *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*), leçon du 15 février 1977

“This *corps-de* [body of] is parasited on by the signifier, for the signifier through it forms part of the Real, it is indeed there that I am right to situate the Symbolic, one must think of the following, which is that we might have dealings with the *corps-de* only in the dark. How could we recognize in the dark that it is the Borromean knot? That is what is at stake in the Passe”. J. Lacan, *The Seminar*, Book XXIV, *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*), lesson of February 15, 1977. Trans. Cormac Gallagher, unpublished.

Prelude 8, Marcelo Mazzuca

The paradoxes of the desire of the analyst

Our next rendezvous in Paris has put us on the track of desire and its paradox: how to circumscribe desire through interpretation if it is logically incompatible with speech? Answer: not without another desire.

This leads to a wide range of clinical problems that open onto a particular ethical consideration, that of situating the coordinates of the desire of the analyst, this “special class of desire that is manifested in interpretation”,^[1] this “postulate” at the base of all analytic formation.^[2]

It is well known that Lacan himself first formulated the question of the desire of the analyst at the precise moment that he was situating the paradoxes of desire.^[3] The topological formulation of desire in 1958 leads him inexorably to an ethics of the treatment that involves integrating “the Freudian conquests on desire” with a response “in act”.^[4]

Ten years of teaching later ends with the account of the structure of the analytic act. And they enable us in this case to have recourse to a vast range of references reflecting the various aspects of the function “desire of the analyst” and some algebraic concepts that support them.^[5] This recourse suggests a formulation: how can we say that the truth of every dream is in the realisation of a desire when it brings with it an “irrealisation” of this oneiric realisation. We could affirm that the meaning of the desire of the analyst is that of “realisation in act” because, being both an ethical and clinical operation, it is a notion that does not signify such and such a desire of such and such an analyst.

That is clear, but can we go so far as to maintain that this desire is exempt from paradoxes? What does the analyst do when faced with the paradoxical structure of desire? These questions refer to the clinic of the end of analysis and the pass and that opens the question of the links between desire and act, and also between jouissance and satisfaction that are sometimes correlative. For it is not enough to reach the end with the collapse of the truth of desire in the “I lie”, we also have to be able to situate the connection with the source of the drive and with the saying that names it. Even if this name were to be “Pinocchio”, that is not enough to situate the subject of the enunciation; it is equally necessary to verify if his heart is made of fantasy, and if his nose can really grow.

Translation from Spanish into French: Isabelle Cholloux

Translation from French into English: Susan Schwartz

[1] J. Lacan, (1962-1963) *Le séminaire, Livre X, L'Angoisse [Anxiety]*, Paris, Seuil, 2004, p. 68.

[2] J. Lacan, (1963-1964) *The Seminar, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York and London, W.W. Norton and Co. 1981, Lesson of January 15, 1964.

[3] J. Lacan, (1958) “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 617 (French numeration).

[4] *Ibid.* p. 615 (French numeration).

[5] J. Lacan, (1963-1964) *The Seminar, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York and London, W.W. Norton and Co. 1981, Lesson of January 15, 1964.

Prelude 9, Albert Nguyễn

A new desire

Some notations on the theme and a question: A new desire? What is the source of desire? The poet Reiner Kunze wrote about it plainly:

“The poem resides in the extent of its wonderment,

It is there that we go”.

Analysis wends its way from paradox to paradox, but in order to name, and even more “to rename anew the things of the world”, say F. Cheng, in responding to the unnameable, another name for the impossible: such is desire.

The subject is so prey to desire and its paradox that Lacan notes on page 558 of the Seminar *Desire and its Interpretation*: “Desire is at once subjectivity—it is at the very heart of our subjectivity, what is most essentially the subject—and at the same time it is its contrary, opposed to subjectivity as resistance, as paradox, a rejected kernel, refutable”.

Paradox of desire knotted to love and to the jouissance of the symptom.

The desire of the analyst comes from the act itself which both supports and dictates an ethic that governs the Saying, the One-saying, the Real. Crisscrossed threads, contrived, knotted, plaited like so many figures from which desire is deduced, not without guilt/cut [*coupabilité*],[1] in the sudden appearance of its cause.

A new desire that Lacan retranslated on the model of *Ein neues Subjekt*: it is new that there is a subject, and new that there is this desire that had been rejected. At the end and in what follows, this new desire is inscribed, is written, an effect of the resolution, of the reduction of the paradoxes of jouissance, of the paradoxes of love, and of the paradoxes of desire, because of the inexorable real. The desire of the analyst is a desire to know once the desire from knowledge and its love has fallen; this desire to know is the chance to give to the unknown the fullness that comes back to it; what remains is the unknown.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

[1] The neologism in French, “*coupabilité*” combines the words guilt, *culpabilité*, and cut, *coupe*.

Prelude 10, Silvia Migdalek

The paradox of desire and love

Playing with the delights of etymology and the dictionary, we read that the term ‘paradox’ comes from the Greek (*para* and *doxos*) and means ‘beyond what is credible’, and also refers to something opposed to ‘common opinion’. Currently the word ‘paradox’ has numerous meanings. Let us consider one of them, given the resonances it has with analytic practice: *a statement whose veracity or falsehood is unsayable*.

