

VII Encontro Internacional da IF-EPFCL
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O que responde o
psicanalista? Ética e clínica
¿Qué responde el
psicoanalista? Ética y clínica
Que répond le psychanalyste?
Éthique et clinique
Che cosa risponde lo
psicoanalista? Etica e clinica
What does the psychoanalyst
respond? Ethics and clinics



VII Meeting of the IF-SPFLF

WHAT DOES THE PSYCHOANALYST RESPOND? ETHICS AND CLINICS

July 2012, 6th - 9th

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PRELIMINAR 2: GETTING USED TO THE REAL, CLINIC AND ETHICS Carmen Gallano

For Lacan, the clinic and ethics are defined in relation to the real. From his first encounter with the patient, the analyst is confronted with the clinic, the real being that which is impossible to bear for this subject. As for ethics, Lacan signaled from the first lesson, page 11 of his Seminar *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*: “Insofar as Freud’s position constitutes progress here, the question of ethics is to be articulated from the point of view of the location of man in relation to the real”.

In practice, the analyst’s first response—with his saying [*dire*] and his making said [*faire dire*]—aims at the inclusion of that real in an analysable symptom: a knot of sense enjoyed in its signifiers which in the unconscious carry a *jouissance* outside sense.

Only when the painful *jouissance* of the symptom incorporates the enigma of sense, does the real of the clinic open the way to the experience of the unconscious. In effect the emergence of the question for the subject —“what does this malaise mean?”—will push him to want to decipher it in the signifiers of his history, those which have determined him in the Other and for the Other.

So we can see that the psychoanalytic clinic, that of the symptom, as well as ethics, that of the psychoanalyst, connect the real with a saying. These are two heterogeneous sayings.

The saying of the analysand participating in the experience of the unconscious in the frame of the transference is directed towards a search for sense from which he awaits the resolution of “the truth being” of the symptom in a knowledge. What he will discover is the signification of a repetition that exhausts no sense and in which the real will be manifested as a missed encounter until it is revealed as its driving force. When belief in the effects of sense and the sense enjoyed in the analyzing *lucubration* falls, it is his ethics which comes into play in this encounter with the real. Is he disposed to give up the foundations of his fantasy, which have become the source of a harmful repetition inept at covering the radical lack in the Other?

In the cartels of the pass, one sometimes witnesses two forms of analysands’ testimonies: some continue to savour the proliferation of sense with the formations of the unconscious, leaving outside any surfacings of the real in the passages-to-the-act and in acting-out. These appear throughout the vicissitudes of their recounted histories. Others have localized, not without the horror of a knowing, the object *a* of their fantasy which they have placed in the analyst, gaze or voice; the latter falls then as agent for the subject supposed to know. The object of the oral or anal drive *jouissance* gives them being in their neurotic fantasies, which results in the enslavement in relation to the Other so as to maintain the Other without lack.

Still others to their credit testify to the real which their psychosis confronts them with, and of their subjective responses faced with that, sometimes with surprising successes of symptomatic invention, other times with a certainty following from an incontestably delusional conviction.

Some finally are stopped there and others not, because they testify to this pass to the real which transforms the traumatic into a cause for a desire of knowledge [*savoir*]. They surprise the cartel by the singular way in which a subject makes do with a *jouissance* outside sense and the relativity of the truth of his subject being. It will no longer occupy him in order to orient himself within the particular traces of his *lalangue*.

This is what Gracián evoked—and this cost him his incarceration by religious authorities—and from whom Lacan drew the ethics of “speaking well”. In relation to truth Gracián said that it will always be “about to give birth” (*de parto*) and in an ethic of “speaking well”, that of the “discreet”, it will never be completely born. At that time, a renowned author of the theatre of the *Golden Century*, Ruiz de Alarcón, with genius staged the subtleties of “The Lying Truth” (*La verdad mentirosa*),—I do not believe that Lacan read this work otherwise he would have cited it. Another Spaniard, no less lucid, the melancholic Goya subsequently illustrated how much “dreams of reason” engender monsters in claiming to produce truths, knowledge.

The monsters, we well know, are figures of fantasy, the ways that someone “has a feeling of being” the object of the jouissance of the Other and the manner in which it becomes horrifying. The modalities within which these figures leave scope for the saying of the analyst so that the analysand does not remain in these “imagarisations” of the real of his position as object of jouissance or that of its traumatic partners, is what is crucially at stake for the desire of the analyst. The desire of the analyst will be expressed by his saying and by his acts oriented to make the analysand leave this impasse.

Let us pick up what Lacan said in his seminar *Crucial Problems of Psychoanalysis*:

“... no end to the enigma of my desire is possible without this crossing through the object *a*. I heard, not so long ago, in one of my analyses, the term being employed there, in connection with someone for whom analysis did not seem to have been a great success from the point of view of personal qualities. ‘There are then’, said my analysand, making himself an objector for the occasion, analytic miscarriages!’ This expression rather pleased me. I would not have invented it. [...] In effect, there is a turning point of the analysis where the subject remains dangerously hanging from this fact of encountering his truth in the object *a*. He may remain there, and that one sees.”¹

It is at this crucial moment when the subject suffers from the reduction of his truth to object *a* which gave him being in his fantasy, it is there that the ethic of the analyst is really at stake. It is when there are almost no further already known signifying interpretations, putting the accent on the marks of the Other’s sayings to which the subject was fixated. How, in these crucial moments where the end of an analysis is at stake, that is to say the destiny of the analysand’s desire and jouissance, does the analyst operate efficaciously (or not) to have an impact on the position of the subject? Is it only a matter of

“personal qualities” or else how the analyst intervenes in relation to that position?

One would not know how to evaluate the analyst’s response in these crucial moments through the intermediary of the testimonies of the pass. I have tested it through the length of 12 passes recorded in the cartels in which I have participated until now: the failure of the pass to the analyst remains on the side of the passant, logically, except in those flagrant cases of fault on the part of the analyst of which the passant eventually testifies.

For that, the question which I wish to pose in this *Prelude* for our Rendezvous in Rio is the most difficult to examine because we do not have an answer: in what way can the saying of the analyst starting out from its relation to the real of the unconscious, to a real that is not of the clinic, operate on the different vicissitudes from which the analysand suffers the real of a jouissance; a jouissance not entering into his desire and producing the effect of a subjective satisfaction for this analysand?

In the lesson of the Seminar cited above, Lacan says: “the real is that which cannot not be”. A definition which does not resolve the specificity of the real that erupts in the current crisis of capitalism, and generates the “impossible to bear” for increasing sectors of the population, that is to say huge social symptoms. But Lacan has since clarified in *The Third*, the difference between the real such as it appears in the discourse of the master and that of the real of the symptom of a subject where his particular unconscious acts.

Each analyst must not cease to question himself on what makes him analyst: this singular and incalculable saying which weaves its responses in connection to a real which is presented in his patients in such different ways.

Madrid, 4 September 2011.

Translated by Esther Faye and checked by Leonardo Rodríguez

¹J. Lacan. Lesson of 16 June 1965, unpublished Seminar.