



Flying Papers N°7

Pass ♦ Ethics

Aperiodic bulletin of intercontinental and bilingual
school cartels

December 2025



Table of contents

Table of contents	2
Opening	3
Alejandro Rostagnotto \\ The expansion of the analytic act	6
Nicol Thomas \\ What does the analyst authorise themselves from?	11
Joanna Szymańska \\ In the game, alone...	20
Pedro Pablo Arévalo \\ Position of the analyst in the School and in the cure	26
Matilde Pelegrí \\ What place is there for enthusiasm in the analyst's position?	34
Carole Leymarie \\ Lacanian ethics	42
To be continued...	48

Opening

The CAOE, the College of Animation and Orientation of the School, is pleased to present the 7th electronic edition of the *Flying Papers*, intended for the circulation of the work of the "Intercontinental and Bilingual Cartels".

The *Flying Papers* seek to constitute a "space of resonance" within our School, based on the different individual productions of these cartels. In this 7th edition of *Flying Papers*, we publish the papers presented at the last *Half-day exchange between Intercontinental and Bilingual Cartels* of our School, which took place on 11 October via Zoom, and whose focus on this occasion was to consider the crucial issue of the relationship between the dispositif of the pass and the ethics of psychoanalysis: 'Pass ♦ Ethics'.

Some very important questions were raised, which encourage us to continue working. Among these, we can mention, from the first table: Of what does the psychoanalyst authorize himself of? What is this act, never defined before Lacan; the 'politics of the act' in the School as a 'form of ethical hospitality' for the "resonance" of 'what persists beyond the end'; the ethics at stake in the functioning of the School, especially in the difficult task, the responsibility of the AMEs, of appointing passeurs (and appointing passeurs whose

'passage' is not to the analyst's desire); and pointing towards the end as what would define a 'truly Lacanian' analyst. From the second: the position of the analyst in the School as 'inextricably linked to their position in the cure'; the 'ethical interpellation' linked to the question of enthusiasm in 'occupying the place of the analyst'; and the theme of ethics as that which 'we have in common in our School', specifically, 'Lacanian ethics' which 'points to *jouissance* in order to allow' the subject 'to continue desiring'.

We invite you to read it!

The CAOE cartels have effectively allowed new working links between the members of the EPFCL and have given an account of the diversity, local particularities, and ever-changing expansion of the Forums of the eight Zones of the IF, which are based on a single principle: the extension of the intension of psychoanalysis, that is, what maintains the very essence of the "analytic discourse in act in the treatments."

Making a cartel, committing oneself to this work, shows that a psychoanalyst takes "making School" seriously, contributing to the elaboration of a knowledge about the logical and ethical principle of that which "makes" an analyst capable of sustaining psychoanalysis.

We can say that, since the Founding Act, all cartels belong to the School and are open to all. However, the School cartels of the CAOE, which

are intercontinental and bilingual, invite School members to do precisely what they committed to when they enrolled as interested parties in the EPFCL and its insistence on its object. Let us recall the terms of the Guiding Principles for a School: for a member of the School, it is a “specific commitment that is not only a commitment to psychoanalysis in intension, but another ‘intension’ without borders.”

Our School is international and speaks multiple languages. Our exchange apparatus would not be possible without the willingness and enormous work of the teams of translators, to whom we are especially grateful. Certainly, our various experiences with AI translators make us appreciate their collaboration even more. Thank you!

— The College of Animation and Orientation of the school, CAOE: Dyhalma Ávila, Antonia María Cabrera, Rosa Guitart, Adriana Grosman, Gabriela Zorzutti, Karim Barkati, Mariana Severini.

Alejandro Rostagnotto \ The expansion of the analytic act

— “Wunsch: What have 20 years of the EPFCL pass taught us?” Cartel¹



Alejandro Rostagnotto. AME. Member of the Argentine Forum of the Lacanian Field, polo Mediterráneo.

The paper I am presenting comes from the experience of the cartel Wunsch —name that we share with the publication of our School—, integrated by Patricia Zarowsky, Camila Vidal, Sol Aparicio, Sandra Berta and the one speaking, Alejandro Rostagnotto.

The cartel was conformed around the theme the teachings of the pass, and its task consisted in a sustained reading of the AE's published articles in Wunsch between the years of 2004 and 2024. Parting from this experience, I can affirm that the wrings gathered in that publication constitute a resonance box of the expansion of the analytic act. In that echo of two decades the vibration of

¹ Patricia Zarowsky, Camila Vidal, Sol Aparicio, Sandra Berta, Alejandro Rostagnotto (Plus-one)

an ethic becomes audible, one that is written rather than said.

The expansion of the act

When the analytic act is consummated, it leaves expansive effects, that seek new ways of being said and of being inscribed. This resonance -that which persists beyond the end- constitutes, to my taste, the very matter of the expansion of the analytic act. It includes unprecedented ways of saying that were not present at the closure of the analysis, but rather they emerge from the encounter with the cartel; and this valid both for the pass and any other experience of cartel.

The cartel, inasmuch as collective experience, can be thought of as one of the privileged places where that expansion makes itself heard. And this not because of repeating the act —which would be impossible—, but because it hosts its effects. In each reading, in each conversation, something of the analytic saying is at play again. The cartel thus becomes in a space where the ethics realized in the act finds a way to prolong itself, of resonating, of becoming shared word.

Politics of the act / Politics of the School

This expansion does not happen by spontaneous generation. It supposes politics: a politic of the act, or, if you prefer, a politics of the School. This is about sustaining the conditions so that the

resonance of the act doesn't go quiet in the institutional automatisms. The School doesn't produce the act, but it can offer the field where its effects are transmitted. In this sense, the politics of the act is not an administration of knowledge, but rather a form of ethical hospitality: the way in which the School lets itself be affected by the echoes of the acts that give it foundation.