It is perhaps in the clinic of amorous life where the paradox of desire becomes singularly tense, shaping what we may also call the paradox of love. The latter, love – let it be clear from the start – is not desire: desire is its anchoring in the drive. Freud says that we are reluctant to conceive of love as another partial drive – *we believe* that we perceive in it an aspiration to a totality. The ego loves or hates, but the relation between the drive and the object is called fixation: the fixation to an autoerotic rim, or the perverse trait of neurosis. As a consequence love carries the ballast of its origins in the drive. When Freud establishes the foundations of his theory on love, he inverts the ‘common opinion’, which does not hit the target regarding the cause of love: one does not love because one desires; it is, rather, because one desires that one loves. Desire reveals that the structure is with a hiatus. Freud illustrates the point early under the guise of a mythical experience of satisfaction that inscribes the irreducible loss of the object whose result is the emergence of desire, the very first motion of a psychical nature. In the words of Lacan, in *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, at stake there is ‘an unfortunate start’.

The unsayable, *das Ding* as the non-predicable nucleus of the Other, does not allow any identification. The Thing, as the vacuum of the saying, will nest on everything that can be said. Thus, the logic of the not-all is introduced in the saying, and of course in all amorous discourse. This is the paradox of the love that aspires at the totality, since it does not want to know anything about castration or, to put it in Lacan’s terms, about the

impossibility of writing the sexual relation/proportion; yet, paradoxically, nothing makes so present this dimension of an impossible real than the amorous experience. Both in Freud and in Lacan we can find the use of this dimension as an original and fertile logical impossibility. That obscure 'object of desire', incompatible with speech, in amorous life, always appears with a certain dramatic tension: one is never more at the mercy of the other than when one loves... that is the tragicomedy of love...

The problematic question concerning the paradox of desire in the field of love opens the path to a large series of interesting articulations, one of which is the relation it has with what after Freud we call transference love. This is a modality of love that emerges in the transference, which Freud identifies as something 'unwilling to accept the interpretation', a recalcitrant and indomitable love, the erotomanic border of love that frequently appears in the clinic of some 'women of elementary passions'. One could think that in this case an impasse of the unconscious manifests itself.

In its dimension of repetition, transference love veils the object of the trauma. In its beginnings, transference evolves in the direction of identification. In this process, Lacan proposes that what must be at work is the analyst's desire, which leads precisely to the traversing of the plane of identifications, which does not take place without the analyst's desire as its operator:

In order to give you formulae-reference points, I will say—if the transference is that which separates demand from the drive, the analyst's desire is that which brings it back.[\[1\]](#)

Thus, this is a desire that aims at revealing the origin of all demand in the drive, initially veiled by transference love itself. This desire is not a pure desire, and Lacan names it as the desire to obtain 'absolute difference'. The question arises at that point as to how the subject experiences a crossing-over that is produced exclusively by an experience of analysis. In the testimonies of the pass it is verifiable that it is around the vicissitudes of the experience of love that decisive moments of inflection occur. At those moments the subject has to assume a position in the face of what of his desire and – to open a connection with another possible articulation of the topic – his *jouissance* has been elaborated in the analysis.

What articulations and differences could we establish between transference love and the Freudian ethical precept of the law of abstinence, and the analyst's desire? Undoubtedly they are not the same thing.

We might say that in the work of Lacan, from *Seminar XX* onwards, there appear a widening and a few new developments as to how he conceived this absolutely essential dimension of human experience. Perhaps we may summarize this movement as an extension in which the precedent continues to be true, but the new developments compel us to include new perspectives that in their ensemble represent a certain re-evaluation of love.

Our next encounter, therefore, will be the occasion to ascertain the new lines of tension derived from the teaching of Lacan in the 1970s. It is interesting to note how Colette Soler summarizes the new perspective in her book *Los afectos lacanianos*:

Love comes to reveal the impasses of the unconscious as knowledge which remains unknown, obscurely learnt and presenting an obstacle to the sexual relation. Love is an index, not of an intersubjectivity, but rather of an inter-recognition between two *speakingbeings*, made of two *lalanguages*.[\[2\]](#)

As from *Seminar XX, Encore*, there is a new approach to love: it becomes the sign of an affect of the unconscious. To conclude, I share with you the final paragraphs of that Seminar, so as to prepare the ambience for our Rendezvous of Paris, 2014:

[...] I will say that what is important in what has been revealed by psychoanalytic discourse – and one is surprised not to see its thread everywhere – is that knowledge, which structures the being who speaks on the basis of a specific cohabitation, is closely related to love. All loved is based on a certain relationship between two unconscious knowledges.

If I have enunciated that the subject supposed to know is what motivates transference, that is but a particular, specific application of what we find in our experience. I'll ask you to look at the text of what I enunciated here, in the middle of this year, regarding the choice of love. I spoke, ultimately, of recognition, recognition – via signs that are always punctuated enigmatically – of the way in which being is affected qua subject of unconscious knowledge.

