

Temptations of the analyst

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In our last International School Meeting I tried to advance into the question of the mis-recognition proper to the analytic practice: the systematic negation of the real at play in it. If the mis-recognition is the characteristic note of the analysis -mis-recognition of the symptoms, of the real, of the act- then we see in the fore the question about the defensive operations that this radioactive material of the analysis may provoke in the analysts.

An analysis begins by the “I don’t want to know” of the unconscious, and may conduce in some occasions to the horror of the act. The note persists, therefore, there is no cure of this real. It follows from it that this be not something “to stare at directly”, like the sun or death. However, this indomitably revulsive character seems to adopt at times politically correct costumes in the transmission, with their expected effects of seduction, fascination and sedation. The correct opinion – orthodoxy – is perhaps a melody that can be identified during certain moments in the schools of psychoanalysis. It is a contagious melody, that sticks, of the kind that cannot be but reproduced: a tempting and sticky hit. It can be recognised by its somniferous tones and the heaviness of its automatic and repetitive obedience. It does not wake up, it clams down, It doesn’t produce discomfort, it gives security.

Thus, paradoxically, orthodoxy could turn into another modality of the not wanting to know, in a defence against the anguish that the encounter with the heterity produces. Then, all heretics? This could yet be another way of the politically correct, extolling heresy as the correct way. The heresy of yesterday can be the orthodoxy of today. Probably the psychoanalytic orthodoxy that we recognise as such today proceeds from the elaboration, from the decanting of Freudian heresies, stripped away sufficiently from their uncomfortable elements. Perhaps we might be able to read in certain orthodoxy a defensive function, maybe it gives protection, refuge, and furthermore, this may be necessary at times. There may be then transmissions where this defensive piece weighs more than in others. I wonder then: what kind of a refuge is our School? What impact does this have in the *dispositif* of the pass? Wouldn’t the presence of conflict, of controversy, of the unexpected be the very thing that could pierce any confirmation of what is supposedly correct and expectable from an analyst?

Taking this grain, I believe that the debate regarding the possible convergence or identification between the end of analysis and pass over-dimensions the question of the end and in turn bring us out of focus regarding the conditions that lead to the passage from analyzand to analyst. There could have been a pass before the end, or afterwards. There can be an end of analysis and that there be no pass. Therefore this relation that is thought of in such tight terms, tends to mis-recognise the gap between the end of analysis and the pass. I propose to demonstrate it with a distinction that we find in Lacan and that I would like to underlie, regarding the knowing-how-to-do and knowing how to be a waste.

In 1976¹, Lacan defines the end of analysis as knowing how to do there with the symptom: “know how to untangle it, manipulate it”. But this knowing how to do concerns the end of analysis, not the advent of the desire of the analyst. Furthermore, that knowing how is not privative of analysis alone. In fact, in the XXIII seminar, the knowing how to do appears defined as “the art, the artifice, what gives the art of which one is capable a notable value²”. Lacan says of Joyce that he is a man of *savoir faire*, that is, an artist³, and sustains throughout the seminar the question of how did Joyce reached a notable status with his work, that is how did he manage to keep busy so many people? But Joyce didn't get there by way of

analysis. Therefore, this knowing how to do with the symptom is not something that would allow for the recognition of the analyst, we can also find it in the artist. There may be ends of analysis that would arrive to the knowing how to do there with the symptom, and even those who get there without analysis. That knowing how doesn't necessarily lead to the analytic act, it may end up in an artistic act. On another note, there is the question of the "notable value" of that knowing how, which opens the question of whether this notable status is convenient for the analytic practice, even when in terms of the recognition that an analyst could expect from his/her work.