The constellation of ones

In the reading work of the cartel Wünsch, especially in the papers of the AE of our School we saw appear what we could call a constellation of singular experiences.

Each AE, when writing their itinerary, accounts for their own way of having resolved their case and of the consequences of such resolution for their praxis. In that plurality we verify that psychoanalysis is reinvented in each act. There is no model nor matrix that would unify them: there is a plurality of ones. This constellation does not form a closed set. It does not produce doxa nor a conceptual precipitate. It rather generates a disposition: a being forewarned, an opening to plurality. The reading of these testimonies does not leave accumulable knowledge behind; instead it leaves a sensibility, a disposition to the listening, a form of attention to detail that escapes all systematization.

It could be said that the cartel, far from unifying experience, it amplifies it. Each reading produces a new saying which, when inscribed and given to read, renews the field of psychoanalysis. That plural textile configures a historical map of the ways of thinking the act. The constellation of ones that emerges from that reading — a sort of Milky Way of desire— points, after all, to the fact that the School is not sustained in the unity of the One, but in the resonance of its differences.

The corporal experience of the reading

It is worth adding that the reading in the cartel transcends the intellectual exercise and what is configured is, above all, a corporal experience. In my own experience, the reading and the conversations provoke something closer to a resonance or vibration than comprehension. Affecting the body, displacing the usual criteria of intelligibility, opening a space for disposition. This affectation/affection —that moves rather than clarify— constitutes a sensite form of the politics of the act. It is not about understanding but rather going through it. the analytic act does not produce universals, but structure effects in singular bodies. The cartel, in this sense, prolongs the ethics of the act as corporal experience: a place where language continues its inscription.

Resonance and political condition

Perhaps the expansion of the analytic act, in the end, is about this: of the possibility for the ethics of the act to find its resonance in the bodies, in the readings and in the conversations that a School sustains. The cartel *Wunsch* —as its name indicates— its founded on desire. And it is in this shared desire, in this plurality of ones, where the most lively politics of a School makes itself heard: that of maintaining the field of the act open, there where desire insists in reinventing itself.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

Nicol Thomas \ What does the analyst authorise themselves from?

— “Analysis in the End” Cartel²

Nicol Thomas. Registered Practicing Psychoanalyst in Naarm/Melbourne Australia. Analyst Member of the School of the IF-SPFLF.

Thank you to the CIOS for inviting me to this event. I will speak about the cartel that I have been working in with Dyhalma Ávila-López, Radu Turcanu, Carolina Zaffore and Gabriela Zorzutti (in alphabetical order), and with thanks to the work of these cartelysands.

Our cartel has the working title of the f(x) of the AMS, and with the title of this panel, we are exploring questions of What does the AMS authorise themselves from? This presentation follows the lines of questioning that we have been working on, and as such is put together from the notes of the discussions of our cartel.

One of the fundamental tasks of the AMS is to be able to nominate passeurs. This then predicates that the AMS has the ‘know-how’ to do so.

² Dyhalma Ávila-López, Radu Turcanu, Carolina Zaffore, Gabriela Zorzutti, Nicol Thomas (Plus-one)

The passeur is nominated by an AMS who recognises something of the pass from analysand to analyst in the passeur, recognises something of the desire of the analyst. This moment, however, is not the same as the end of the analysis, as the production of the passeur (to be) is still under the transference in the analysis.

How to approach this question? we asked. We began with Freud's *Analysis: Terminable and Interminable* (1937) to orient what the end of an analysis means, and the difference of the end of an analysis between Freud and Lacan. For Freud, the end of analysis is the bedrock of castration, but with Lacan, there was something else. If the splitting of the ego as a defence is from an inadequate early decision, castration can only be an economic "cure" or end; what of that something that cannot come out from under repression? There is also a residue, something unanalysable that remains, the push of the drive. What is "uncurable" is linked to the primordially repressed matter that we don't access by way of analysis; this is the distinction between Freud's thinking and Lacan's.

This is also how Lacan formulates the register of the Real: that thing that evades domestication. Thus, can the cure ever end on a structural issue? With Lacan, the end is beyond the structure, beyond the phallus.

Lacan's reading of *Analysis: Terminable and Interminable* led him to think of the pass; is there a way to reach a degree of 'normality' in which the ego can deal with the drives and not let them be completely wild? Is there something more than mere therapeutics in the formation of an analyst? What is an experience of the unconscious, to speak the truth in two places at once without contradiction? If the symptom is the result of an inadequate early decision, then the symptom is a part of the self; it causes conflict and division, the speaking of which is what analysis traces. The speaking in analysis is an operation on knowledge, not just therapeutics. Thus, there is an ethical aspect of the symptom, which involves decision, position, a justification of its existence and resistance. The ending of an analysis involves that the symptom at the beginning is not the same at the end!

Lacan's question—what makes an analyst and where does the analyst come from?— introduces his invention of the Pass. Is there an adequate decision at the end? This adequate decision is what Lacan called "self-authorisation", which for the one who passes from analysand to the desire of the analyst, means also an interest in the psychoanalytic community and a will to work at the School of psychoanalysis. What is the experience and experiment of psychoanalysis? [In French, the word *experience* can be used for both "experience" and "experiment", but there is a

distinction between the two in English that we can utilise.]