There's no such thing as a sexual relationship because one's jouissance of the Other taken as a body is always inadequate – perverse, on the one hand, insofar as the Other is reduced to object *a*, and crazy and enigmatic, on the other, I would say. Isn't it on the basis of the confrontation with this impasse, with this impossibility by which a real is defined, that love is put to the test? Regarding one's partner, love can only actualize what,

in a sort of poetic flight, in order to make myself understood, I called courage – courage with respect to this fatal destiny.^[3]

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Translated by Leonardo Rodríguez

^[1] Lacan, J. (1977). *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*. London, Tavistock, p. 273.

^[2] Soler, C. (2011). *Los afectos lacanianos*. Buenos Aires, Letra Viva, p. 109.

^[3] Lacan, J. (1998 [1972-73]). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Book XX, Encore 1972-1973*. New York and London, Norton, p. 144.

Prelude 11, Antonio Quinet

Kalimeros for 2014

“Radiant Himeros triumphs here, the desire born from the gaze of the waiting bride in bed”, says the Greek chorus.^[1] Himeros is the brilliance of “victorious” desire, resolute

desire, which makes Antigone the desiring desired. Himeros is the flower of desire that blooms in the field of the drive between two deaths. The heroine that Sophocles created is the paradigm of desire in act and she is the object cause of desire (particularly for Haemon, Creon's son).

Himeros comes from the Greek verb *himeirein*, "to desire". In mythology, Himeros is a god, twin of Eros, both of them present at the birth of Venus, the goddess of beauty. While Eros is the feeling of love, Himeros is sexual desire, properly speaking. Himeros is not desire as lack, aspiration or void of satisfaction, but rather the state of desire, of sexual excitation; desire in its assertiveness, becoming visible in the being-for-sex. Here, it is not about desire with impediments that are a consequence of its articulation with the Law, desire that is unsatisfied, forestalled or impossible, as in neurosis. This is not desire in its roaming, which leaps from object to object and is never satisfied because it is the metonymy of lack. Himeros is desire in its positivity, an assertive desire, desire in act – the foundation of the desire of the analyst.

Beginning with Lacan, psychoanalysis and art allow us to grasp the distinction between desire as lack, equivalent to the minus phi ($-\phi$), and desire caused by the object *a*. The former is articulated with the law and impossibility; the latter with jouissance and the satisfaction derived from the presence of the object of surplus jouissance [*plus-de-jouir*]. Himeros is one of the names of desire in its assertiveness.

Beyond demand, here is desire and its real of jouissance: in the scopic field "desire on the side of the Other" [*desir à l'Autre*],^[2] in the vocative field, "desire of the Other" [*desir de l'Autre*]. The gaze and the voice are the two modes [*effaçons*]^[3] whereby the subject vanishes in order to allow desire to shine.

The artist raises musical notes to the dignity of the voice as surplus jouissance [*plus-de-jouir*] – it is a "surplus voice" [*plus de voix*] that makes itself heard. Just as the painter throws on the canvas a "surplus gaze" [*plus de regard*]. The artist's act, realised in his resolute desire, puts into the work of art this something "of himself" that hardly belongs to him, that escapes him: the object *a*. There, the analyst must allow the artist to teach him.

The dawning of the light of day coming out of night's darkness was a desired light for the Greeks. That is why the word for day is *himera*, as we have learned from Plato. "Good-day", "*kalimera!*", is literally, "Beautiful day". Based on this, Lacan proposes a new salutation: "*Kalimeros!*" – "Good-day and Beautiful desire!"

Kalimeros for 2014!

Translation from Brazilian into French: Elisabete Thamer

Translation from French into English: Susan Schwartz

[1] Translator's note: In the Penguin Classics translation of *Antigone* by Robert Fagles, these words are rendered: "Love alone the victor—/warm glance of the bride triumphant, burning with desire!"

[2] Translator's note: See *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, session of March 11, 1964. In Alan Sheridan's English translation, "*desire à l'Autre*" has been translated as "*desire on the part of the Other*" (p. 115, italics in the original).

[3] Translator's note: "*Effaçon*" is a neologism created by Lacan. It suggests both "*effacer*", to erase, and "*façon*", a style, a way of behaving. See "*Radiophonie*", *Autres Écrits*, pp. 427 and 434.

Prelude 12, Claude Léger

Desire caught again by the tail

During the dark years of the Occupation, Lacan and Picasso were in the same boat, the one called "Work, Family, Fatherland ... and tightening the belt."

They are also in the same photograph, taken in March 1944, by Brassai at the home of Michel Leiris, on the occasion of a performance among friends of Picasso's play *Le désir attrapé par la queue* [*Desire Caught By the Tail*]. If at the time Picasso was catching desire by the tail, it was because he was hard up for money [*il tirait le diable par la queue*].

Some time before this, Lacan had seen, in Saint-Paul-de-Vence, an installation by Prévert of match boxes within match boxes, a collection which, according to Lacan, was paradigmatic of sublimation, seeing that it was designed with discards elevated by

accumulation to the dignity of the Thing. André Breton wrote: “Every bit of debris we come across must be regarded as a precipitate of our desire.”