I venture further into the proposed distinction; in the same seminar where Lacan leaves on the artist's side the matters of knowing-how-to-do and notability, he reserves for the analyst that knowledge that he had already characterised in 73: "knowing how to be a waste"⁴, necessary condition of possibility – although not sufficient- of the analyst's desire's emergence. I recall the terms in which he puts it: for Lacan it is about knowing how to be a waste parting from having sifted one's own cause of the horror to knowledge, and in addition, a note of enthusiasm. He makes of this the 'mark', the condition, that will be recognised in the analyst that runs the risk of undergoing the pass, and this not only for the analyst functionary that is authorised by himself. I say condition of possibility because it is not given that this knowing how to be a waste be coloured by enthusiasm. Lacan evokes the possibility of depression and in fact a difference should be made between knowing how to be a waste and identifying to the waste melancholically.

That *sicut palea* is renamed in '75 as "*ordure décidée*"⁵, convenient position for the analyst. On the side of the analyst then, knowing how to be a waste with decision and enthusiasm; parting from having been able to sift something of one's own cause of horror of knowledge. No question that nobody embarks on such a long and costly formation to end up like this! This proposal then unmarks itself from the 'ought to be' or the 'want to be', it does not travel those roads. In the beginnings of an analysis certainly the aspects linked to the ideals and 'the ought to be' are shed. It is my understanding that at the end of an analysis there also takes place a mourning, this time about what was believed that one wanted to be and that this would be achieved in the end.

With this I want to emphasise that the desire of the analyst dislocates from the 'wanting to be', that emergence is disruptive, deviated, even aberrant, according to the term of Lacan in *The knowledge of psychoanalysis*⁶. It is an emergence that seems to be produced rather as an ignored encounter, a surprise that awakens. Horror and awakening. Each analyzand counts on their own orthodoxy, the orthodoxy of their fantasy which gives them protection and safety. It is with regard to this authority principle of fantasy that a heretic deviation can come to happen insidiously. I proposed the conception of the *clinamen* for that effort of apprehension that the *dispositif* of the pass constitutes. *Clinamen*, infinitesimal deviation that changes the course of events inadvertently and irremediably. Does the *dispositif* of the pass allow to capture these imperceptible deviations that produce unexpected emergencies, those little heresies? Can the deviations that lead to the aberration of the desire of the analyst be detected? By which ways the propensity of an analysis can lead someone into the propulsion of the analytic act?

In a way it seems that the analysis produces sort of an accumulation of experiences regarding the waste, from the beginning and not only at the end. It begins with the symptom and the formations of the unconscious -which are in themselves heretic wastes of consciousness-, advances in the shedding of the fantastic orthodoxy, in the fall of the subject supposed to knowledge, it undoes the religious beliefs in the fathers, it strips off the love for truth and jouissance of meaning. It is a journey of wastes, of remains. In each meander of the analysis something of this experience of the waste appears. Will that experience be able to result in a knowledge, will it lead to depression, to enthusiasm? Where will the refuge be found now?

Taking the question of the desire of the analyst in this way of knowing how to be a waste conduces to another point of great importance for the quotidian functioning of the school: the one of compensations or recognitions that the analyst can expect, given this is not something that his analytic practice would furnish him necessarily. There is no recognition for the analytic act, there is mis-recognition. But analysts are also human beings, thirsty of *escabeau*. How to bear the castration of the *escabeau* that the position of the analyst requires? By which ways are certain compensations sought after? What politics is propitious for a school that claims not to be trapped in the narcissistic pregnancy, in the trap of competition, in the *escabeau* like transmissions? What would a politics that would point to redirect towards elaboration before the temptation of the analysts look like?

We await you in Buenos Aires, in the desire of a school that will not cease to cause effervescence.

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti

¹ J. Lacan, (1976-1977), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIV, L'insu que sait de l'une-bevue s'aile à mourre*. Inédito. Clase del 16/11/1976.

² J. Lacan, (1975-1976), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII*, Paris, Seuil, p. 61.

³ J. Lacan, (1975-1976). *Le séminaire. livre XXIII*, Paris, Seuil, p. 118.

⁴ J. Lacan, (1973), "Note italienne", *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

⁵ J. Lacan, (1975-1976), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII*, Paris, Seuil, p. 124.

⁶ J. Lacan, (1971-1972), *El saber del psicoanalista. Charlas en Sainte Anne*, inédito, clase del 1/06/72.