In the Proposition of 1967, Lacan outlines the position of Analyst Member of the School; whereas the Analyst of the School proposes themselves, the AMS is proposed by their colleagues, what sort of “guarantee” does this hold? The AMS is the one responsible for nominating passeurs to hear the testimonies of the candidates for the position of AS. That means the AMS has been observed not only in their desire for the work and function of the School but also their capacity to recognise when a passeur is possible.

This leads us to recognize a powerful distinction between the *end* of an analysis and *a passage from analysand to analyst*. At the end of an analysis, the analysand has to make a logical demonstration of the experience of being under the operation of analysis that has come to an end-point; the symptom is not the same as it was in the beginning. The transference to the analyst is dropped for something new to emerge that has to do with desire rather than anxiety.

But the *passage from analysand to analyst* is not the same; and this is what the Pass is concerned with; why is there so much elaboration of the *end* when what the Pass is looking for is the trajectory of the analyst’s desire (which we know is not a

pure desire [Lacan 1964], whatever that purity is). These are two different moments.

The procedure of the Pass respects the logic of the structure of the analysis, and what the School can guarantee (maybe the only thing) is that an analyst be the production of their formation and self-authorisation.

So, the AMS function requires a know-how to do with this passage. The AMS does not have to do with the end of an analysis. AMSs are entrusted to designate what palpitates in the pass, which is an *experiment* which always involves a risk and an *experience* in which participants end up profoundly changed. This is why, even if there is no designation of AS, the *experience* of giving your testimony can result in a difference for the analyst's desire and orientation to the work of the School. In English the word "pass" is paired with "fail"; but even if there is a "failure" of "the pass", this is a trickery of words. The *experience* of the Pass is what counts towards the analyst's desire, an *experiment* concerning *experience*. It is not didactic.

How then, are the end and the Pass articulated? It is not of logical necessity that the analysis be finished to enter the Pass. Lacan devoted an entire Seminar to the Knowledge of the Analyst (1971-1972); what allows the analyst to authorise themselves? The analyst, as he says in the Italian Note (1973), will end up being nothing, refuse,

dropped by the analysand when the end occurs. So, what can the AMS know? That the passage is a moment and the Pass is an experience that has nothing to do with the analysis.

The nomination of a passeur by an AMS is an act, just as self-authorisation is an act. These acts are not passive. What is necessary for an act? From where does the AMS authorise?

This cartel raises the question of the space where this can be articulated amongst us. How do we understand the place of the being of the object cause of desire? How does the AMS designate the passeur? The Pass works “at your own risk” and it works because it is untameable, experience, experiment, subject by subject. How to speak about this without reducing the functioning of the AMS to a list of criteria?

This cartel also invites the question of in-tension and ex-tension in transmission of this dispositif. What should we do to bring about some animation to this transmission?

We also identify a problem; what function does the AMS have in ex-tension? The designation of passeur comes only via analyst and without demand; what happens when an AMS can identify a passeur in an analysand who has *no* desire to become an analyst and comes under the apprehension of a “cure” and has no interest in either Forums or the School?

Further, can we identify a difference between psychoanalysis in-tension and ex-tension, on the loose idea that analysis in ex-tension operates with the analysand who comes as a sort of refugee from psychiatry/psychology and doesn't want to have to do with the School of psychoanalysis? What of the function of the AMS when they recognise the passage in such an analysand? Analysis has an effect on all of its practitioners, analysand and analyst alike, but what does this mean for the School's dispositifs?

Given that the theme of the School this period is the Ethics of psychoanalysis and the others, is there a place for psychoanalysis with analysands who are not "in" the School to be included as "others"? Can this be seen as psychoanalysis in extension? What can be said of the ethics of the desire for analysis with this "other" in relation to the functioning of the School, in particular that of the responsibility of the AMS to nominate passeurs who have reached their own "passage" from symptomatic to where?

To conclude; this cartel has not yet finished working, but we so far have opened a question regarding the responsibilities of the AMS. There is a risk for the AMS, it is difficult to nominate passeurs. Foremost there is the time that it takes for an analysand to find their way to a passage to an other desire, a difference in position to their

symptom. To hurry this process surely cannot produce ethical results.

It may be the moment to take the opportunity for the AMS to speak; why and what of the function of AMS? Maybe there can be some new experience to transmit about the ethics of analysis and the others.

References

- Freud, Sigmund. 1937. *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*. In Freud, S. 2001. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume XXIII (1937-1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis and Other Works*. Trans J Strachey. London: Vintage, Random House. 209-253.
- Lacan, Jacques. 1964. "Seminar of 24 June 1964: In you more than you". In Lacan, J. 1998. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. Trans A Sheridan. London: WW Norton & Company. 263-276.
- Lacan, Jacques. 1967. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School" in *Analysis Number 6 1995*, Ed R Grigg et al. Trans R Grigg. Geelong: The Australian Centre for Psychoanalysis in the Freudian Field. 1-13.

Lacan, Jacques. Nd. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Knowledge of the Psychoanalysis 1971-1972.* Trans C Gallagher. From unedited French manuscripts.

Lacan, Jacques. 1973. *The Italian Note.* Trans S Schwartz.

Joanna Szymańska \\ In the game, alone...

— “The pass to the analyst” Cartel³



Joanna Szymańska. Member of the Polish Forum of the Lacanian Field since its foundation in 2010. Practising psychoanalyst since 2000. MA in English language and literature, and psychology.