In 1941, the year Picasso wrote his play, he painted “Bust of a Woman in a Hat”, in which the upper and lower halves of the face were so oriented as to be diametrically opposed, producing the illusion of movement, like in a blurred photograph.

“I do not seek, I find.” Such was Picasso’s maxim, which Lacan cited numerous times. Indeed, he had found the *Minotaure* without ever having gotten lost in the labyrinth, this Picassian figure having opened up perspectives much wider than those of the academism of avant-garde, which had served as his springboard.

In 1978, Lacan ended by stating that he was, in fact, not finding, but he was, nevertheless, continuing to seek. Among his questions, there was one that is of particular interest to us: why does desire pass into love?

Translated by Devra Simiu

Prelude 13, Manel Rebollo

What does speech desire?

What does desire signify? What does this word want to mean?

Put like this, with these words the question itself implies a desire of saying, a “wish to say” which assures that it is there, in the interstices of language where desire lives.

Even the name that Freud assigns it in German, *Wunsch*, does not arrest it in a signification; with *Begehren*, he finds another term, which, for all that does not exhaust its meaning. So here we have the secret of its indestructibility. One has to locate something to destroy it; and desire’s delocalization is obvious, taking up its residence, its *Dasein*, its presence, in the space between two signifiers. There is no place for desire in consciousness, only in the failure [*insuccès*] of the attempt through which it reveals itself as a not-knowing that knows [*insu qui sait*][\[1\]](#).

Lacan tried to locate it in various ways:

Through writing: at the level of the fantasy, between the line of enunciation and that of the statement, in his graph of desire; and again, between the “all” on the masculine side and the “not all” on the feminine side in the formulas of sexualization.

Through nomination: in a route, which passes rea-son-ably [*rai-son-ablement*] through *das Ding*, design, disbeing [*desêtre*]; he then tracks through new terms such as object *a*, surplus jouissance [*plus-de-jouir*], and the metonymic one, etc., through which he strolls about like a lizard in the hedgerows of the saying, losing his tail in each substantial modality of jouissance.

The product of language and the cause of discourse, every *parlêtre* tries to make do with it in his symptom. Thus, articulated in speech – but not articulable – in its playful wanderings among what is said it allows itself to be loved by subjects.

How then to catch it? Solely by the detour of interpretation, this saying of the analyst without meaning [*sin-sontido*]^[2] that will allow the desire of the subject to “resonate” [*raisonner*] within a fleeting moment of knowledge in the locus of truth. So that this knowledge stops being the truth. There we have its destiny.

Translated by Esther Faye

^[1] The punning of “*insu qui sait*” in French cannot be reproduced successfully in English.

^[2] The neologism “*sin-sontido*” plays with the equivocation in Spanish between sense – “*sentido*” – and sound – “*sontido*”.

Prelude 14, Ricardo Rojas

Desire-of-knowledge and Entzweiung of the Subject*

“Such, at least, is the way traced by neurosis for the psychoanalyst so that, in truth, by its repetition he can bring it to an end(....) This is something he could not accomplish except by supposing that *désêtre* (disbeing) is nothing but the desire-of-knowledge.” Jacques Lacan^[1]

The syntagma desire-of-knowledge introduces paradoxes. In The Symposium^[iii] what is at stake in the desire-of-knowledge is the agalma, which can be read with the clues: being-of-knowledge and being-of-truth.^[iiii] If the outcome is an effect of truth, it marks the primacy of the signifier where desire is a desire-of-knowledge, “aroused by a cause connected with the formation of a subject,”^[v] with its unfolding effect – Entzweiung – between being-of knowledge and being-of-truth, between the “I think” and the “I am”. Between knowledge and truth there is a hole, the object “a”, because even though the being-of-truth is the aim, the agalma, this trace that the analyzand follows in his analysis, is impossible to reach. The topology of the subject in his relations with these three terms:

The “First Version of the Proposition of 9 October on the Psychoanalyst of the School”^[iv] situates the analyst at the level of the “s” of pure signification that can only be determinable by a displacement which is desire, and where there is no other choice than it becoming the desire of the Other in its pure form as desire-of-knowledge. The function of the agalma of the *Subjet-supposed-to-knowledge* then is the way of centering what is at stake in the choice of knowledge in the moment of the pass, and stressing that the not-knowing is central.

The plus-de-jouir,^[vi] is what answers the loss of jouissance whence was engendered an animation that is unfettered when joined to the desire-of-knowledge. “The truth is *pure* desire-of-knowledge” but the effect of thought comes under suspicion, because thought is not only the question posed regarding the truth of the knowledge – the great Hegelian step. The Freudian advance is to outline it as that which impedes access to knowledge, the point of failure of the “I don’t know” from where the unconscious emerges as a *desire of knowledge* with its dimension of the unformulable, just like in Freud’s dream “he didn’t know”. The truth that psychoanalysis interrogates in the unconscious as “*failure* creator of knowledge”, the point of origin of the desire-of-knowledge, of a censored knowledge, is nothing other than correlate of that failure. In the study of the relations between knowledge and truth, from the time he distinguished demand from desire, what Freud points to – Lacan tells us – is the designation of a place of incidence of a particular desire, the point at which sexuality comes into play as fundamental in the domain of the desire-of-knowledge.

The desire-of-knowledge[vii] does not lead to knowledge; rather it is the hysteric's discourse that leads to knowledge. It is she who animates a man with the desire-of-knowledge. Whereas it is as object "a" that the analyst occupies the position in the discourse, that is to say, he is present as cause of desire for the subject, offering himself as the target of the analytic operation – crazy, we could say, paradoxical – in as much as the subject commits to follow the trace of a desire-of-knowledge that has nothing to do with knowledge.

On the side of the analysand there is more a horror of knowledge" [viii], than desire-of-knowledge which makes it different from the desire of man as desire of the Other. To the desire-of-knowledge is then attributed the desire to invent knowledge.

That is why the passant testifies to being in the service of the desire-of-knowledge even without acknowledging what he brings; the same happens for the passeur who interrogates. A risk for both[ix] is that this knowledge is constructed from their own harvest. Because in other knowledges, such knowledge would not be given a place, it is rather this that makes one doubt that the knowledge of the passant had emerged. This is why, Lacan tells us, that it is necessary for a passeur to listen to it. That is, if one succumbs to the weight of other knowledges – for example, succumbs to the temptation of making what has been heard into doxa – rather than preserving the weight of the unknown, it ends up in a belief that the knowledge has not been barred. Hence the answer of the Cartel could be that they are not convinced of the end. Perhaps, to avoid this Verleugnung, it might be necessary for the participants in the Cartel of the Pass "to belong" [x] like the passeurs, to that moment of the pass, so that this particular knowledge that is outside the frame of other established knowledges can be listened to. And here we return to the epigraph at the beginning in which désêtre (disbeing) is nothing other than the desire-of-knowledge, (of knowledge) of the hole, hence the parenthesis introduced by Lacan, which we write (a).

Translation by Gabriela Zorzutti

NOTES:

*This Prelude is a reminder of the teachings of Lacan following the traces of this syntagma desire-of-knowledge

[i] Text dated February 3, 1969, Of a Reform in its hole, unpublished, Version of Patrick Valas.

[ii] In Seminar VIII, *The Transference*, Lacan sets out to decipher Plato's *Symposium*, where he deduces the relationship of knowledge to the *agalma*.

[iii] It is in Seminar XII, *Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis*, that Lacan provides these clues which will reappear in the summary of his teaching in the same seminar and in Seminar XIII (lesson of 04/20/1966), in which he comments on the summary. .

[iv] See Lacan's text "On a purpose" (*Ecrits*, 2006, p. 303) which serves as punctuation, in which he reviews the work on topology that he developed in Seminar XII, *Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis*, a seminar that along with the following one, makes precisions regarding the subject to which the conceptualization of psychoanalysis refers.

v In this text, which appeared in *Autres Ecrits* (Seuil 2001), Lacan develops the relations between the subject-supposed-to-know and the *agalma*, with respect to the end of analysis.

[vi] It is in Seminar XVI, *From an Other to the other*, that he develops the notion of plus-de-jour. During the entire seminar he tries to clarify what the knowledge, in the analytic experience, concerns.

[vii] Seminar XVII, *The Other side of Psychoanalysis*, where he examines the relations of knowledge and truth in the discourses.

[viii] It is in Seminar XXI, *The-names-of-the-Father/The non-dupes err*, that he clarifies the relations with the horror of knowledge.

[ix] 1974-05-08 Note that Jacques Lacan addresses personally those who were susceptible to being designated *passants*, Published in *Analyse freudienne presse*, 1993, n° 4, p. 42.

[x] A Heideggerian expression developed by Beatriz Maya in one of her elaborations of her experience as *passant* and *porteur*, "*Lo que pasa en el pase*" (What passes in the pass) #1, Publication of the EPFCL-ALN

Translator's note: The graphic has the word 'knowledge' on the right and "truth" at the bottom.

Prelude 15, Beatriz Zuluaga

Ethics of desire

“In the dream it was evident that the girl had been many years in front of that infinite window trying to finish the bunch, and that she was in no rush because she knew that death was in the last grape”
Of love and other demons
Gabriel García Márquez

Continuing this sequence of *Preludes* that precedes our Meeting in July, it is a fact that in reflecting on the theme that will bring us together for the VIII Meeting of the SPFLF, several paths have been opened up, different ruptures in the horizon of desire that are articulated to that “undecidable” which constitutes the very core of psychoanalysis: the analytic act, the end of analysis, jouissance, love, the relation between the sexes, and of course the object *cause*, just to name a few. The *Preludes*, like Saint John’s finger, point to a beyond, invite us to push “against”, to avoid the “doxa”, betting on that which seems of no interest to humanity. Regarding this, Freud tries, from his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1915-17), Part II, “Wish-fulfilment”, about the dream, to transmit to his listeners the novelty of his discovery. But if the nightmare and the anxiety dream exist, where is the wish fulfillment Dr. Freud? Lay critics, Freud tells us, are keen to show him that displeasure is constantly knotted to oneiric activities, rather than the pleasure obtained from a desire denied in wakefulness. But behind the manifest content there is distortion and censorship; this is the novelty, Freud insists. Yet, what Freud showed the world, the novelty of his discovery that pointed to *unsatisfied or impossible* desire, heir of a mythical and unforgettable *satisfaction*, is of no interest to humanity. “Human beings, as you know, have an instinctive tendency to defend themselves from intellectual novelty.^[1] There is no interest in the new, and even less is there a desire to know about what the real entails, Lacan will say later.