To the interpretation that proves to be a fundamental tool in an analysis, as we know, Lacan adds in the period of the Baltimore conference⁴, the introduction of the analytic act. Interpretation brings with it the revelation, in

3 Maria Celia Delgado de Carvalho, Adriana Grosman, Gabriela Moreira, Leonardo Pimentel (Plus-one), Joanna Szymańska

4 J. Lacan, Baltimore Conference 1966: Regarding the structure as a mixture of Otherness, the sine qua non condition of absolutely every subject. In so much of the placing of the Other as a place, one asks where the subject is? You need to find the subject as a lost object. More precisely, this lost object is the support of the subject and in many cases, it is something more abject than we can consider, in some cases, it is something that all psychoanalysts, and many people who have done a psychoanalysis, know perfectly well. This is the reason why many psychoanalysts prefer to return to psychology.

different ways,⁵ of an S2. And it gives a significant meaning that we have a duty to interpret.

However, Lacan adds that "the act of the analyst is not without saying", a saying that has to do with jouissance. "The act happens through a saying, as a result the subject changes". A saying, then, that has nothing to do with meaning, but with the real.⁶

We agree that it is an act, that of the analyst, in which the analyst does not think. Lacan speaks of the analyst's word as an autistic word⁷.

Is the jouissance conveyed in a saying on the side of the analysand or the analyst in his act? One might ask whether, in the analytic act, the phantom of the patient is not necessarily taken into account. That in this act of the analyst, the jouissance of the analysand is involved, could only be said if it had an effect on the analysand. The subject in analysis in front of the analyst's act will not be the same after this act.

⁵ J. Lacan, Crf., L'etourdit, Autres écrits, Seuil Paris 2001: where Lacan produces a change of axiomatics in teaching, between that of desire that was based on the word addressed to the Other, while desire is placed among the signifiers and slips into the metonymy of the chain. The axiomatic of jouissance now prevails, of which the word becomes a vehicle. The unconscious becomes encrypted, written knowledge that houses jouissance and that must be encrypted when it is read.

⁶ J. Lacan, L'etourdit, Autres écrits, Seuil Paris, 2001, p.459: The reason lies in the fact that the analytic discourse concerns the subject, which, as an effect of signification, is the response of the real.

⁷ J. Lacan, L'acte psychanalytique, Compte rendu du séminaire 1967-1968. Autres écrits. Seuil. Paris 2001 p.375

These reflections were born in the light of a cartel in which we worked on the analyst's desire. A desire in which jouissance cannot be avoided.

From the moment I started thinking about what I was going to write for the "Flying papers", the analyst acts, and afterwards I thought, paradoxically, that the analyst did not think at the time.⁸ As is presumed in the specificity of his act.

Following a few sessions of an hysterical analysand, there is a moment of protest against her elderly father who is also her employer and who does not leave her much decision-making space at work. The man evidently will not leave his place to anyone, for reasons that I do not know as I do not know him. At the end of the session, we agree on a new appointment at such and such day and time. The young woman frequently asks for appointments for her sessions late at night for work reasons. When she asks me "is it okay at 20.00 on that day?", the analyst replies – "of course, I love my job!"

The young woman begins to laugh when she says, "I hope not like my father!" While she wrote the appointment on his cell phone.

I wait for her the next time at 20.00 and she does not come.... Then at 20.20 I send her a text asking her: "didn't we have an appointment at 20.00?"

8 J. Lacan, Seminar 15, The psychoanalytic act, lecture of 19 June 1968.

“No! I’ll check now”

Afterwards she writes to me that she had not written the appointment in her mobile phone calendar and that several times during the week she had searched for the time when she was supposed to come, but she could not find the appointment in her calendar.

When I called her, after her – “No!”, which was her first reply, she wrote that she had written the appointment on her mobile phone calendar but had not saved it.

I think that as an analyst, maybe my act was incorrect? Was it something of my own enjoyment, a passage to the act? Or a phantasmal desire of mine that made me believe in the existence of the sexual relation?

I take my question to supervision.

In supervision my question led me to ask myself whether I should charge for the session when the subject did not show up. Thinking does not always help the analyst... As we will see.

The supervising analyst asked me why the analysand shouldn't pay for the session which she did not attend. Why shouldn't the analyst charge her fantasy, for the time that she waited during her appointment and for what is almost certainly an *acting out*.

The subject expects a representation of himself from the Other and it is there where the word can be thawed. It is the act that brings out the usual broken record of repetition.

For the analyst, it was a surprise to propose a new session, which was almost immediately accepted. I am asking her the question, who didn't show up and what happened, when I ask her why she didn't come.

We know that the subject often denies the act, does everything, such as making a note on the mobile phone calendar of a new session, without saving it and then not finding it when she looks for it in the calendar, blinded by her fantasy.

The young woman cried inconsolably due to a furious quarrel with her father, where the struggle was steeped between issues of work and questions of the father's love for his daughter, since he is a father who is also her employer.

In the tears it turned out to be a sorrow, which made her cross the Rubicon ... "I don't want this legacy of violence that I received from my father! "I humiliated him myself."

It is there that I thought that the analytic act worked, a saying directed to other sayings, all that one says or does not say is the desire of the analyst, this is the logic that is given by saying. Not only did she pay for her session, but she also

commented, "I have to work on this, because it's something that costs me a lot."

So it is important to understand that saying orients the said, because the act has introduced an error that has allowed repetition to be broken.

Translation: Carmelo Scuderi

Pedro Pablo Arévalo \\ Position of the analyst in the School and in the cure

— “Position of the analyst” Cartel⁹



Pedro Pablo Arévalo. Psychoanalyst in Barcelona. AME, member of the Galician Forum of Psychoanalysis. Member of CIG 2023-2024. Organizer of the seminar 'The formation of the analyst, from Freud to Lacan', an activity of the Spanish-speaking community of the IF-EPFCL, registered with the Galician Forum of Psychoanalysis. Former member of the Forums of Venezuela, Pereira and Barcelona.