But in spite of this, the “paradoxes of desire” have already reached a first elaboration in this sequence of *Preludes*; they foretell of a desire to say, or rather to half-say something about that real, product of our experience of knowledge. The real stalks our formation; not to take it into account could loosen the ties that allow this experience to be “distinguished from therapeutics, which is not only a distortion of psychoanalysis through relaxing its rigor”.^[2]

Lacan always warned us, “Knowledge is not made for humanity, for [humanity] does not desire it”.^[3] Hence it is expected of the psychoanalyst to subtract himself, to know how to be that remainder of humanity. Concluding then: our true paradox is that of sustaining a desire which is neither articulable, nor nameable, for it only emerges in the paradoxes of the analytic act itself, in that space where we will gather together to make the bond of

the School. Let us then hope for “satisfaction at the end” in the possible elaborations that will follow these Preludes, satisfaction that Lacan knots to the end of the experience for this “is no more than to have encountered that limit in which the problematic of desire is raised”.^[4] This problematic is linked to our human condition, to a fundamental relation with death, for it confronts us with a tragic freedom, that of Oedipus, the one of having to face the consequences of having “known [*sabido*] about desire”.

The RV awaits us in Paris. We still have time to develop, to *a*-pproach, the theme that calls us. A RV that makes a new paradox, for in *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* Lacan raises the question: “what happens each time that the bell of desire rings for us? Well one does not approach it and for the best reasons”. Let us then go “against”, let us get closer to it, for we count on the desire that up to now has brought us together, despite the paradox implied in sustaining and speaking about the “undecidable”.

Translation by Gabriela Zorzutti

^[1] Sigmund Freud, “Wish-Fulfilment”, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Lecture XIV, SE XV: 214.

^[2] Jacques Lacan, “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, 1-13.

^[3] Jacques Lacan, “*Note italienne*”, *Autres Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, 308.

^[4] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-60*, trans. D. Potter, London, Routledge, 1992, 300.

Prelude 16, Susan Schwartz

Of Desire and Death

In 1947 a beautiful young woman, considering herself an unworthy bride for her husband to be, jumped to her death from the 86th floor of the Empire State building. She landed, seemingly unbroken, on the roof of a parked car. A photo was published in *Life* magazine soon after, and the image was seen to represent “death’s violence and its composure”

as she “reposes calmly in the grotesque bier her falling body punched into the top of the car”. The image was reproduced many times in different contexts including by Andy Warhol in “Suicide (Fallen Body)”, 1962.[1] It is in the tradition of the much-reproduced death mask of the beautiful, anonymous woman, *L'inconnue de la Seine*, who drowned, presumed suicide, in the late nineteenth century. The mask, with its enigmatic smile inspired art and literature; it was an erotic ideal of its time.[2]

In 1846, Edgar Allen Poe wrote, “The death of a beautiful woman is, unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the world.[3] “Poetical”, because for him, a poem is only a poem to the extent that it excites; in its knotting of beauty, desire and melancholy, the death of a beautiful woman lures, fascinates but also disturbs. Why this effect? Lacan will say in Seminar VI, *Desire and its Interpretation*, “the object of the fantasy is the alterity, image and pathos, through which an other takes the place of what the subject has been deprived symbolically”: the phallus.[4] This provides the frame for his interpretation of the function of Ophelia in *Hamlet*, because for Hamlet, she is the conscious object of his fantasy and the “barometer” of his relation to his desire. Lacan speaks of her as “one of the most fascinating creations of the human imagination”,[5] one of the most captivating and most disturbing [*les plus troubles*].[6] For him she is a creature of flesh and blood whose suicide he terms “ambiguous”. [7] There is no easy relation between beauty, desire and death: the beautiful suicide has something of the uncanny about her, and something of the fetish too.

As phallus-girl, Ophelia is the object of Hamlet’s desire; as exteriorised phallus, signifying symbol of life, he rejects her and she is only reintegrated into the fantasy “at the price of mourning and death”. [8] In the death that produces a real hole she becomes the impossible object that reinstitutes her value as object in desire. [9]

For Lacan, *Hamlet* is the tragedy of desire and mourning, a mourning that demonstrates the closeness of the links between the registers of the real, the imaginary and the symbolic. [10] The relation of desire and death is paradoxical. Desire attaches the subject to life in its quest for more being, yet death is its condition: the corpsification the subject suffers as a consequence of its dependence on the signifier. “[D]esire is borne by death” says Lacan, and that is the one and only meaning of life. [11]

[1] <http://kottke.org/08/07/the-most-beautiful-suicide>

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L'Inconnue_de_la_Seine

[3] Edgar Allen Poe, “The Philosophy of Composition”: <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/poe/composition.html>

[4] Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre VI, Le désir et son interprétation*, Paris, *Éditions de la Martinière et Le Champ Freudien Éditeur*, juin 2013, p. 370 (Lesson of 15.4.59). Translation in English by Cormac Gallagher can be found at: <http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/>

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 291 (Lesson of 4.3.59).

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 357 (Lesson of 8.4.59).

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 292 (Lesson of 4.3.59).

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 380, 382 (Lesson of 15.4.59).

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 396-97 (Lesson of 22.4.59).

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 399 (Lesson of 22.4.59).

[11] Jacques Lacan, “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power”, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, pp. 536-37/642.

Prelude 17, Colette Soler

Desire caught by ...

While I was busy with other things, I had the crazy thought that desire “caught by the tail” does not take us very far – apologies to Picasso from whom I have borrowed the phrase. Not much further than the bed, the space of the embrace. For whoever wishes to go further, it must be caught in a different way. *Mais comment?* [But how?] “Just like that: “*mécomment*”.[1] This “*mécomment*” calls up speech and its topology, and entirely refutes any attempt at organo-dynamism, past or present, that of Henri Ey or that of neuroconductivism. Organo-dynamism is precisely what takes man in general by his organism and thus desire in particular by the tail, believing that it is “by the organ that the Eternal feminine lures you upstairs” as Lacan says pricelessly. This organ was sung, even bellowed, in the staffrooms of Lacan’s time. Those were still good times for psychiatrists who, since then, have lost their organ, I mean their voice, and for all I know the staffrooms

don't sing much any more. This is because the new organo-dynamism, even worse than yesterday's, does not sing nor does it concern itself with desire but rather with what keeps every organ and everyone in good order.

Psychoanalysis is alone in still caring about desire and we are proud of this. Only, to desire is to be in "imminence" of castration. Whence the alternation of phases between the pleasure of the quest that contributes so much to the feeling of life, and the anxiety that brings back the real. Who then will deserve the name of "desiring *par excellence*"? Not the neurotic in any case.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

[1] *L'étourdit, Scilicet* 4, p. 27. Translator's note: "*mais comment*" and "*mécomment*" are homophones in French. "*Mécomment*" is not a word, although the prefix "*mé*" denotes the negative. The emphasis here seems to be on the nonsense of what is heard in what is said.

Prelude 18, Marc Strauss

Extreme platitude or witticism of the real?

This subject had at first spoken of his father, a man of admirable intelligence but who drank more than was reasonable: an alcoholic. He had then spoken of his beloved, also of admirable intelligence, but who ate more than was reasonable: a bulimic. When invited to say what he did that was more than reasonable, he responded: "I masturbate". Finally questioned about the person who made that judgement, he concluded, rather uncomfortably, "Well, me ..."

Thus he confirmed that for him, as for everyone, the "I" who does and the "I" who says are not always in agreement about what is reasonable, even when they are inseparable ... Is this then the paradox of desire, as an essential point of impasse in all histories, that one can do nothing but speak about. A paradox that would be better for us to accept in the end, so that we can get around it all the better.

Can this confusion be the starting point of another outcome of the analysis, where the cause of desire is recognized in the absolute singularity of its reality as remainder? If the effect is no longer one of joui-sens, the analysand's relation to desire is changed. Where will that take him? Moreover, isn't there another paradox in wishing to take up this place

of the analyst-remainder? Lacan responded to these questions by changing the status of knowledge, lightened through the laughter that returns to it (cf. *Télévision* with “gai savoir [“gay science”] and “Plus on est de saints, plus on rit” [“the more saints, the more laughter ...”])[1].

The theme of the approaching *Rendezvous* will enable us to exchange our points of view on psychoanalysis, which starts with the analysis of symptoms, the paradoxes of desire that are so painful to bear, in order to end in the founding of the desire of the analyst. And to the satisfaction that we release in this subject by unknitting his symptoms in the proper way, we will also add our pleasure in progressing together in the development of this proper way.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

[1] See *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*. Trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 16 and 22.

Prelude 19, Celeste Soranna

*Strange stars stare at the Earth,
They are the colour of iron and wander in desire,
Searching for love with incandescent arms,
And reaching the cold of the air.*
Élise Lasker Schüler

Of desire in spite of everything

No matter on what level we are in the graph, no one can declare desire, and all consideration or conceptual articulation can easily resound as a predicate. “What is desire if desire is the desire of the Other?” [1]

Lacan returns to this point on several occasions in the course of his work, and he interrogates this point each time as if it were the first. As if each time he were on the point of inventing something different, of elaborating new formulae, in order to subtract what does not come from the desire of the analyst (or what does not come every time): neither by the door of sexuation, nor by the exit door already paradoxically open. Let’s think about the “quantum formulae of sexuation” [“les formules quantiques de la sexuation”][2]. For the poetry of the third millennium, as for the desire of the analyst, a “system of anti-fragility” [“système d’anti-fragilité”] should be invented in order to safeguard the paradox.

If the poetry of the third millennium is defined as a “fragile enigma” [“énigme fragile”][3], to the extent that it escapes the grasp of the saying, desire is sustained from paradoxes.