Thank you to the CIOS for the invitation, as a member of the cartel on the ‘Position of the Analyst’ that I share with Ana Alonso, Constanza Lobos, Miriam Pinho and Jorge Escobar. This brief text, although individual, benefits from the work of the cartel, especially the notes that my colleagues have generously provided me with.

This is the fifth Half-Day of Intercontinental and Bilingual School Cartels. The first was by call for proposals, the others by invitation. On various occasions and in various spaces, I have expressed my opinion that it is the cartels themselves that should decide whether or not to participate in any

⁹ With Ana Alonso, Constanza Lobos, Miriam Pinho, Jorge Escobar and Pedro Pablo Arévalo (plus-one).

event, in accordance with the idea of the cartel as the base organ of our School, as proposed by Lacan in *d'Écolage* (1980)¹⁰. For this reason, this kind invitation presented me with a dilemma. If I accepted it, I would be going against my position that it is the cartels themselves that should apply. If I rejected it, I would lose a unique opportunity to express this and to promote the work of the cartel. I decided to accept it and try to do so in a constructive way from an institutional point of view. We can see this as an example of a particular position of the analyst, of this analyst, towards the School. One that seeks to be consistent with the principles, without falling into unnecessary conflicts.

The organisers maybe are aware of my position, so it is very much in line with the ethics of our School to have extended the invitation. This is another position of the analyst, this time from a place in the hierarchy, one that does not seek to silence differences, but rather to enable open debate.

Both above positions are consistent with the ethics of psychoanalysis, which we know well leads to the fall of the Other at the end of the cure. It would not be consistent to promote in the School an automatic adherence to the decisions and positions of the organisational bodies, as if

¹⁰ Disponible en: <https://eolcba.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/b-Decolage-Lacan-1980-.pdf> (p.2)

these constituted an unbarred Other, while in the cure we would direct the analysand towards the destitution of the Other, in accordance with the end of the analysis we seek.

Thus, individually or within organisational bodies, the analyst takes a stance before the School and before the scattered and disparate, and consistency with principles is to be expected, one that must exist from *the moment the analyst authorises by himself, before some others*.

Lacan leaves us with numerous examples of positions taken within the School, several of which were of paramount importance. Playing with signifiers, what better example than the *1967 Proposition*, a true act with truly transcendental institutional consequences?

Of course, deviations can occur. For example, the analyst may position themselves as an S_2 , a master of knowledge, or as an S_1 , whose commands must be obeyed without question. Both positions lead to the One, both inconsistent with sustaining the discourse of the analyst in the cure. Another possible deviation would be to express a strong identification with a particular ideology, -political or otherwise, without excluding psychoanalysis, which can be taken as an ideology- something incongruous with the fall of ideals that comes with the end of analysis. Or to act institutionally prioritising one's own benefit, perhaps putting the cynical balance of an analysis

at stake. Or to turn psychoanalysis into a simple business.

In summary, it is clear that the position of the analyst in the School is inextricably linked to their position in the cure. It must be understood that analysands, in meetings at the institution or in other spaces, are outside the Freudian device, but not outside analysis. The unconscious never rests.

Now, we have referred to 'the' position of the analyst in the cure, as if it were unique. We can indeed say that the analyst as the semblance of the object cause of desire constitutes the fundamental position of the analyst in the cure. Although little is said about how to achieve this. One way to seek an answer could be to start from the desired effect: the desire of the analysand. That is, how can we get the analysand to desire, especially to desire in their analysis? Is it enough to remain silent and paralysed in action? That may work in some cases and on some occasions, but in general it does not. Effective interpretations, incisive questions, timely cuts, and sonorous silences are needed. Each analyst must invent their own way of being an effective semblance of the object of desire and not remain an inert disguise.

But let us return to the question: is this the analyst's only position? One need only recall instances of anguish or excessive enjoyment, for example, to cast doubt on this. Sometimes the

analyst must act as a therapist, even if that is not their fundamental role. But it is a different position. Perhaps there are others. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the position of the analyst is a transferential one.

Lacan constructs the notions of the discourse of the analyst and the analytical act, partly seeking to distance himself from the subjective connotations of the desire of the analyst. Do these constitute other positions? Certainly not. In the discourse of the analyst, the object *a*, cause of desire, is placed in the position of agent of discourse, addressing the divided subject, in order to isolate the master signifiers S_1 and elaborate a knowledge S_2 about the unconscious truth. It is clear that this is not another position, but rather its structuring based on the places and elements of the discourses. As for the analytical act, we can take it as another structuring, perhaps a deeper one, of the fundamental position, which, as Lacan points out in Seminar XVII (1969-1970), '*is essentially made up of the object *a**'.¹¹

There are other notions or signifiers that Lacan assigns to the analyst, and although these do not constitute different positions, they become elements to be taken into account in the exercise of the fundamental one. We have first, in the chronology of the cure, the subject supposed to

¹¹ Seminario XVII *El reverso del psicoanálisis*. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1992, p.45.

know, which is supported by transference and is a condition of analysis. More profound and crucial is the desire of the analyst. Although, as we said before, Lacan tries to distance himself from it, due to its subjective connotation, in reality he never completely abandons it. Thus, in the *Italian Note of 1974*¹², he speaks of a *desire to know*. And even towards the end of his long and monumental trajectory, in Seminar XXV, *The Moment of Conclusion* (1977-1978), he returns to the desire of the analyst, linked to the Freudian *Wunsch* - the longing, the demand - and to knowledge. '*That is surely why I have placed the emphasis on the desire of the analyst*,' says Lacan¹³.