Prelude 20, Sol Aparicio

To die, to sleep; to sleep, perchance to dream... (Hamlet)

A fundamental desire inhabits sleep and is satisfied in the dream: the desire to sleep. A well-known doctrinal point established in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, becomes suddenly for Lacan the greatest enigma of the dream mechanism.[1] Why didn't Freud speak of a need to sleep, rather than of a desire? And why is it only Lacan who is surprised by that? The body and its jouissance arrive on the scene at that point: “the essence of sleep is the suspension of the body's relation to jouissance.”[2] When the body is enjoying, we no longer sleep. However, when we are sleeping, we dream. The body that sleeps is certainly unplugged from language which “fits out” jouissance,[3] but not completely; the dream's knitting remains possible.

The need to sleep? Yes, but... “the needs of speaking beings are contaminated by the fact of being involved in an other satisfaction.”[4] Sleep is involved in the satisfaction that the dream provides. Now, isn't it “incredible that the power of the dream has gone as far as making a corporeal function of sleep and desire”?[5]

Here, Lacan follows Freud very closely. 1. To dream is an activity that aims at *aLustgewinne*, a surplus enjoyment. 2. The dream only functions to protect sleep. 3. “What is it about the dream dependent as it is on the unconscious, that is, on the structure of desire, that would be able to disturb sleep”? This is a question credited to Freud.

In reply, Lacan advances this hypothesis: jouissance is in the very ciphering that the dream work brings into play. The more it ciphers, the more it enjoys and the more it disturbs sleep. However, this does not take us very far. We stop dreaming when we fall into a deep sleep. “Sleep remains protected from jouissance.” It may continue, with the dream's complicity, which stops just at the appointed time.

“*El sueño de la razón produce monstruos*,” said Goya. Namely, “the dream of reason...”; but also, “the sleep of reason...” *El sueño*: the Spanish tongue speaks thus of the dream's complicity with sleep. *El sueño* is the signifier of the desire to sleep, the one that says: “we only wake so as to go on sleeping”!

Sleep is thus extended for the parlêtre. It is “not that his body needs more sleep than others,” but that “the imaginary sleeps;” there is in the imaginary “something which

requires that the subject sleep.” The imaginary, besides, is that: “the prevalence given over to a need of the body to sleep.”[6]

When, then, will there be an exit from sleep?

The analytic discourse was born from its break from the sleep of hypnosis. Psychoanalysis, born from an awakening! The awakening that implies a desire other than the one to sleep has appeared. A desire that lets itself be questioned by the jouissance that disturbs.

Translated by Esther Faye

[1] *Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, p. 57.

[2] *Séminaire XIX, ... ou pire*, Seuil, p. 234.

[3] *Seminar XX, Encore*, p. 55.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 51.

[5] *Séminaire XX1, Les non-dupes errent*, 20 November 1973, unpublished.

[6] *Ibid.*, 19 March 1974.

Let's see what Henri Meschonnie says on the subject of poetry in *Celebration of Poetry* [*Célébration de la poésie*][4]: “For a poem, it is necessary to learn to refuse, to work on a whole list of refusals. Poetry changes only if we refuse it. As the world only changes through those who refuse it”.
Saying no in order to consent to what?

If desire does not coincide with what is true either, as Demosthenes shows us in one of his maxims, then, paradoxically, to say no to misleading love – love as semblant of knowledge – can signify consent in order that psychoanalysis continue to exist through a different love, a love that emerges from the discourse of the analyst.

Perhaps, but there is no love that is new, different. Let's also remove the perhaps – we say there is nothing to do with the “wanting to know nothing about it” particular to each of us in relation to the horror, but... Yes there is a but. We mustn't forget desire as objection (to jouissance, to impotence, to imposture...), but, again, psychoanalysis aims at a love that really points beyond the lure... Until proven otherwise.

Translated from Italian to French by Nathalie Dollez

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[1] Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XXI, Les non-dupes-errent*, Lesson of April 9, 1974.

[2] *Ibid.*: "...In Rome ... I was asked questions, namely if the quantum formulae – because there are four of them – could well be situated in a way that had some points of correspondence with the formulae of the four discourses. This is ... this is not necessarily unproductive, since what I evoke, finally, is that the little a comes to the place of the x of the formulae that I call: the quantum formulae of sexuation".
« ...A Rome... on m'a posé des questions, à savoir, si les formules quantiques, parce que elles son quatre, pourraient bien se situer quelque parte d'une façon qui aurait des correspondances avec les formules des quatre discours. C'est... c'est pas forcément infécond, puisque ce que j'évoque, enfin, c'est que le petit a vienne à la place de x des formules que j'appelle: formules quantiques de la sexuation.»

[3] Giovanni Dotoli, *La poésie française au début du 3eme millénaire ou l'énigme fragile*, Schena Editore, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Brindisi, 2002.

[4] Henri Meschonnie, *Célébration de la poésie*, pp. 252-254. "Pour un poem, il faut apprendre à refuser, à travailler à toute une liste de refus. La poésie ne change que si on la refuse. Comme le monde ne change que par ceux qui le refusent"