Moving on to another notion, in his 1974 conference *La troisième*, Lacan argues that psychoanalysis is a symptom, from which it can be inferred that the psychoanalyst is also one. Negative transference seems to support this deduction, at least in its necessary but temporary nature.

Regarding the knotting function of the analyst, Lacan, in Seminar XXIII, *The Sinthome* (1975-76), states that psychoanalysis is not a sinthome, but that the psychoanalyst is¹⁴. Why is the

¹² "Nota italiana", en *Otros escritos*. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2012, p. 329.

¹³ Seminario XXV *El momento de concluir* (inédito). Clase 1, del 15 de noviembre de 1978. Disponible en: <https://www.psicopsi.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Lacan-Seminario25.pdf> y, en francés, en <http://staferla.free.fr/S25/S25.pdf>

¹⁴ Seminario XXIII *El sinthome*. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2008, p. 133

psychoanalyst a sinthome? Perhaps because where the nodal structure has been disrupted, where the sinthome has been disturbed, the psychoanalyst can be a substitute. Is it enough to be the semblance of the object cause of desire to be a sinthome? Good question...

Finally, let us mention the idea of the analyst as a poem, based on Lacan's aphorism in the *Preface to the English edition of Seminar 11* (1976): '*I am not a poet, but a poem. And one that is written, even though it seems to be a subject.*'¹⁵ What does Lacan mean, and how does this 'poem' articulate with the position of the analyst as the semblance of the object cause of desire? Another good question, which we will have to leave for another occasion.

I conclude with a brief reference to Rimbaud, in his poem *Conte*, written when he was about twenty years old¹⁶:

"Il voulait voir la vérité, l'heure du désir et de la satisfaction essentiels. Que ce fût ou non une aberration de piété, il voulut. Il possédait au moins un assez large pouvoir humain."

(Clase 9, del 13 de abril de 1976).

¹⁵ En *Otros escritos*. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2012, p. 600.

¹⁶ Rimbaud, A. (1886). "Conte". En *Iluminaciones*. Madrid: Visor libros, edición bilingüe, 8^a. edición, 2008. Available in English in: <https://allpoetry.com/poem/8541807-Tale-by-Arthur-Rimbaud>

"He wanted to see the truth, the hour of essential desire and gratification. Whether this was an aberration of piety or not, that is what he wanted. Enough worldly power, at least, he had."

Translation: Pedro Pablo Arévalo.

Matilde Pelegrí \\\ What place is there for enthusiasm in the analyst's position?

— “Italian Note” Cartel¹⁷



Matilde Pelegrí. Clinical psychologist-Psychoanalyst. Member of the Barcelona Psychoanalytic Forum. AME of the Lacanian Field Forum School. Member of the International Lacanian Field Forum. Teaching member of ACCEP (Clinical and Teaching Association of Psychoanalysis). Member of the Family Planning Professionals and Member of the Family Spaces Professionals.

Thank you to the CAOE for inviting me to participate in this Half-Day Poster Session. I am in the poster session ‘Italian Note’ with Juan del Pozo, Gladys Mattalia, Pedro Pablo Arévalo and Elynes Barros. We are reading Colette Soler's commentary on Italian Note and openly discussing each chapter, which has been very helpful for my presentation on enthusiasm.

Lacan, referring to the end of analysis, tells us in the ‘Italian Note’: “From that moment on, he knows that he is a reject. That is what analysis must at least make him sense. If he is not fired with enthusiasm for it, there may well have been

¹⁷ With Juan del Pozo, Gladys Mattalia, Pedro Pablo Arévalo (plus-one), Elynes Barros and Matilde Pelegrí.

an analysis, but not chance of an analyst." Lacan links enthusiasm with overcoming horror. What horror is he referring to? The horror of knowledge.

Two alternatives arise here: if knowing how to be a reject does not lead to enthusiasm, there was no analyst, there would have been analysis without an analyst, or if it does not lead to enthusiasm, it does not become an analyst. Can we think that many cures that we carry out, if enthusiasm does not appear, could be cures with an end but that the analysed does not become an analyst? Is there no desire on the part of the analyst? Do the analyst's enthusiasm and desire go hand in hand?

Knowing how to be a reject does not seem to be an easy thing. Knowing how to be already implies the perspective of a knowledge in the real that, when derived from wastefulness, becomes imbued with connotations. How can one be enthusiastic about wastefulness? And that this leads to enthusiasm and not to suicide is a greater enigma.

This enthusiasm is the subject's response to a 'touch of the real' that shakes their structure. It is a passion that arises from acquiring knowledge about one's own enjoyment and desire and the ability to convey it.

For the analyst, this enthusiasm is fundamental to the analytical cause. A psychoanalyst who does not possess this enthusiasm despite having undergone analysis has not fulfilled their role beyond the merely technical, as inferred from Lacan's saying.

But this enthusiasm at the end of analysis is not the same as that found in clinical practice, where we can observe a certain state of enthusiasm that emerges during the cure at moments of encountering castration or at the moment of traversing the fantasy, which the analysed sometimes expresses as liberation.

Is it perhaps a genuine enthusiasm that leaves its mark on the subject, marks that make it possible to recognise a loss in the mourning processes that he had to go through in order to conquer his desire?

Can this enthusiasm at the end produce enthusiasm for the pass, enthusiasm for learning more about clinical practice, enthusiasm for leading other analyseds to that end, or for writing, even writing a book or other different things? This enthusiasm does not always lead to the pass...

Colette Soler tells us in her book entitled "Lacanian Affects" that it is this enthusiasm that she takes as affection. She says that what matters is not 'the end of analysis in terms of knowledge,

but rather selecting according to the affective effect of that knowledge.'

Knowledge is related to *jouissance*; therefore the end of analysis related to knowledge has to do with ethics. The ethics of the analytical act is what allows us to correctly read what Lacan calls enthusiasm.

The conclusion that Soler draws in that part of the book is this: "to make an affection such as enthusiasm, beyond acquired knowledge, the sign of the analyst, is to indicate that the *Eureka* of knowledge is not enough, that it is underestimated and that the "unfathomable decision of being" in its contingency is brought to the fore. In other words, the analyst's desire – perhaps rare, to be distinguished from the desire to be an analyst, which is common – is not for everyone who is analysed."

Many psychoanalysts authorise themselves to be analysts before the end of their analysis, and conduct treatments. Are they analysts, without the enthusiasm that comes at the end of analysis?

Lacanian enthusiasm is the joy that accompanies the idea of the object *a* as the cause of desire, of the desire to know about the horror of knowing. We will not say that the Other is joyful, because it does not exist, but we can speak of enthusiasm on the condition that we place it in relation to

constructing and inventing a knowledge about one's own mode of jouissance.

With Lacan, we know that the non unwary err. In an analysis, the subject must be unwary of their unconscious in order to know something about their own fantasy. Analysing oneself implies that the subject does not allow themselves to be taken or carried away by reassuring or threatening words when they touch on the unknown. The analyst is there as the guardian of the void, as a partner of the drive, so that the subject can move from neurotic misery to ordinary misfortune.

If the purpose of analysis is to learn about castration, how can that knowledge be assumed as enthusiasm? "So much for enthusiasm, I can say an enthusiasm linked to the real, to what sustains when the touch of the real shakes the subject and he responds with an enthusiasm linked to gay knowledge, to his cause, linked to the knowledge he acquired in his passage from horror to knowledge to the desire to know and to know how to do with that..."

The key, it seems to me, lies in tying this know-how to 'that' and expressing it with the enthusiasm of transmitting knowledge, of a desire that is no longer anonymous.

How can one be enthusiastic about being a reject? What makes a subject enthusiastic about being a reject? Is there a crazy risk in being enthusiastic

about being a reject? Is there a jouissance? What jouissance is involved as an analyst? The enjoyment is the act itself? For example, the novelty of each case that comes our way, the unprecedented nature of which forces us to invent, the joy produced by an opening of the unconscious, even if it is fleeting. Lacan tells us in his Yale lecture, 'Being an analyst is very hard work and it is tiring work.' What about enthusiasm? Is it enthusiasm that allows the analyst to avoid reutilisation?

This raises several questions: Is there enthusiasm, joy in taking the place of the analyst? This question is an ethical challenge. From what place does the analyst operate? What does he seek in this work with the incurable, with excess and with transmission?

For Lacan, only those who desire to be analysts are analysts. But the consequence for those who have this desire is that they become rejects of humanity.

This statement retains, even today, the radical nature of its violence and all the force of its provocation: proposing a desire that leads to separation from humanity once one abandons oneself to it is certainly not something designed to encourage candidates for analysis.

Each of us has our own style in analytical practice, and style is a set of multiple heterogeneous

elements, a feature of our own analysis, a feature that comes from the enjoyment of the word we had, which was analysed and of which something remains...

We cannot be entirely analysts; we are not entirely analysts. And enthusiasm, is it not all enthusiasm?

It seems to me that this puts things into perspective a little and that this enthusiasm, this rebellion, this heresy, is what brings us here today. Otherwise, what are we doing here today? It is about finding enthusiasm each time. In that sense, it seems to me that enthusiasm is rebellion with a cause, that of psychoanalysis, and it does not leave us much time for boredom.

Colette Soler says in a lecture in Argentina in 2014, "Enthusiasm as an emotion that would put an end to the horror of knowing, the horror specific to each subject, distinct from the horror of everyone else".

"For Lacan, what transcends us on a secular level is precisely the real. It is the real that transcends us, that pierces us, and he believes that to be an analyst, the subject must have this ethical response, which is not to lament the real, even if it is an unpleasant real. It is not a pleasant real, but one that pierces us. And the condition for piercing the real is therefore this affection of enthusiasm."

We know that Lacan ultimately chose satisfaction. Enthusiasm has the same singularity as

satisfaction. The real is a singular real. The real of the unconscious is singular, and the affective response is singular.

Carole Leymarie \ Lacanian ethics

— “Lacanian Ethics” Cartel¹⁸



Carole Leymarie. Member of EPFCL-France. Member of the Steering Committee (2025-2028). Member of the Executive Committee (2021-2024). Secretary of the Bureau (2021-2022). Elected representative of Cluster 14 (2019-2020).

Our cartel is made up of Sonia Alberti (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), María de los Ángeles Gómez (San Juan, Puerto Rico), Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk (Warsaw, Poland), Francisco José Santos (Madrid, Spain) and ego (Paris, France).

From our initial exchanges, we agreed to work on the theme of ethics, which we feel is what we have in common in our School beyond borders, but we still had to figure out what we were putting behind this concept.

Our common question was to know what ethics became for Lacan between his 1959 seminar (Seminar on Ethics) and after the shift in 1975, that is, between ‘not yielding to his desire’ and ‘the

¹⁸ Sonia Alberti (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), María de los Ángeles Gómez (San Juan, Puerto Rico), Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk (Warsaw, Poland), Francisco José Santos (Madrid, Spain) and Carole Leymarie (plus-one) (Paris, France).

real of jouissance'. We had thought of titling our cartel 'From the ethics of desire to the ethics of jouissance in psychoanalytic practice,' but the title itself already provided answers to what we were going to question. Therefore, we have kept this broader title, 'Lacanian ethics.'

In order to work on the evolution of ethics in Lacan's teaching and its implications for the clinic, we started from our individual readings of Seminar VII, Ethics, and then studied Kant with Sade (written in 1962) step by step, a study that is still ongoing.

In this text, Kant and Sade, Lacan states from the outset that he will demonstrate that Sade's philosophy completes and 'gives the truth of Kant's Critique [of Practical Reason]'; we will try to understand how.

As you know, Kant, after attempting to answer 'What can I know?' in his Critique of Pure Reason, attempts in this work to answer the question 'What should I do?' Reason is not only on the side of knowledge, but also on the side of action and is based on a moral imperative:

'Act in such a way that the maxim of your action could become a universal law.' Anything that is of the order of pleasure extracted from action would devalue the action. For Kant, impulses and feelings would be of a pathological nature.

For his part, Sade, in his text written in the form of a dialogue, criticises institutions (religion, family, marriage) and moral law, which he sees as an obstacle to freedom and pleasure. The part of his text that Lacan prescribes us to read: 'Frenchmen, one more effort if you want to be republicans'; comes as a refutation of Kant's maxim, denouncing the limits of reasoning based on morality because it is itself induced by established norms.

In Kant with Sade, Lacan weighs Kant's repression of drives (for whom feelings and drives are pathological and hinder practical reasoning) against Sade's right to jouissance. In both cases, Lacan questions the matter of the enunciation. Which is the subject of the enunciation in these two maxims?

In Kant's statement, it is a moral imperative that comes from the Other (the big Other), Lacan tells us, and this is what Sade's text proposes in its denunciation of moral reasoning based on established norms.

In Sade's statement: "I have the right to enjoy your body, whoever may say what they will, and I will exercise that right, without any limit stopping me in the whim of the exactions I wish to satisfy in it." Lacan tells us that it is the freedom of the Other that is posed there as the subject of its enunciation and that this fantasy pushes the reader to come to terms with their own desire.

Sade, in essence, following Lacan, pushes us to question 'what does Kant want?'

Given that Kant considers the subject to be transcendental, seeking to separate himself from his affects, his statement does not take into account his own will. And because of this will of Kant himself, in wanting to find a morally acceptable action, he does not see what is at stake in it, that is, his own jouissance.

Sade's text thus reveals the truth of Kant's enunciation by exposing the jouissance that lies behind every moral principle. Lacan emphasises that in Kant there is indeed a divided subject, marked by the bar of the signifier, with his moral law, a law that gives sense to desire, but at the same time he emphasises that Kant does not take jouissance into account. And Lacan says: 'Desire, what is called desire, is enough to make life senseless if it produces a coward'. In other words, desire gives a sense to life and loses its sense when we have too cowardly a relationship with our desire. We could even go so far as to say that to lose the cause of desire is to lose oneself in jouissance. This is a proposal made by our cartel on the basis of Lacan's text in relation to our clinic.

In the rest of the text, Lacan points out that the limit of the Sadian position is that the 'executioner' himself is at the service of jouissance and that this jouissance springs forth again and

again. Or, to quote more poetically: "How far does Sade take us in the experience of this jouissance, or only of its truth?

For these human pyramids, fabulous in demonstrating jouissance in its cascading nature, these waterfalls of desire built so that it might iridesce the gardens of East with baroque voluptuousness, if it made it spring even higher into the sky, it would draw us closer to the question of what is dripping there." The question that arises then is to know what limits enjoyment. And Lacan answers this: it is the fantasy.

Let us take things in the other sense, because the Sadian fantasy would have us forget the inaugural subjective division. Entry into language introduces a limitation on jouissance. This limitation pushes us to constitute a fantasy that puts us in contact with the object cause of our desire (object a) that we seek in the Other. Now, all desire points to a gain in jouissance.

This text, Kant with Sade, announces the passage from "not giving in to one's own desire" to "the real of jouissance", which, it seems to us, does not cancel each other out, but rather complement each other.

In a cure, the subject who goes to an analyst comes with their symptom, which bothers them and to which they are nevertheless so attached. Lacanian ethics would be that which points to

jouissance in order to allow them to continue desiring. In other words, it is precisely that which causes their desire that the analysand must be able to scratch the contours of. The analysand, whatever their gender, history, or identifications, remains a subject of the unconscious, and whose analyst, by their act, not in the place of the Big Other but of a subject supposed to know, points to this point of the real that Kant seemed unable to confront.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

To be continued...

We thank the authors of these *Flying Papers No. 7* for their contributions and elaborations.

We invite all members of the School to continue to encourage the formation of new cartels, thus supporting this CAOE initiative that has yielded such valuable results, thanks to the working relationships forged in our community, beyond linguistic and geographical boundaries.

We remind them that they can send their proposals to the following email address:

caoe@champlacanien.net

The School's College of Animation and Orientation (CAOE) has the mission of encouraging the School's debate at an international level. This College is responsible for coordinating the activities and/or themes of the School's Seminars, initiating them where they do not yet exist, scheduling conferences, and, in short, making the School's work a reality at the international level.

The CAOE website is translated into the five languages of the IF:

FR

<https://www.champlacanien.net/public/1/epCAOE.php?language=1>

EN

<https://www.champlacanien.net/public/1/epCAOE.php?language=2>

ES

<https://www.champlacanien.net/public/1/epCAOE.php?language=3>

BR

<https://www.champlacanien.net/public/1/epCAOE.php?language=4>

IT

<https://www.champlacanien.net/public/1/epCAOE.php?language=5>

The IF website can be found at this address:

<https://www.champlacanien.net>

Edition in charge of: Dyhalma Ávila and Adriana Grosman, with the collaboration of Karim Barkati.